Pettis v. House of Ruth MD ( 2006 )

REDACTED OPINION
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-2443
TRICIA F. PETTIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
HOUSE OF RUTH MARYLAND, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (CA-03-
2498-RWT)
Submitted: July 15, 2005 Decided: August 11, 2005
Redacted Opinion Filed: March 6, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tricia F. Pettis, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Ellis Bers, Melissa
Menkel Shorey, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, L.L.P., Baltimore,
Maryland; Judith Anne Wolfer, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Tricia F. Pettis alleges that she was unlawfully
terminated by House of Ruth Maryland (“HORM”) due to her race in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), and the Prince
George’s County (Maryland) Human Relations Commission Act. Pettis
also claims her termination violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). The district
court granted summary judgment to HORM, and Pettis appealed.
Following our review of the record, we found no
reversible error and issued an opinion affirming the grant of
summary judgment in favor of HORM. Pettis thereafter filed a
motion seeking to have this court’s opinion placed under seal.
Upon careful consideration of the matter, we withdraw our original
opinion and reissue the opinion with sensitive information
redacted. In light of this disposition, we deny Pettis’ motion.
This court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo.
Higgins v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact, given the parties’ respective
burdens of proof at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986). In determining
whether the moving party has shown there is no genuine issue of
material fact, a court must assess the factual evidence and all
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inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id. at 255; Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth
Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1996).
Pettis first argues that the district court erred by not
giving preclusive effect to findings of fact by the Virginia
Employment Commission (“VEC”) made in connection with Pettis’ claim
for unemployment compensation benefits. Factual determinations
made in state unemployment claim proceedings receive no preclusive
effect in actions brought under federal statutes despite involving
the same operative facts. Ross v. Communication Satellite Corp.,
759 F.2d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “[A] judicial
determination by one administrative agency is not binding on
another adjudicator, which is seeking to determine an apparently
identical issue under a different statute . . . so long as there
exist substantial differences between the statutes themselves.”
Id. at 361-62 (internal quotations and citations removed). In
Virginia, an employer alleging misconduct as a basis for denying an
employee unemployment compensation benefits must show that the
employee deliberately and willfully engaged in conduct evincing a
complete disregard for the employer’s workplace standards and
policies. See Va. Code Ann. § 60.2-618 (Michie 2005); Branch v.
Virginia Employment Comm’n, 219 Va. 609, 249 S.E.2d 180 (1978). In
an action under Title VII, however, the standard is quite different
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because all the employer must do to meet its burden of production
is provide a lawful nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.
Because the legal standards are not identical, the findings of the
VEC cannot be given preclusive effect under Ross.
Pettis claims she was unlawfully terminated by HORM due
to her race in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
To survive summary judgment, Pettis must come forth with either
direct evidence of discrimination or establish a prima facie case
of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). Pettis submitted no direct evidence of racial
discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
termination under Title VII or § 1981, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was terminated; (3)
at the time of the termination, she was performing at a level that
met legitimate job expectations; and (4) she was replaced with a
similarly situated applicant outside the plaintiff’s protected
class. See King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003).
The parties do not dispute that Pettis, an African American, is a
member of a protected class, that she was terminated, or that she
was replaced with a similarly situated applicant outside her
protected class.
Pettis claims she was meeting HORM’s job expectations,
but has provided little evidence beyond her own opinion. An
employee’s “naked opinion” of her performance is not enough to
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establish a prima facie case of discrimination. King v. Rumsfeld,
328 F.3d at 149; Evans v. Technologies Apps. & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d
954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996). “It is the perception of the decision
maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.”
Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960-61
(4th Cir. 1996). HORM established that Pettis did not meet its job
expectations. Pettis failed to prove that she met the job
expectations of HORM and, therefore, failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.
Pettis also claims her termination violated the ADA. To
establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination under the ADA,
“a plaintiff must show that (1) she was a ‘qualified individual
with a disability’; (2) she was discharged; (3) she was fulfilling
her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of discharge;
and (4) the circumstances of her discharge raise a reasonable
inference of unlawful discrimination.” Rohan v. Networks
Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 272 n.9 (4th Cir. 2004). To
demonstrate she is a qualified individual with a disability, she
must show that she is significantly restricted in a major life
activity. Pollard v. High’s of Balt., Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 467 (4th
Cir. 2002). An impairment’s impact on a major life activity must
be “permanent or long-term.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). “[A] temporary impairment
. . . will generally not qualify as a disability under the ADA. An
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impairment simply cannot be a substantial limitation on a major
life activity if it is expected to improve in a relatively short
period of time.” Pollard, 281 F.3d at 468. Pettis failed to
demonstrate that she qualified for a disability.
Pettis claims that HORM violated the confidentiality
provisions of the ADA, which generally prohibit an employer from
discriminating against an individual by requiring medical
examinations or making inquiries regarding the nature and extent of
an employee’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000). The ADA
“permits employers . . . to make inquiries or require medical
examinations necessary to the reasonable accommodation process.”
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.14(c). The information sought by
HORM about Pettis was permissible and did not violate the ADA
confidentiality requirements.
Pettis claims HORM fired her in retaliation for
exercising her confidentiality rights under the ADA. Pettis did
not include this claim in her EEOC complaint; therefore, no
administrative investigation was conducted on this claim.
Therefore, because the scope of Pettis’ complaint exceeds the
limits set by the allegations of her administrative complaint, we
cannot analyze the merits of Pettis’ retaliation claim. See
Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132-33 (4th
Cir. 2002).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting HORM’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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