United States v. Jackson , 427 F. App'x 265 ( 2011 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4604
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TYQUAN JACKSON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.  Henry E. Hudson, District
    Judge. (3:09-cr-00352-HEH-1)
    Submitted:   April 7, 2011                    Decided:   May 3, 2011
    Before DAVIS and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
    Pratt, Mary E. Maguire, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
    Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.     Neil H. MacBride, United
    States Attorney, Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United
    States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Tyquan Jackson appeals his conviction and eighty-month
    sentence, following a jury trial, for possession of a firearm by
    a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006).
    On appeal, Jackson contends that there was insufficient evidence
    to sustain the jury’s verdict.            Finding no reversible error, we
    affirm.
    We review a district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 29 motion for acquittal de novo.                United States v. Reid, 
    523 F.3d 310
    , 317 (4th Cir. 2008).                   “A defendant challenging the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction bears a
    heavy burden.”            United States v. Beidler, 
    110 F.3d 1064
    , 1067
    (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).                          We will
    uphold a jury’s verdict “if, viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the government, it is supported by substantial
    evidence.”       Reid, 
    523 F.3d at 317
    .               Substantial evidence is
    “evidence     that    a     reasonable   finder     of   fact    could     accept   as
    adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”                United States v. Alerre, 
    430 F.3d 681
    ,    693        (4th   Cir.    2005)    (internal      quotation     marks
    omitted).      In resolving issues of substantial evidence, we do
    not    reweigh       the     evidence     or      reassess      the      factfinder’s
    determination        of    witness   credibility,        see    United    States    v.
    Brooks, 
    524 F.3d 549
    , 563 (4th Cir. 2008), and “can reverse a
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    conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the prosecution’s
    failure is clear.”            United States v. Moye, 
    454 F.3d 390
    , 394
    (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    To   establish      a   violation     of     
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1)
    (2006),    the   Government      must   prove     that:       (1)    Jackson       was   a
    convicted felon; (2) Jackson knowingly possessed a firearm; and
    (3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.                            See United
    States v. Gallimore, 
    247 F.3d 134
    , 136 (4th Cir. 2001).                        Jackson
    stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony and that the
    firearm traveled in interstate commerce.                   Thus, the Government
    only had to prove Jackson’s knowing possession.
    Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the Government, we hold that there was sufficient evidence
    from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
    that Jackson possessed a gun.                  The jury heard from a police
    officer who saw Jackson holding a gun, as well as from several
    other     officers      who     observed       Jackson’s       nervous        behavior,
    described his attempt to flee from them, and saw the gun at the
    scene.    Because we cannot say that the officers’ testimony was
    inherently improbable or incredible, we decline to reassess the
    jury’s credibility determinations.               See United States v. Close,
    
    349 F.2d 841
    , 848-49 (4th Cir. 1965).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We   dispense    with    oral    argument      because    the       facts    and   legal
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    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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