Thomas v. Polk , 176 F. App'x 377 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-7
    JAMES EDWARD THOMAS,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    versus
    MARVIN L. POLK, Warden,       Central    Prison,
    Raleigh, North Carolina,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.   Malcolm J. Howard,
    District Judge. (CA-99-503-5-H-HC)
    Argued:   March 16, 2006                    Decided:   April 17, 2006
    Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit
    Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Chief Judge Wilkins wrote the
    opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Duncan joined.
    ARGUED: Ann Elizabeth Groninger, PATTERSON HARKAVY, L.L.P.,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Porter Babb, Sr.,
    Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert
    E. Zaytoun, ZAYTOUN & MILLER, P.L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina,
    for Appellant. Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    WILKINS, Chief Judge:
    James Edward Thomas appeals an order of the district court
    denying his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction
    and death sentence for the murder of Teresa West.1       See 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2254
     (West 1994 & Supp. 2005).         We affirm the denial of relief.
    I.
    The facts may be briefly stated.         Thomas moved into the Sir
    Walter Tourist Home in Raleigh, North Carolina, in early 1986.
    While living there, he befriended Teresa West, the manager of the
    home.       In June of that year, Thomas moved to Cary, North Carolina
    with his fiancee, Sandy Jordan.      On the evening of June 13, Thomas
    borrowed a friend’s car and drove to the tourist home to visit
    West, who had told Thomas she had some heroin (Thomas was a heroin
    addict). After unsuccessfully seeking to acquire cocaine to inject
    along with the heroin, Thomas proceeded to West’s room, where he
    injected the heroin.       He also dissolved and injected some pills
    West gave him.
    According to Thomas’ trial testimony, West, who was only
    partially clothed, confronted him and demanded sex. Thomas refused
    on the grounds of fidelity to Jordan and inability due to the
    heroin. West attempted to start an argument, at which point Thomas
    1
    Thomas named Marvin Polk, the Warden of Central Prison in
    Raleigh, North Carolina, as Respondent. For ease of reference, we
    refer to Respondent as “the State” throughout this opinion.
    2
    claims he passed out.    When he awoke, West was dead; Thomas fled
    the apartment.     West’s body was found with a telephone receiver
    inserted into her vagina.    The forensic expert who performed the
    autopsy testified that West was strangled manually and with a pair
    of pantyhose and that the insertion of the telephone receiver
    probably occurred post-mortem.
    Thomas was charged with, and convicted of, first-degree murder
    and first-degree sexual offense. See 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-17
    , 14-
    27.4 (2005).     The murder conviction rested on both premeditation
    and the felony murder rule, with the underlying felony being the
    first-degree sexual offense.    The jury sentenced Thomas to death.
    On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Thomas’
    convictions but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing
    on the basis of McKoy v. North Carolina, 
    494 U.S. 433
    , 435 (1990)
    (holding that North Carolina jury instructions improperly required
    juror unanimity as to mitigating factors).     See State v. Thomas,
    
    407 S.E.2d 141
    , 146-55 (N.C. 1991).   Thomas was again sentenced to
    death, and this sentence was affirmed.     See State v. Thomas, 
    477 S.E.2d 450
     (N.C. 1996), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 824
     (1997).
    Two attorneys were subsequently appointed to represent Thomas
    on post-conviction review.     On February 4, 1998, these attorneys
    filed a two-page motion for appropriate relief (MAR) raising a
    claim relating to Thomas’ first sentencing hearing.   The MAR judge
    denied the motion on June 9 without requiring a response from the
    3
    State and later denied a motion to vacate the denial.   Thereafter,
    the Office of the Appellate Defender moved to have appointed
    counsel replaced on the basis that “they have failed to competently
    and conscientiously represent their client.”       J.A. 602.   This
    motion was granted, and new counsel were appointed.     New counsel
    moved to vacate the order dismissing the MAR and to allow the
    filing of a new MAR; this motion was denied.        In August, new
    counsel moved to compel discovery pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
    § 15A-1415(f) (2005).2     The court denied the motion on the basis
    that Thomas’ MAR had already been denied when discovery under
    § 1415(f) was requested.
