United States v. McNeil , 429 F. App'x 333 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4976
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    COREY LAMONT MCNEIL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
    District Judge. (1:09-cr-00399-TDS-1)
    Submitted:   April 25, 2011                   Decided:   May 19, 2011
    Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
    for Appellant.   Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Robert A.
    J. Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Corey      Lamont     McNeil      appeals      his     conviction     after    a
    jury   trial      and   seventy-four-month             sentence      for    one   count    of
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006).                      McNeil raises two claims
    of   error    on    appeal:       that   insufficient            evidence   supports      his
    conviction; and that the district court imposed a substantively
    unreasonable sentence.            We affirm.
    I.    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    “A     defendant       challenging            the    sufficiency      of     the
    evidence faces a heavy burden.”                      United States v. Foster, 
    507 F.3d 233
    , 245 (4th Cir. 2007).                      We review a sufficiency of the
    evidence challenge by determining whether, viewing the evidence
    in   the    light   most     favorable         to    the   government,      any   rational
    trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.                United States v. Collins, 
    412 F.3d 515
    , 519 (4th Cir. 2005).                We will uphold the jury’s verdict if
    substantial evidence supports it and will reverse only in those
    rare cases of clear failure by the prosecution.                               Foster, 
    507 F.3d at 244-45
    .         We    do    not    review      the    credibility     of     the
    witnesses and assume that the jury resolved all contradictions
    in the testimony in favor of the government.                        
    Id. at 245
    .
    2
    To        support       a    conviction           for     being      a        felon    in
    possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1), the government must
    prove the following elements:                  “(1) the defendant previously had
    been   convicted        of     a    [felony];          (2)     the    defendant           knowingly
    possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or
    affecting       commerce,          because        the       firearm      had     traveled          in
    interstate       or     foreign         commerce        at     some     point        during       its
    existence.”           United       States    v.       Moye,    
    454 F.3d 390
    ,       394,    395
    (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).                   McNeil does not contest that he has
    been   convicted        of   a     felony     or      that     the    firearm        in    question
    traveled in interstate commerce.                        He argues instead that there
    was insufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm.
    The        gravamen         of    McNeil’s          argument        is        that    his
    conviction was based entirely on an in-court identification made
    by   Detective        Raymond       Laird     of      the     Forsyth    County           Sheriff’s
    Office.      McNeil’s conviction was predicated on his sale of a
    firearm to Laird, who was operating in an undercover capacity.
    Laird had never met McNeil before the firearm sale, and twelve
    months had passed before Laird was shown three photographs of
    McNeil    and     asked      to      confirm          his     identity     as    the        seller.
    Accordingly, McNeil argues, the identification is not reliable
    and the district court should have granted his Fed. R. Crim. P.
    29 motion for a judgment of acquittal.
    3
    As    McNeil   points   out,   we    have   cautioned   district
    courts to be mindful of the reliability problems that may arise
    when     the        government’s   factual    allegations     hinge    on   the
    identification of a single witness, especially in circumstances
    where significant time has lapsed from the alleged crime to the
    first identification and where no full line-up was conducted.
    See United States v. Holley, 
    502 F.2d 273
    , 274-75 (4th Cir.
    1974).    Our review of the record, however, leads us to conclude
    that the district court did not err in denying McNeil’s Rule 29
    motion.
    First,     other    circumstantial     evidence    corroborated
    Laird’s identification.            McNeil’s girlfriend testified that at
    the time of the transaction, she lived with McNeil at the very
    apartment where the transaction took place, and McNeil drove a
    burgundy van similar to the one from which detectives saw the
    suspect emerge prior to the sale.                  In addition, the district
    court cautioned the jury to be mindful of the means of the
    witness identification.            Nevertheless, the jury found Laird’s
    identification credible, and we decline to disturb that finding
    on appeal.
    4
    II.     Sentence
    McNeil next argues that the district court imposed an
    unreasonable         sentence          because      the        sentence    was      greater     than
    necessary under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2006).
    We    review        a    sentence         for     reasonableness         under    an
    abuse-of-discretion standard.                       Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).             This review requires consideration of both the
    procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence.                                        
    Id.
    First,    we     must          assess    whether         the     district      court     properly
    calculated          the    Guidelines          range,          considered        the    § 3553(a)
    factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
    sufficiently explained the selected sentence.                              Id. at 49-50; see
    United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n
    individualized            explanation         must       accompany        every     sentence.”);
    United    States          v.    Carter,       
    564 F.3d 325
    ,     330   (4th Cir. 2009)
    (same).     An extensive explanation is not required as long as the
    appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district court] has
    considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
    exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”                                      United
    States v. Engle, 
    592 F.3d 495
    , 500 (4th Cir.) (quoting Rita v.
    United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007)), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 165
          (2010).            If    the    sentence          is    free    of      significant
    procedural          error,         this        court           reviews     the         substantive
    5
    reasonableness of the sentence.                   Lynn, 
    592 F.3d at 575
    ; United
    States v. Pauley, 
    511 F.3d 468
    , 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
    McNeil does not allege the sentence was procedurally
    unreasonable.             We      therefore         analyze      the      substantive
    reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the
    circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its
    discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied
    the   standards     set       forth    in    § 3553(a).”        United       States   v.
    Mendoza-Mendoza, 
    597 F.3d 212
    , 216 (4th Cir. 2010).                          We presume
    on    appeal     that     a    sentence      within     a     properly       calculated
    Guidelines range is reasonable.                    United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
    We have reviewed the record, and conclude that McNeil
    has not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness accorded to
    his within-Guidelines sentence.                  The court carefully articulated
    its rationale for the sentence it imposed.                      We agree with the
    district court’s conclusions that a within-Guidelines sentence
    served the goal of deterrence and protection of the public and
    was   appropriate       because       of    the    serious    nature     of    McNeil’s
    offense.
    We    therefore       affirm      the    judgment    of    the     district
    court.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions      are    adequately         presented   in     the    materials
    6
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    7