United States v. Boyd , 429 F. App'x 233 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5159
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALISON LEVON BOYD, a/k/a Alyson Levon Boyd,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (1:08-cr-00493-MJH-1)
Submitted: May 2, 2011 Decided: May 17, 2011
Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand,
United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United
States Attorney, Allison W. Smith, Third Year Law Student, WAKE
FOREST UNIVERSITY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alison Levon Boyd entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006), reserving the right to
challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
the firearm seized during the search of his car. Boyd claims he
did not give his consent to search the car and even if he did,
his consent was not voluntary. * We affirm.
On appeal from a district court’s denial of a
suppression motion, factual findings are reviewed for clear
error and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. See United
States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 553 (4th Cir. 2007). Although
the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches,
the general requirement for a warrant does not apply where valid
consent to the search is given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Buckner, 473 F.3d at 553-54. “Consent to
search is valid if it is (1) knowing and voluntary and (2) given
by one with authority to consent.” Buckner, 473 F.3d at 554(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Whether a
defendant’s consent to a search is voluntary is a factual
question determined under the totality of the circumstances and,
*
Boyd does not challenge on appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress the statements he made after
the gun was seized.
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accordingly, is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49; United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d
529, 533 n.* (4th Cir. 2004).
While the Government has the initial burden at a
suppression hearing to prove that consent was freely and
voluntarily given, Buckner, 473 F.3d at 554, when a suppression
motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. United States v.
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). This court gives
due regard to the district court’s opportunity to judge the
credibility of witnesses and does not review credibility
determinations. United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th
Cir. 1995). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in determining that Boyd voluntarily consented to
the search of his car.
The district court’s finding that Boyd gave his
consent to search the car, based on the testimonies offered by
two police officers, is not clearly erroneous. Likewise, there
was no clear error in the court’s finding that Boyd’s consent
was given voluntarily. The court found no credible evidence
that Boyd was coerced or threatened to give consent or that he
was unable to provide consent.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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