Antonio v. Moore , 174 F. App'x 131 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-6272
GABRIEL A. ANTONIO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
JAMES MOORE, Detective,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
LISA ZANDEL, Magistrate,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (CA-03-1560-1)
Submitted: January 18, 2006 Decided: March 9, 2006
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew W. Greene, SMITH & GREENE, P.L.L.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for
Appellant. Ara L. Tramblian, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY,
Arlington, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
2
PER CURIAM:
Gabriel A. Antonio appeals the district court’s decision to
dismiss his original complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and its subsequent denial of his
motions to vacate the dismissal and amend his complaint pursuant to
Rule 60 and Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
his original complaint, Antonio brought claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective James Moore and Magistrate Lisa
Zandel, asserting constitutional violations arising from the
application of unduly suggestive identification procedures and the
issuance of a defective arrest warrant during his underlying
criminal prosecution for robbery. Following the district court’s
decision to grant Detective Moore’s motion to dismiss the
complaint, Antonio moved for reconsideration and leave to amend the
complaint to add new factual allegations underlying his preexisting
claims and substantive due process claims. Because we conclude
that Antonio’s claims in his original and proposed amended
complaint fail to state a cause of action, we affirm the district
court’s disposition of these motions.
I.
On December 17, 2003, Antonio, an incarcerated prisoner acting
pro se, filed his original complaint in the Eastern District of
Virginia, asserting constitutional violations related to his
3
ultimate criminal prosecution for robbery. In substance, Antonio
alleged that Detective Moore violated (1) his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process by applying unduly and unnecessarily
suggestive out-of-court identification procedures; (2) his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during those identification procedures;
and (3) his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful
seizures by procuring an arrest warrant without probable cause
while investigating the robbery. Antonio further alleged that
Magistrate Zandel violated (1) his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unlawful seizures in issuing the warrant; and (2) his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by failing to provide the
factual basis on which she issued the warrant, thereby undermining
his ability to challenge the validity of the warrant on appeal.
In addition to setting forth these claims, the original
complaint stated that Antonio could not finish the complaint based
on his perceived time limitations. As such, he “submitted a motion
to Amend this complaint” and sought “time to amend it, and a
liberal time at that.” J.A. 13. The attached motion for leave to
amend the original complaint set forth Antonio’s belief that he
“may need” to amend his claims against the defendants, incorporate
other possible claims, add other defendants and other plaintiffs,
and amend his present claims. J.A. 23. Antonio also requested the
appointment of counsel and assistance in serving the original
complaint.
4
By order dated February 5, 2004 (“February 5, 2004 Order”),
the district court sua sponte dismissed (1) the claims against
Magistrate Zandel based on absolute judicial immunity; and (2) the
claims against Detective Moore without prejudice based on Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Antonio had not demonstrated
that he had obtained a favorable termination or vacatur of his
guilty plea to the robbery. The district court also denied as moot
Antonio’s pending motions for leave to amend the original
complaint, appointment of counsel, and assistance in serving the
complaint.
On February 11, 2004, Antonio moved for reconsideration of the
February 5, 2004 Order. In his motion, he admitted that he had
pleaded guilty to the robbery charge, but asserted that his Section
1983 claims did not implicate the validity of his plea. After re-
examining Heck, the district court vacated the February 5, 2004
Order on April 27, 2004. The district court permitted the claims
in the original complaint against Detective Moore to proceed, but
dismissed the claims against Magistrate Zandel as frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Upon Detective Moore’s subsequent motion to dismiss, however,
the district court dismissed the remaining claims in the complaint
by order dated January 25, 2005 (“January 25, 2005 Order”), which
is the subject of the present appeal. The district court concluded
that the due process claim failed to state a cause of action
5
because any tainted identifications flowing from the allegedly
suggestive identification procedures were not presented at trial.
The district court similarly found that Antonio’s Fourth Amendment
claim failed to state a claim because he had only challenged the
lack of specificity of the probable cause determination, rather
than the validity of the determination itself. However, the
district court did not explicitly rule on Antonio’s Sixth Amendment
claim.
