Okocha v. Adams , 259 F. App'x 527 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1776
NWABUEZE OKOCHA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
PATRICIA L. ADAMS, M.D.; K. PATRICK OBER,
M.D.; WILLIAM B. APPLEGATE, M.D., M.P.H.; WAKE
FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; WAKE
FOREST UNIVERSITY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00275-WLO)
Submitted: June 6, 2007 Decided: July 9, 2007
Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Theo I. Ogune, OGUNE LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. James
T. Williams, Jr., Elizabeth V. LaFollette, BROOKS, PIERCE,
MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nwabueze Okocha appeals from the denial of preliminary
injunctive relief in his civil action. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Okocha filed a complaint against Wake Forest University,
School of Medicine, Wake Forest University and several individuals
associated with Wake Forest University (collectively “Wake
Forest”), alleging that he was dismissed as a student from the
medical program at Wake Forest in violation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and 1985; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; the Supremacy Clause; the Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C.G.S. 75-1.1; the confidentiality
provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(c); and state law claims of breach of contract, fraud,
invasion of privacy and unfair and deceptive trade practices.
Okocha also filed a motion for a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, asking the district court to reinstate
Okocha to the medical program as a North Carolina resident,
prohibit Wake Forest from discriminating or setting policies that
discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or national origin, prohibit
Wake Forest from using or examining confidential information
obtained from the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), and order Wake Forest to destroy all records
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obtained through illegal means. The district court construed the
motion as seeking a preliminary injunction and denied the motion
after a hearing. Okocha timely filed an interlocutory appeal
challenging the district court’s order.
Thereafter, Okocha filed a motion for recusal of the
district court judge, which the court denied. Okocha did not file
a notice of appeal with respect to the denial of that motion. On
appeal, Okocha argues that: (1) the district court erred when it
failed to enjoin Wake Forest from relying upon alleged facts
obtained in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c); (2) the district
court failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); (3) the district
judge erred when it failed to recuse himself; and (4) the district
court erroneously failed to follow Fourth Circuit precedent when
considering his motion for preliminary injunctions.
The standard for granting a preliminary injunction is the
“balancing-of-hardship” analysis set forth in Blackwelder Furniture
Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). In
determining whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate, the
district court considers four factors: (1) the likelihood of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is
denied; (2) the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the
requested relief is granted; (3) the likelihood the plaintiff will
succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Rum Creek Coal
Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 1991). We
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conclude that Okocha failed to meet this standard with respect to
any of the grounds used to support his motion for a preliminary
injunction. Moreover, we also conclude that any alleged
deficiencies in the district court’s findings of facts and
conclusions of law were harmless as we were able to evaluate the
propriety of the district court’s decision from the undisputed
facts and on matters of law. Finally, as Okocha failed to appeal
from the order denying his motion for recusal of the district court
judge, we decline to consider this claim for lack of jurisdiction.
See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978). In
any event, a district court’s denial of a motion to recuse is not
a final appealable order. See In re Va. Elec. & Power Co., 539
F.2d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 1976).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order
denying Okocha’s motion for a preliminary injunction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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