    The North Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari review
    “for the limited purpose of remanding ... for reconsideration ...
    in light of this Court’s opinion in State v. Bates, 
    348 N.C. 29
    ,
    
    497 S.E.2d 276
     (1998).”      State v. Thomas, 
    526 S.E.2d 475
     (N.C.
    1998).    The MAR court reaffirmed its previous order on the basis
    that Bates, which involved only the scope of § 1415(f) and the
    proper respondent to a discovery motion under the statute, was
    inapplicable to the procedural question of whether a request for
    2
    Section 1415(f) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he
    State, to the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the
    capital defendant’s counsel the complete files of all law
    enforcement   and  prosecutorial   agencies   involved  in   the
    investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the
    defendant.”
    4
    discovery could be granted after an MAR had been filed and denied.3
    The North Carolina Supreme Court thereafter denied certiorari. See
    State v. Thomas, 
    539 S.E.2d 7
     (N.C. 1999).
    Thomas    then    filed    this     federal   habeas   petition.      As    is
    relevant here, Thomas claimed that the jury charge with respect to
    the felony murder count was unconstitutional and that trial counsel
    were constitutionally ineffective.             The district court denied the
    former    claim   on   the     merits    and   found   that    the    latter    was
    procedurally      defaulted.       The    district     court   then    granted    a
    certificate of appealability as to the felony murder claim, and we
    expanded the certificate to include the ineffective assistance
    claim.
    II.
    We first consider Thomas’ challenge to his conviction.                Prior
    to trial, Thomas requested an instruction on the felony murder
    charge that would have required the jury to find that West was
    alive at the time of the sexual offense.                    Thomas argued that
    because North Carolina law defined a first-degree sexual offense as
    a sexual act committed “against the will of the other person,” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4
    (a)(2), the offense could only be committed
    3
    Thomas asserts that Bates “held that a defendant who, like
    petitioner, was denied discovery because his MAR was already
    denied when he requested it, was in fact entitled to discovery.”
    Br. of Appellant at 5.    We discern no such holding in Bates,
    however.
    5
    while the victim was alive and thus had a “will” that could be
    overborne.      Otherwise,     Thomas         argued,     the    offense    was   the
    misdemeanor act of desecrating a corpse, which could not support a
    felony     murder   conviction.         The      trial     court      refused     this
    instruction, and instead instructed the jury that “it makes no
    difference whether the intent to commit ... a sexual offense was
    formulated before the use of force or after it, so long as the
    elements of ... sexual offense occur under circumstances and in a
    time frame that you find to be a single transaction.”                     J.A. 324.
    On    direct   appeal,    Thomas         argued    that    the   evidence     was
    insufficient to support his felony murder conviction because the
    evidence established only that the insertion of the telephone
    receiver into West’s vagina occurred after her death.                      The North
    Carolina    Supreme   Court    rejected        this     claim,    concluding      that
    “[b]ecause    the   sexual    act   was       committed    during     a    continuous
    transaction that began when the victim was alive, we conclude the
    evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
    first-degree sexual offense.”        Thomas, 407 S.E.2d at 149.
    Before this court, Thomas argues that the instruction given by
    the trial court was unconstitutional because it allowed the jury to
    convict him even if the sexual offense was a mere afterthought to
    the murder, thereby violating the constitutional principle that
    “only true involvement in a murder while perpetrating a felony
    shall put a defendant in jeopardy of his own life.”                   J.A. 826; see
    6
    Enmund v. Florida, 
    458 U.S. 782
    , 798 (1982) (holding that the
    imposition of the death penalty on a felony murder theory violates
    the Eighth Amendment when the defendant was a minor participant in
    the underlying felony and “did not kill or intend to kill”).4                We
    may not grant relief on this claim unless the decision of the North
    Carolina Supreme Court affirming Thomas’ felony murder conviction
    “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
    clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
    Court.”       
