United States v. Pilson ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4733
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DANIEL RYAN PILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4736
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DANIEL RYAN PILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4737
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DANIEL RYAN PILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4931
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TED EVAN DOUGHTY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4932
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TED EVAN DOUGHTY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4933
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
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TED EVAN DOUGHTY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill and Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour,
District Judge. (0:04-cr-01033-MBS; 3:05-cr-00944-MBS; 0:05-cr-
00393-MBS)
Submitted: April 11, 2007 Decided: May 21, 2007
Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina; Kenneth M. Mathews, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellants. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, C. Todd
Hagins, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Daniel Ryan Pilson and Ted
Evan Doughty appeal their convictions and sentences for three
counts of bank robbery and one count of conspiracy to escape.
Pilson contends the sentence was not reasonable because the
district court failed to discuss the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000)
sentencing factors, imposed a sentence greater than necessary, was
unaware it could order a variance sentence and considered improper
information in imposing the sentence. Doughty contends the court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty
plea. We affirm.
We review a sentence to determine whether the district
court correctly calculated the advisory guideline range and has
considered the range, as well as the factors set out in § 3553(a),
and whether the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). A sentence within the properly
calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006).
Pilson does not argue that the sentencing guidelines’
range of imprisonment was not correct. Thus, we find the sentence
within the guidelines was reasonable. The district court is not
required to list through the § 3553(a) factors. See United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[r]equiring
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district courts to address each factor on the record would . . . be
an exercise in unproductive repetition that would invite
flyspecking on appeal.”). We further find no evidence the court
was unaware it could impose a variance sentence given that Pilson’s
career offender status was arrived at as a result of convictions
for minor offenses. We further find no evidence the court
considered information outside the PSR in imposing sentence.
With respect to Doughty, we review the district court’s
refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir.
1996). When considering whether to allow such a withdrawal, a
six-factor analysis is applied. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d
245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). Under Moore, a district court considers:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his
plea was not knowing and voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has
credibly asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has been
a delay between the entry of the plea and the filing of the motion;
(4) whether the defendant had close assistance of competent
counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the
government; and (6) whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court
and waste judicial resources. Id. Although all the factors in
Moore must be given appropriate weight, the key to determining
whether a Rule 32(e) motion should be granted is whether the Rule
11 hearing was properly conducted. United States v. Puckett, 61
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F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). We closely scrutinize the Rule 11
colloquy and attach a strong presumption that the plea is final and
binding if the Rule 11 proceeding is adequate. United States v.
Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992).
We find no error in the Rule 11 proceeding. After
reviewing the transcript, we find no evidence that Doughty’s plea
was not voluntary and knowledgeable. We further find he failed to
assert his actual innocence. We find the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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