United States v. McMillion , 175 F. App'x 588 ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4764
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    CHARLES L. MCMILLION, SR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Beckley.  David A. Faber, Chief
    District Judge. (CR-04-191)
    Submitted:    January 19, 2006               Decided:   April 6, 2006
    Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Matthew A. Victor, VICTOR, VICTOR & HELGOE, L.L.P., Charleston,
    West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, Acting United
    States Attorney, Monica L. Dillon, Assistant United States
    Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Charles L. McMillion was convicted in the Southern
    District   of   West   Virginia     on   six     counts   charging    him   with
    conspiracy    from    December   13,     2001,    to   October   9,   2003,    to
    distribute at least 80 grams of oxycodone, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    ; distribution of oxycodone on October 8, 2003, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1); distribution of oxycodone on
    October 9, 2003, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1); aiding and
    abetting possession with intent to distribute oxycodone on October
    9, 2003, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    ;
    use of a firearm on October 8, 2003, in furtherance of a drug
    trafficking crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A); and
    possession of two firearms on October 9, 2003, in furtherance of
    a   drug   trafficking     crime,      in   violation     of     
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(C).        The district court sentenced McMillion to 51
    months’ imprisonment for each of Counts One through Four, to be
    served concurrently; a consecutive mandatory 5-year sentence for
    Count Five; and a consecutive mandatory 25-year sentence for Count
    Six.   McMillion appeals on various grounds, none of which we find
    meritorious.    Accordingly, we affirm.
    First, McMillion contends that the district court erred
    in not granting his motion to suppress evidence that was seized
    pursuant to a search because the warrant did not issue from a
    state “court of record,” as required by Federal Rule of Criminal
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    Procedure Rule 41(a).        He contends that the state search became a
    federal       search   because   of   a    telephone    call      from   state   law
    enforcement officers to an assistant U.S. Attorney seeking advice
    and that the state magistrate was not a “court of record.”
    Following a hearing, the district court concluded that Rule 41(a)
    was not applicable because the search was not “federal in nature”
    inasmuch as federal officers were not directly involved.                         See
    United States v. Smith, 
    914 F.2d 565
     (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
    denied, 
    498 U.S. 1101
     (1991).             We agree with the district court
    that there was no evidence of federal direction or approval of the
    search, let alone any prior intention by federal prosecutors to
    take over the case.
    Second, McMillion contends that the district court erred
    by imposing two consecutive sentences -- one for 5 years and one
    for 25 years -- for convictions on Counts Five and Six under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)   (stating       that   in   case   of    a   “second   and
    subsequent conviction under this subsection,” the defendant shall
    “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25
    years”).        McMillion contends that the “second and subsequent
    conviction” provision of § 924(c)(1)(C) does not apply here
    because Counts Five and Six were linked to a single underlying
    predicate offense involving drug trafficking.                 McMillion's theory
    is that § 924(c)(1)(C) can only be triggered if there are separate
    and distinct underlying predicate offenses.                  In this case, there
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    were separate offenses for drug trafficking on October 8, 2003,
    and October 9, 2003, the dates on which the firearms offenses were
    committed.    But even if the single conspiracy offense is taken as
    the   predicate       drug   offense,     we    have    held    that     "consecutive
    sentences under section 924(c)(1) are appropriate whenever there
    have been multiple, separate acts of firearm use or carriage, even
    when all of those acts relate to a single predicate offense."
    United States v. Camps, 
    32 F.3d 102
    , 106 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
    added); see also United States v. Lucas, 
    932 F.2d 1210
    , 1221-23
    (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that "each separate use of a firearm in
    relation    to    a    violent    crime    or    drug       trafficking       crime   is
    punishable    under     section    924(c)       regardless      of     whether   other
    section     924(c)     charges    are     related      to    the     same    predicate
    offense").    Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's
    imposition of consecutive sentences for Counts Five and Six.
    Third, McMillion contends that the district court erred
    in denying his motion for acquittal based on insufficient evidence
    as to Counts Two and Five. After reviewing the record, we find
    that the government produced sufficient evidence on which a
    reasonable jury could have convicted McMillion beyond a reasonable
    doubt.     That evidence included McMillion’s confession and the
    testimony    of   a    police    informant.         Although       the      informant’s
    testimony was contradicted by other witnesses, the jury was
    entitled to weigh the credibility of the witnesses in reaching its
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    own conclusions.       See United States v. Wilson, 
    118 F.3d 228
    , 234
    (4th Cir. 1997).
    Finally, McMillion contends that he was denied due
    process because the jury, which rendered its verdict in less than
    forty minutes, did not adequately deliberate about the charges
    against him. Aside from the brevity of its deliberations, however,
    there is no evidence that the jury failed to weigh all the
    relevant evidence in making its determinations. See Segars v.
    Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 
    286 F.2d 767
     (4th Cir. 1961) ("A
    short period of deliberation by a jury before returning a verdict
    does not establish the proposition that the jury did not properly
    perform its duties") (quoting Patten v. Newton, 
    159 A.2d 809
    , 810
    (N.H. 1960)).
    Finding no merit to his assignments of error, we affirm.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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