United States v. Taylor ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4797
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MALIKAIH TAYLOR, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:07-cr-00197-RBH)
Submitted: March 27, 2008 Decided: April 1, 2008
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Malikaih Taylor, Jr., pled guilty pursuant to a written
plea agreement to possession of a firearm after having been
convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000). The district court sentenced Taylor to seventy months of
imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory sentencing guideline
range. Taylor appeals his conviction and sentence. His counsel
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), challenging the adequacy of the colloquy held in accordance
with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and the reasonableness of Taylor’s
sentence. Counsel states, however, that in his view, there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Taylor was informed of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.
Counsel raises as a potential issue the adequacy of the
plea hearing but does not identify any deficiencies in the district
court’s Rule 11 inquiries. Because Taylor did not move in the
district court to withdraw his guilty plea, the Rule 11 hearing is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517,
525 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing standard). Our careful review of
the record convinces us that the district court fully complied with
the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Taylor’s guilty plea, ensured
that Taylor entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, and
determined that the plea was supported by an independent factual
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basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20
(4th Cir. 1991).
Counsel also questions whether the district court imposed
a reasonable sentence. Appellate courts review sentences imposed
by district courts for reasonableness, applying an abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597-98
(2007); United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir.
2007) (discussing procedure district courts must follow in
sentencing defendant). “A sentence within the proper Sentencing
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v.
Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) (upholding presumption of
reasonableness for within-guidelines sentence).
Here, the district court properly calculated the
guideline range, appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory,
and considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West
2000 & Supp. 2007). Taylor’s seventy-month sentence is the bottom
of the guideline range and is below the statutory maximum sentence
of ten years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (West 2000
& Supp. 2007). Finally, neither Taylor nor the record suggests any
information so compelling as to rebut the presumption that a
sentence within the properly calculated guideline range is
reasonable. We therefore conclude that the sentence is reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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