United States v. Denkler , 232 F. App'x 336 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4781
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
PHILLIP DANIEL DENKLER, a/k/a George Austin,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00264-D)
Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: July 10, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Devon L. Donahue,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Phillip Daniel Denkler pled guilty to interstate
transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual
activity, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(a) (West Supp. 2006) (Count One), and
interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle, 18 U.S.C. § 2312
(2000) (Count Two). He received a sentence of 360 months
imprisonment on Count One and a concurrent sentence of 120 months
on Count Two. Denkler appeals his sentence, arguing that (1) the
district court erred in considering the victim’s statement to a
federal agent because it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability
to support certain fact findings that affected the sentence, see
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3(a), p.s. (2005); (2) the
district court clearly erred in finding that the victim’s ability
to appraise or control the situation was substantially impaired
after Denkler gave her vodka to drink, USSG § 2G1.3, comment.
(n.5(B)(I)); and (3) the district court abused its discretion by
departing upward pursuant to USSG § 4A1.3, p.s., on the ground that
criminal history category V substantially under-represented the
seriousness of his criminal history. We affirm.
In August 2005, after serving an eight-month custodial
sentence for taking indecent liberties with a thirteen-year-old
girl, and then violating probation, Denkler began serving six
months electronic house arrest in Rocky Mount, North Carolina.
Within a few days, using the name “George,” he had somehow come in
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contact by telephone with a twelve-year-old girl, who told Denkler
she wanted to leave home. On August 25, 2005, driving a car he had
stolen from a former roommate, and in possession of a credit card
stolen from his mother, Denkler picked up the victim.
On August 30, 2005, Denkler left the victim at a bus
station in Des Moines after helping her call her grandparents from
there. The victim told her grandparents that “George” had forced
her to have intercourse multiple times. At a local hospital, the
victim described the sexual contacts she had with Denkler to local
authorities and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, and
identified him from a photographic line-up. She told investigators
that Denkler had threatened to kill her if she did not have sex
with him, and when she refused to perform oral sex on him, he
choked her until she nearly passed out to make her comply. The
victim said Denkler refused to let her call her grandparents during
the trip. She told the FBI agent that Denkler slapped her and
pulled her hair and made her drink a glass of vodka. She also said
Denkler told her that, if he went to jail because of her, he would
kill her when he got out, and that he would kill her if she was
pregnant with his child and had an abortion or gave up the child.
The results of the medical examination were not made available
to the investigators or, later, to the court, and investigators
were not able to obtain independent evidence that Denkler used
force or threats with the victim because she had showered and had
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been swimming since the last time she and Denkler had intercourse,
and the motel room where the last intercourse occurred had been
cleaned.
Denkler was arrested on September 1, 2005, in Colorado.
He told authorities that he and the victim had consensual
intercourse several times during the trip, but denied using force
or threats. He said that, on the first night they spent in a
motel, they had drunk vodka together, after which the victim got
“wild” and they had intercourse.
After Denkler’s guilty plea, the probation officer
calculated the offense level for the sex offense under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.3 (2005) (Transportation of
Minors to Engage in Prohibited Sexual Contact with a Minor).
Denkler had 9 criminal history points, which placed him in criminal
history category IV. However, because he qualified for sentencing
as a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors, see USSG
§ 4B1.5, he was placed in criminal history category V. The
recommended advisory guideline range was 168-210 months
imprisonment.
With advance notice to the parties, the district court
decided to apply a cross reference in USSG § 2G1.3(c)(3) for
offenses involving conduct described in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a) or
(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), to USSG 2A3.1 (Criminal Sexual
Abuse). The court determined that the cross reference applied
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because it found as a fact that Denkler used force to engage in
sexual conduct with the victim, see § 2G1.3, comment.
(n.5(B)(i)(I)), and also forced her to drink vodka, which
substantially impaired her ability to appraise or control her
conduct, see id. (n.5(B)(i)(IV)). The offense level calculated
under § 2A3.1 produced a higher offense level than § 2G1.3 or USSG
§ 4B1.5 (Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors);
accordingly, the court applied it.
