United States v. Strange , 286 F. App'x 805 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4372
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JERMAINE TERRELL STRANGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:95-cr-00083-BO-11)
Submitted: November 30, 2007 Decided: December 21, 2007
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Banumathi Rangarajan, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jermaine Terrell Strange appeals from his forty-five-
month sentence for violating his supervised release. On appeal, he
argues that his sentence is unreasonable. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range
and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1813 (2007).
Here, it is uncontested that Strange sold crack cocaine on three
occasions within one year of his release from confinement and that
the district court sentenced Strange within his properly-calculated
advisory sentencing range of 37-46 months. (J.A. 23). See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2006). Under these
circumstances, we do not find that the district court’s sentence
was plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437; see Rita v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007) (noting that “[w]here
a [sentencing] matter is . . . conceptually simple” and the record
makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and
arguments “we do not believe the law requires the judge to write
more extensively.”).
Accordingly, we affirm Strange’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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