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2254
    (d)(1).          A state court decision is
    “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent in either of two situations:
    (1) when “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
    governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) when “the
    state       court   confronts   a   set    of   facts   that   are   materially
    indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
    nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]
    precedent.”         Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 405-06 (2000).         A
    state court decision rests on an “unreasonable application” of
    clearly established Supreme Court precedent when “the state court
    identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]
    Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the
    facts of the prisoner’s case.”            
    Id. at 413
    .   The Supreme Court has
    4
    It is not clear that Thomas raised this particular claim on
    direct appeal. However, because the State does not assert that
    the claim is defaulted, we will consider it on the merits. See
    Royal v. Taylor, 
    188 F.3d 239
    , 247 (4th Cir. 1999).
    7
    made clear that the phrase “clearly established Federal law”
    “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme]
    Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court
    decision.”   Id. at 412.
    Although Thomas cites numerous decisions of the Supreme Court
    concerning the necessary level of culpability for the imposition of
    the death penalty, none of these cases held, or even intimated,
    that the Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty
    when, although part of the same transaction, the underlying felony
    occurs after the death of the victim.     We therefore affirm the
    rejection of this claim by the district court.
    III.
    We now turn to Thomas’ claim concerning the ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel.   In his second MAR, Thomas sought to
    raise a claim that trial counsel were constitutionally defective
    for failing to present substantial amounts of information about
    Thomas’ horrific childhood.    Cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 
    539 U.S. 510
    ,
    524-29, 534-38 (2003) (holding that counsel were constitutionally
    deficient, and petitioner was prejudiced, by counsel’s failure to
    investigate his background).    The MAR court concluded that this
    claim was defaulted because it was not raised in Thomas’ first MAR.
    See N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1419(a)(1) (2005).
    8
    Absent cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, a
    federal habeas court may not review constitutional claims when a
    state court has declined to consider their merits on the basis of
    an adequate and independent state procedural rule.           See Harris v.
    Reed, 
    489 U.S. 255
    , 262 (1989).           A procedural rule is adequate if
    it is regularly or consistently applied by the state court, see
    Johnson v. Mississippi, 
    486 U.S. 578
    , 587 (1988), to cases that are
    procedurally analogous, see McCarver v. Lee, 
    221 F.3d 583
    , 589 (4th
    Cir. 2000). Adequacy does not require “an undeviating adherence to
    [the] rule admitting of no exception” so long as the rule is
    consistently applied “in the vast majority of cases.”             Mueller v.
    Angelone, 
    181 F.3d 557
    , 584 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).        Furthermore, we necessarily look only to the
    period    prior   to   the   time   the    defendant   violated   the   state
    procedural rule; decisions applying or declining to apply a state
    rule after that time are irrelevant in determining whether the rule
    was consistently applied at the critical time.              See Meadows v.
    Legursky, 
    904 F.2d 903
    , 907 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
    Section 1419(a)(1) has repeatedly been held by this court to
    be an adequate and independent procedural rule.           See Bacon v. Lee,
    
    225 F.3d 470
    , 476 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing cases).5          Indeed, we have
    5
    We ultimately concluded in Bacon that there was “some doubt”
    as to whether the North Carolina Supreme Court consistently
    applied § 1419(a)(1) when the MAR court had granted a motion to
    reconsider its denial of a previous MAR. Bacon, 
    225 F.3d at 477
    .
    Because Thomas’ MAR was never reopened, Bacon is not controlling.
    9
    held that § 1419(a)(1) is an adequate state rule in a case
    presented in precisely the same procedural posture as Thomas’,
    namely, when a claim raised in a second MAR was ruled defaulted on
    the basis that it was not raised in a previous MAR even though the
    petitioner asserted that the failure to raise the claim earlier
    stemmed from counsel’s ineffectiveness.            See Boyd v. French, 
    147 F.3d 319
    , 331-32 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1998).