At sentencing, after the FBI agent who interviewed the
victim in the hospital in Des Moines testified, the district court
found as a fact that Denkler had used force to engage in sexual
conduct with the victim. The court consequently determined that
§ 2A3.1 applied and recalculated the guideline range as 262-327
months. The court then departed upward, pursuant to USSG § 4A1.3,
from criminal history category V to category VI, which increased
the guideline range to 292-365 months. After considering the
factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006),
the court imposed a sentence of 360 months on Count One and a
concurrent 120-month sentence (the statutory maximum) on Count Two.
Alternatively, the court stated that, “even if category V were the
appropriate criminal history category, the court would sentence
Denkler, pursuant to a variance, to the same sentence of 360 months
for Count One and 120 months for Count Two, to run concurrently,”
because his threats to kill the victim if he went to jail or if she
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became pregnant and aborted or gave up the child increased the
seriousness of the offense and were not accounted for in the
offense level.
On appeal, Denkler first challenges the district court’s
application of § 2A3.1 on the ground that the district court erred
in relying on information that lacked sufficient indicia of
reliability when it determined that he used threats and force to
engage in sex with the victim. Policy statement § 6A1.3(a)
provides that, in resolving disputes about sentencing factors, the
district court “may consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial,
provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability
to support its probable accuracy.”
Denkler first contends that allowing sentencing courts to
rely on hearsay violates the Sixth Amendment, citing Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (addressing right of confrontation
at trial), but concedes that other circuits have held that Crawford
does not apply to sentencing hearings. See, e.g., United States v.
Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005). Denkler principally
argues that the district court should not have relied on the
victim’s statements to investigators, asserting that she wished to
portray herself in a sympathetic light to her grandparents, and to
place the blame for the anxiety she caused them on Denkler.
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Denkler maintains that the district court ignored certain
facts, such as, that the victim used the screen name
“sexysatinangel” when text messaging on her cell phone, sexually
explicit language was used in some of her text message exchanges,
and the clothing she brought on the trip included lace thong
panties, black lace panties, and a sleeveless shirt with the phrase
“no boundaries” on it. Denkler also argues that the court ignored
the fact that the medical examination of the victim revealed no
indication of forcible intercourse, bruises, or serious injuries.
He points out that the medical examination form states that the
victim answered “Yes,” when asked whether she had “any consensual
coitus in the previous 72 hours.” With respect to this question,
the FBI agent who interviewed the victim testified at sentencing
that the doctor who filled out the form told her the question was
meant to determine whether there had been recent sexual activity,
not whether it had actually been consensual. The agent also
testified that the victim was cooperative with her and with the
hospital staff, and was “very honest and very credible.”
Even though authorities were unable to find evidence to
substantiate the victim’s statements, we conclude that her
statements had sufficient indicia of reliability to support their
probable accuracy. She submitted willingly to a medical
examination and to interviews by local and federal authorities, and
acknowledged that she had engaged in text messaging with other men.
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Her statement to the FBI agent was consistent with her previous
statement to local police. Therefore, the district court did not
err in relying on her statements.
Denkler also contends that the district court clearly
erred in finding that the victim’s ability to appraise or control
the situation was substantially impaired after she drank alcohol
because the court lacked the information necessary to reach that
conclusion. We need not decide this issue because the district
court’s finding that Denkler used force against the victim to
engage in sex with her was supported by the victim’s statement and
that finding is sufficient to trigger the application of § 2A3.1.
Finally, Denkler maintains that the district court abused
its discretion in departing upward from criminal history category
V to category VI. In his view, the guideline sentence adequately
accounted for his past criminal conduct and the court departed
merely because it was dissatisfied with the length of the guideline
sentence. Denkler does not challenge the court’s determination
that a departure was also warranted based on the high likelihood of
recidivism.
Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
we review a sentence for reasonableness. United States v.
Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2007). “When we
review a sentence outside advisory sentencing range -- whether as
a product of a departure or a variance -- we consider whether the
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sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision
to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the
divergence from the range . . . .” Id. A departure pursuant to
§ 4A1.3 is encouraged, provided that the criminal history category
does not account adequately for his past criminal conduct or the
likelihood that he will commit other crimes. United States v.
Dixon, 318 F.3d 585, 588 (4th Cir. 2003).