Following the district court’s January 25, 2005 Order, Antonio
filed a second motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), seeking
to file an amended complaint. In requesting such relief, Antonio
primarily argued that he had refrained from submitting his amended
complaint because the district court had never ruled on his motion
to amend. Moreover, he claimed that his failure to submit a copy
of his proposed amended complaint to the district court stemmed
from his erroneous belief that he needed permission prior to doing
so. At that juncture, Antonio thus attached a lengthy, amended
complaint, which expanded on the factual allegations underlying his
preexisting claims in the original complaint. Antonio also added
two new claims against Detective Moore, alleging that Detective
Moore violated (1) his substantive due process right to familial
privacy by unduly influencing Antonio’s fiancé to abort their
child; and (2) his substantive due process right to privacy by
arresting him.
6
On February 28, 2005, the district court simultaneously denied
the motion for reconsideration and leave to amend the complaint
after finding that the amended complaint raised duplicative and
frivolous claims. Antonio now appeals the district court’s
decision to grant Detective Moore’s motion to dismiss, and its
decision to deny Antonio’s subsequent motions for reconsideration
and leave to amend his original complaint.
II.
A.
In reviewing the district court’s decision to grant Detective
Moore’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we apply de
novo review. Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th
Cir. 2005). In examining the sufficiency of the complaint, we
recognize that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Moreover, we accept as true all allegations in the complaint and
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Venkatraman, 417 F.3d at 420.
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B.
1.
The original complaint asserted that Detective Moore had
violated Antonio’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by applying unduly and
unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court identification procedures
outside the presence of Antonio’s counsel. Because Antonio had
ultimately pleaded guilty to the underlying robbery offense, the
district court dismissed these claims with prejudice, reasoning
that “there is no constitutional right to be free from a suggestive
lineup or photo array as long as the evidence is not used at
trial.” J.A. 89-90. We agree that, based on Antonio’s guilty
plea, dismissal was appropriate because the Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendments only protect the defendant against the admission of
unconfronted and unreliable identification evidence at trial.
The Supreme Court has recognized a panoply of Fourteenth
Amendment and Sixth Amendment protections in the context of illegal
confrontations, as set forth by a trio of decisions, United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263(1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), all decided the
same day. Wade declared that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
protects the accused from standing alone “against the State at any
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out,
where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to
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a fair trial.” Wade, 388 U.S. at 226. Armed with that principle,
the Court concluded that the defendant is entitled to counsel at a
post-indictment lineup based on the inherent vagaries of eyewitness
identifications and the need for adequate cross-examination at
trial. Id. at 236-37.1 Gilbert followed Wade by holding that the
admission of in-court identifications “without first determining
that they were not tainted by an illegal lineup but were of
independent origin [is] constitutional error.” Gilbert, 388 U.S.
at 272. Finally, Stovall stated that even where the defendant
could not avail himself of the protections of Wade or Gilbert, the
defendant could nevertheless attack his conviction based on a
confrontation that was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
1
In Wade, the Court was concerned with the overwhelmingly
prejudicial effect of admitting eyewitness identification
testimony, stemming from unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedures, against the defendant. Specifically, the Court stated
that “the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused
and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification
evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and
variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate
from a fair trial.” Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. Particularly where the
victim is the identification witness and the defendant is reluctant
to take the stand because of his criminal history, the “accused’s
inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that
occurred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity
meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness’ courtroom
identification.” Id. at 231-32; id. at 235 (“Insofar as the
accused’s conviction may rest on a courtroom identification in fact
the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused is
helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is
deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an essential
safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses against him.”).
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to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due
process of law.” Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.
The three decisions interlock to the extent that they
prescribe prophylactic rules excluding unconfronted or unreliable
eyewitness identification. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
112 (1977) (noting that the “driving force” behind Wade, Gilbert,
and Stovall was “the Court’s concern with the problems of
eyewitness identification”). Indeed, in Stovall, the Court
characterized Wade and Gilbert as only fashioning rules “requiring
the exclusion of identification evidence which is tainted by
exhibiting the accused to identifying witnesses before trial in the
absence of his counsel . . . .” Stovall, 388 U.S. at 294.
