Bowens v. Cannon ( 2006 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-7625
    HERBERT T. BOWENS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    AL CANNON, Charleston County Sheriff; DOCTOR
    PIENNING, Correct Care Solutions; NATIONAL
    COMMISSION OF HEALTH CARE,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
    (CA-05-2396)
    Submitted:   March 15, 2006                 Decided:   April 12, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
    curiam opinion.
    Herbert T. Bowens, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Herbert T. Bowens appeals the district court’s order
    accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing
    without prejudice his action filed under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (2000),
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) (2000).*          We affirm in part,
    vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
    Bowens alleged that defendants acted with deliberate
    indifference to his serious medical needs and failed to protect him
    from an attack by another inmate.      We have reviewed the record and
    find no reversible error in the district court’s dismissal of the
    failure   to   protect   claim    or   of    the    claims    of   deliberate
    indifference   arising   before   Bowens      had   surgery   on   his   hand.
    Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief on these claims for the
    reasons stated by the district court.               See Bowens v. Cannon,
    No. CA-05-2396 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2005).
    With regard to Bowen’s claims that the medical defendants
    acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
    post-surgery, we review de novo the district court’s dismissal of
    those claims for failure to state a claim.           De’Lonta v. Angelone,
    
    330 F.3d 630
    , 633 (4th Cir. 2003).          A court “should not dismiss a
    complaint for failure to state a claim unless after accepting all
    well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and
    *
    This order is a final, appealable order over which we have
    jurisdiction. See Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 
    415 F.3d 342
    ,
    344-45 (4th Cir. 2005).
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    drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the
    plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot
    prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to
    relief.”   Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 
    407 F.3d 243
    , 248 (4th
    Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Bowens alleged that medical personnel failed to properly
    clean and dress the surgical wound, failed to issue the prescribed
    antibiotics, and caused him to miss follow-up appointments at the
    hospital by failing to arrange for transportation.              Taking these
    allegations as true, we find that Bowens alleged facts sufficient
    to state a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical
    needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 834 (1994) (discussing
    standard); Martinez v. Garden, 
    430 F.3d 1302
    , 1305 (10th Cir. 2005)
    (“Knowledge of [plaintiff’s] medical condition, coupled with the
    alleged failure to inform him of medical appointments or to arrange
    transportation, may give rise to an inference that defendants acted
    with deliberate indifference.”); Gil v. Reed, 
    381 F.3d 649
    , 661-62
    (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that defendant’s unexplained refusal to
    dispense   prescribed     medication    to   treat   serious    infection   at
    surgical   wound   site    created     genuine   issue   of    material   fact
    regarding defendant’s state of mind).
    Accordingly, we vacate this portion of the district
    court’s order and remand for further proceedings.               We recognize
    that “[d]eliberate indifference is a very high standard--a showing
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    of mere negligence will not meet it.”             Grayson v. Peed, 
    195 F.3d 692
    , 695 (4th Cir. 1999).            But, without at least the aid of a
    response by the defendants, we cannot rule on the present record
    and, therefore, we express no opinion on the ultimate disposition
    of Bowens’ claims.       We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts   and   legal    contentions     are    adequately   presented    in   the
    materials     before   the   court    and     argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED
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