    Thomas acknowledges this, but argues that the North Carolina
    courts do not consistently apply § 1419(a)(1) to situations when
    counsel is ineffective in a first MAR.                 As support for this
    proposition, Thomas cites three cases: State v. Tucker, 
    545 S.E.2d 742
     (N.C. 2000), in which the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed
    the   filing   of    a   second    MAR   after   counsel     admitted   that   he
    “deliberately sabotaged” his representation of the petitioner;
    State v. Pinch, Nos. 80-CRS-16429, 16430, slip op. at 4 (N.C.
    Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2005), in which a second MAR appears to have
    been allowed on the basis of decisions of the United States Supreme
    Court, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(c)(2) (2005); and State v.
    Walker, Nos. 92-CRS-20762, 70920, slip op. at 4-5 (N.C. Super. Ct.
    Nov. 30, 2004), in which the trial court stayed the petitioner’s
    execution on the basis that the petitioner had established a
    likelihood     of   success   on   certain    claims   and    that   failure   to
    We conclude that the limited remand ordered by the North Carolina
    Supreme Court is not sufficient to bring this case within the
    ambit of Bacon.
    10
    consider his claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
    justice, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(b)(2) (2005).
    Not only were all of these cases decided after Thomas’ second
    MAR was defaulted, they also are not procedurally analogous to
    Thomas’   situation.          In      Tucker,    counsel     admitted      that     he
    deliberately sabotaged his client’s case on post-conviction review.
    And, both Pinch and Walker involved claims of a statutory exception
    to the general bar of § 1419(a)(1), something that Thomas does not
    claim here.     Additionally, Pinch is currently the subject of a
    petition for certiorari with the North Carolina Supreme Court.
    Thomas    raises     two     additional     arguments    to    support      his
    assertion that his ineffective assistance claim should not be
    defaulted under § 1419(a)(1).             Although Thomas failed to raise
    these arguments in the district court, we will nevertheless address
    them briefly. First, Thomas maintains that a procedural bar should
    not be applied when it would be grossly unfair to do so.                          See,
    e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 
    534 U.S. 362
    , 376, 382-85 (2002) (“There are
    ...   exceptional     cases      in   which     exorbitant    application      of   a
    generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop
    consideration    of    a    federal     question.”).         There    is    nothing
    inherently unfair, however, about requiring that all available
    grounds for relief be raised in a petitioner’s first MAR.                          See
    McCleskey v. Zant, 
    499 U.S. 467
    , 493 (1991) (“[T]he doctrines of
    procedural default and abuse of the writ are both designed to
    11
    lessen the injury to a State that results through reexamination of
    a state conviction on a ground that the State did not have the
    opportunity to address at a prior, appropriate time; and both
    doctrines seek to vindicate the State’s interest in the finality of
    its criminal judgments.”).
    If there is any unfairness in the application of § 1419(a)(1)
    to Thomas’ second MAR, it is that the attorneys who were first
    appointed     to   represent    him    on   post-conviction     review    were
    deficient.     Thomas raises this as his second contention, claiming
    that    the   ineffectiveness   of    his   first   MAR   counsel   should    be
    “imputed to the State,” thereby providing cause for the default.
    Coleman v. Thompson, 
    501 U.S. 722
    , 754 (1991) (internal quotation
    marks    omitted).     Attorney      ineffectiveness      constitutes    cause,
    however, only when the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
    counsel, which it does not do in post-conviction proceedings.                See
    
    id. at 752-53
    ; Mackall v. Angelone, 
    131 F.3d 442
    , 449 (4th Cir.
    1997) (en banc).
    IV.
    For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the denial of
    habeas relief by the district court.
    AFFIRMED
    12