Similarly, the Court later described Stovall as “protecting an
evidentiary interest, and at the same time, as recognizing the
limited extent of that interest in our adversary system.” Manson,
432 U.S. at 113.
The evidentiary rules created in Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall
thus protect the defendant’s core right to a fair trial. See id.
at 112 (“Wade and its companion cases reflect the concern that the
jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects
of reliability.” (emphasis added)); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297 (“The
Wade and Gilbert rules are aimed at minimizing [the possibility of
conviction based on mistaken identification] by preventing the
unfairness at the pretrial confrontation that experience has proved
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can occur and assuring meaningful examination of the identification
witness’ testimony at trial.” (emphasis added)); Stovall, 388 U.S.
at 298 (“The presence of counsel will significantly promote
fairness at the confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the
issue of identification.” (emphasis added)). Because Wade and its
progeny simply shield the defendant’s right to a fair trial by
precluding the admission of unconfronted or unreliable
identification evidence, only the impairment of the defendant’s
core right--i.e., the right to a fair trial--is “actionable under
§ 1983.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir.
2000); Hensley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The
rule against admission of evidence from unnecessarily suggestive
lineups is a prophylactic rule designed to protect a core right,
that is the right to a fair trial, and it is only the violation of
the core right and not the prophylactic rule that should be
actionable under § 1983.”). In other words, unduly suggestive
identification procedures in the absence of the defendant’s counsel
do not, in and of themselves, implicate the defendant’s Fourteenth
or Sixth Amendment rights, as long as the tainted evidence obtained
is not used at trial. See Alexander v. City of South Bend, 433
F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Constitution does not require
that police lineups, photo arrays, and witness interviews meet a
particular standard of quality.”); Hensley, 818 F.2d at 648 (“[T]he
procedural safeguards established in Brathwaite and Stovall protect
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only against the admission of unreliable evidence at trial and [do]
not establish a constitutional right to be free of suggestive
lineups . . . .”).2
In this instance, Antonio pleaded guilty to the underlying
robbery charge, thereby foreclosing the possibility that
unconfronted or unreliable evidence could be presented at trial.
Moreover, Antonio merely alleged that Detective Moore engaged in
unduly suggestive identification procedures without indicating
whether, and to what extent, they impaired his right to a fair
trial. See Alexander, 433 F.3d at 555 (noting that even where the
plaintiff alleges that some witnesses exposed to the flawed
identification procedures testify at his trial, the plaintiff must
show “how those flawed procedures compromised the constitutional
right to a fair trial”); Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 1005 (6th
Cir. 1993) (finding no due process violation where plaintiff
2
Similarly, the Supreme Court has recently explained that the
prophylactic warnings prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), protect against violations of the Self Incrimination
Clause, which, in turn, “focuses on the criminal trial.” United
States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637 (2004). In concluding that the
Miranda rule is designed to protect the “core privilege of self-
incrimination,” the Court reasoned that the “police do not violate
a suspect’s constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by
negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with
the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda.” Id. at 638,
641. Indeed, potential violations of a defendant’s constitutional
rights “occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned
statements into evidence at trial.” Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the “complete and sufficient” remedy for a perceived
Miranda violation is the exclusion of such statements at trial.
Id. at 641-42 (internal citations omitted).
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alleged that evidence premised on impermissibly suggestive lineup
was introduced at his criminal trial but failed to assert any
violation of his right to a fair trial). Accordingly, Antonio’s
claims arising under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments fail to
state a cause of action and were properly dismissed.3
2.
The original complaint also asserted Fourth Amendment claims
arising from the arrest warrant’s alleged failure to record
Detective Moore’s oral statements to Magistrate Zandel and its
issuance without probable cause. The district court dismissed
these claims, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment permits
magistrates to rely on sworn, unrecorded oral testimony in making
probable cause determinations. We agree that dismissal was
appropriate.4
3
We also note that to the extent that Antonio identified
violations of his right to counsel occurring prior to the
indictment, these allegations fail to state a cognizable claim
because “the right to counsel does not attach until the initiation
of adversary judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gouveia, 467
U.S. 180, 188 (1987).
4
Antonio brought Fourth Amendment claims arising out of the
allegedly defective warrant against both Magistrate Zandel and
Detective Moore. Although Detective Moore argued in his motion to
dismiss that these claims could only apply to Magistrate Zandel,
who had already been dismissed from the case because of judicial
immunity, the district court nevertheless considered the merits of
the claims. On appeal, we need not decide whether these claims
could only be asserted against Magistrate Zandel because, in any
event, they lack merit.
