United States v. Parrott , 234 F. App'x 107 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4442
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    JEROME PARROTT,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
    District Judge. (7:05-cr-00058-F)
    Submitted:   May 30, 2007                  Decided:   July 16, 2007
    Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Diane Pereira, Research and
    Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George
    E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer May-
    Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Following a jury trial, Jerome Parrott was convicted of
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (2000).    The district court sentenced Parrott to
    120 months in prison.   Parrott timely appealed.
    Parrott contends that the evidence was insufficient to
    support his conviction.     We review de novo a district court’s
    decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of
    acquittal.    United States v. Smith, 
    451 F.3d 209
    , 216 (4th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 197
     (2006).    Where, as here, the motion
    was based on a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a
    jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the
    view most favorable to the Government, to support it.”   Glasser v.
    United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942); Smith, 
    451 F.3d at 216
    .
    “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ [is] ‘evidence that a reasonable finder
    of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
    conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
    Smith, 
    451 F.3d at 216
     (quoting United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In evaluating the sufficiency
    of the evidence, this court “do[es] not review the credibility of
    the witnesses and assume[s] the jury resolved all contradictions in
    the testimony in favor of the government.”   United States v. Sun,
    
    278 F.3d 302
    , 313 (4th Cir. 2002).       The court “must consider
    circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and allow the government
    the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to
    - 2 -
    those sought to be established.”        United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
    In order to convict Parrott under § 922(g)(1), the
    government had to establish that “(1) the defendant previously had
    been convicted of a [felony] . . . ; (2) the defendant knowingly
    possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or
    affecting interstate or foreign commerce at some point during its
    existence.”    United States v. Moye, 
    454 F.3d 390
    , 395 (4th Cir.)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 452
     (2006).       Parrott challenges only the second element of
    his § 922(g)(1) conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the government and resolving all contradictions in the
    testimony in favor of the government, the evidence showed officers
    found Parrott lying face-up and naked under a bed, when an officer
    asked him where his gun was he answered that it was under his back,
    and when he was lifted off the floor there was a gun under the
    small of his back.        On the way to the police station, Parrott
    remarked that he “should have let loose.”            We conclude that the
    evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit a reasonable
    fact finder to conclude that Parrott knowingly possessed the
    firearm.
    Without   pointing    to   any   specific    error     in   his   own
    sentence, Parrott objects to the presumption of reasonableness that
    this   court   affords    sentences   within   the     properly    calculated
    guideline range, citing to United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    (4th Cir. 2005), United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
     (4th Cir.),
    - 3 -
    cert.    denied,   
    126 S. Ct. 2309
       (2006),     and   United   States    v.
    Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
     (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2054
    (2006).    He contends that this presumption is unconstitutional and
    amounts to a de facto mandatory guideline scheme that prevents a
    district court from properly considering all the sentencing factors
    under 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).                         To the
    extent    that   Parrott   seeks      to   have   this   court   reconsider      its
    holdings in these cases, “a panel of this court cannot overrule,
    explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of
    this court.      Only the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc
    can do that.”      Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 
    315 F.3d 264
    ,
    271-72 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    Accordingly, we affirm Parrott’s conviction and sentence.
    We   dispense    with    oral    argument    because     the   facts    and    legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    - 4 -