United States v. LaChance , 223 F. App'x 237 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4007
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RAYMOND R. LACHANCE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District
Judge. (CR-04-427-SB)
Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: April 5, 2007
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James A. Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF JIM BROWN, PA, Beaufort, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Hayden Bickerton, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Raymond R. LaChance, Jr.,
pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and a quantity of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (Count One), and
possession with intent to distribute and distribution of a quantity
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2000)
(Count Two). The district court sentenced LaChance to 276 months’
imprisonment on Count One and a concurrent 240 months’ imprisonment
on Count Two. LaChance timely appealed. Counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that in his opinion there are no meritorious grounds for appeal,
but questioning whether the district court erred in determining
LaChance’s sentence. LaChance filed a pro se supplemental brief
asserting additional claims.
LaChance first argues that United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), requires a sentencing court applying the advisory
federal sentencing guidelines to make fact findings beyond a
reasonable doubt. This assertion is without merit. See United
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, ___, 2007 WL 314102, at *7 (3d Cir.
Feb. 5, 2007) (en banc) (collecting cases). Additionally, LaChance
contends that the Confrontation Clause should apply to the district
court’s consideration of information in the presentence report that
increased his guideline sentence. In Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation
Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial statements that are
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not subject to cross-examination. Id. at 50-51. Several circuits
have held that Crawford did not make the Confrontation Clause
applicable at sentencing. See United States v. Katzopoulos, 437
F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d
1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614,
618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 671 (2005); United States
v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243-44 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1086 (2006). In light of these decisions, we conclude that
LaChance’s position is without merit.
We have thoroughly reviewed the issues raised in
LaChance’s pro se supplemental brief and find they do not warrant
relief. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm LaChance’s conviction and sentence. LaChance’s
pro se motion for substitution of counsel is denied.
This court requires that counsel inform LaChance, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If LaChance requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on LaChance.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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