13
“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment requires that
warrants (1) be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, (2)
contain a ‘particular[ ] descri[ption of] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized,’ and (3) be based ‘upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.’” United States
v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S. Const.
amend. IV). It is settled law in this Circuit that the “Fourth
Amendment does not require that the basis for probable cause be
established in a written affidavit; it merely requires that the
information provided the issuing magistrate be supported by ‘Oath
or affirmation.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Moreover,
“magistrates may consider sworn, unrecorded oral testimony in
making probable cause determinations during warrant proceedings.”
Id. (citing cases). Thus, for these reasons, Antonio’s primary
attack on the probable cause determination underlying the warrant--
i.e., that its failure to record Detective Moore’s statements to
Magistrate Zandel rendered it invalid--fails to state a cognizable
cause of action.
To the extent that Antonio otherwise challenges the probable
cause determination, his mere allegation that the arrest warrant
was issued “without probable cause” is too conclusory to pass
muster under Rule 12(b)(6). Although the “liberal pleading
requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain”
statement of the claim, the plaintiff must “offer more detail . .
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. than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type
against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, “[t]he
presence [] of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a
complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged
in the complaint do not support the legal conclusion.” Id. at 405
n.9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted and alterations
in original). By repeatedly asserting that the warrant was issued
“without probable cause,” without offering any factual allegations
underlying this legal conclusion, Antonio failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 8(a) or 12(b)(6). In the absence of any
factual basis for challenging the validity of the warrant, we must
therefore affirm the dismissal of Antonio’s Fourth Amendment
claims.
III.
A.
Turning next to Antonio’s motion for reconsideration, we
review a district court’s disposition of a Rule 60(b) motion for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 204
(4th Cir. 2003). Where the movant seeks to amend the complaint
following judgment, we first examine whether the district court
properly determined whether Rule 60(b) relief was appropriate, and
then address whether the district court abused its discretion in
15
disallowing the amendment under Rule 15(a). 6 Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1489 at 695 (2d ed. 1990); Peterson v. Air Pilots Ass’n, Intern.,
759 F.2d 1161, 1165 n.10 (4th Cir. 1985).
B.
Rule 60(b) permits a party to obtain relief from a final
judgment for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 15(a) provides, in relevant part:
A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend the party’s
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Generally, courts should grant leave to
amend in the absence of “bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing
party, or futility of amendment.” United States v. Pittman, 209
F.3d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
16
We perceive no error in the district court’s decision to deny,
simultaneously, the motion for reconsideration and the motion for
leave to amend based on the duplicative and frivolous nature of the
amended complaint. Even assuming that Antonio met the requirements
of Rule 60(b), he failed to satisfy Rule 15(a). First, the amended
complaint reiterated the same Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fourth
Amendment claims as set forth in the original complaint that were
properly dismissed. Second, the amended complaint failed to raise
any meritorious claims.5 In particular, Antonio asserted
violations of (1) his substantive due process right to familial
privacy arising from Detective Moore’s alleged influence over
Antonio’s fiancé, and (2) his substantive due process right to
individual privacy arising from his arrest. These claims would
both be subject to immediate dismissal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, the statutory screening provision within the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (“On review, the
court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or
any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
5
In his amended complaint, Antonio further alleged that
Detective Moore falsely told him that his fingerprints and license
plate number had been identified at the crime scene, and that
further, Detective Moore attempted to extract a confession from
him. However, Antonio instantly “refuted and repudiated” Detective
Moore’s statements and actions. J.A. 137. Thus, even assuming,
that Detective Moore’s actions implicated Antonio’s constitutional
rights, he has failed to allege any redressible injury.
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granted.”). Accordingly, the district court properly denied both
motions based on futility of amendment. See HCMF Corp. v. Allen,
238 F.3d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 2001) (proposed amendment was futile
where added claim was not legally cognizable); HealthSouth
Rehabilitation Hosp. v. American Nat’l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005,
1011-12 (4th Cir. 1996) (proposed amendment was futile because
allowing it would have “at most, delayed the inevitable dismissal”
of the plaintiff’s claims).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s disposition on
the motion to dismiss, motion for reconsideration, and motion for
leave to amend is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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