Here, the district court decided that criminal history
category V substantially underrepresented Denkler’s criminal
history, even though the application of § 4B1.5 had already raised
him from category IV to category V. First, the court noted that
Denkler was prosecuted in the juvenile court system in Kentucky for
stealing his father’s car. This finding is based solely on a
statement to investigators by Denkler’s estranged father that is
contained in the presentence report. Although Denkler did not
dispute it, no official record of the charge and its disposition
was available. The court decided that the offense was similar to
Count Two, transportation of a stolen vehicle, and that it could
consider both juvenile offenses and prior similar conduct as a
basis for departure. While not exhaustive, the factors suggested
in § 4A1.3(a) as possible bases for upward departure include
“[p]rior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history
category,” and “[p]rior similar adult conduct not resulting in a
criminal conviction.” USSG § 4A1.3(a)(2)(A), (E) (emphasis added).
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Second, the district court considered the fact that
Denkler had previously been charged with statutory rape (for which
the court estimated he would have received a custodial sentence of
at least 192 months), was permitted to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, served a short custodial sentence, violated his probation
and then, after being placed on house arrest, absconded to engage
in the criminal conduct that resulted in his current prosecution.
The background commentary to § 4A1.3 suggests that a defendant who
has a history of serious offenses for which he has received very
lenient sentences may be in a category that underrepresents his
criminal history. The court found that Denkler fit this
description.
Last, the court decided that category V did not
adequately represent the likelihood that Denkler would commit
similar crimes in the future. The court noted that Denkler had
been prosecuted for sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old
girl and a twelve-year-old girl, and for assaulting another
female.1 The court found that Denkler’s conduct showed that he had
no respect for the law and had “a strong tendency to revert to
grossly inappropriate behavior toward females, particularly young
girls.” The court decided that category VI best represented his
criminal history and likelihood of recidivism.
1
Denkler received one criminal history point for a sentence of
30 days custody and 36 months unsupervised probation after he was
convicted in 2002 of misdemeanor assault on a female.
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Denkler argues that category V adequately addressed his
criminal history because it took into account his repeated sexual
offenses involving minors, his custodial status when he committed
the instant offense, and the recency of the prior conviction, and
he emphasizes that he was awarded criminal history points for all
his serious adult sentences. Denkler maintains that the court
erred in assuming that he would necessarily have been found guilty
of statutory rape had he gone to trial instead of pleading guilty
to the lesser offense, and would automatically have received a
sentence of 192 months imprisonment. He further maintains that his
juvenile conviction for stealing his father’s car was not counted
because the sentence and the offense were not sufficiently serious,
and that the district court decided otherwise without adequate
basis for doing so.
After carefully considering Denkler’s arguments, we
conclude that the district court’s decision to depart pursuant to
§ 4A1.3 was reasonable. Denkler had twice received lenient
sentences in state court for offenses against females and, rather
than comply with the conditions of probation, he initiated the
instant offense. The district court based its decision to depart in
part on the under-representation of Denkler’s past criminal conduct
and in part on the likelihood that he would commit future crimes.
Taking the two factors together, the district court could
reasonably conclude that an upward departure was warranted.
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We must also consider whether the extent of a departure
is reasonable. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d at 123. Here, the
court departed upward by one category. The resulting guideline
range was 292-365 months, and the sentence of 360 months (the
statutory maximum) was within the departure range. The court
explained that it chose the maximum sentence in light of several
factors set out in § 3553(a), specifically, “the need to protect
the public, to deter this defendant, to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, and to provide just punishment.” The court further
stated that it imposed a sentence at the top of the guideline range
because of Denkler’s “history of violence and predatory behavior,
and the court’s views on his likelihood to commit similar crimes if
released earlier.”
The top of the pre-departure range in this case was 327
months, thirty-three months less than the sentence imposed. While
it is impossible to be say whether Denkler would exhibit the same
predatory tendencies if he were released after a term of
imprisonment 327 months, or another term of imprisonment that is
less than 360 months, the court reasonably concluded that only the
maximum sentence was adequate to protect potential victims and
punish Denkler for the offenses he committed. We conclude that the
length of the sentence was reasonable.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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