United States v. Jamar Pressey , 583 F. App'x 197 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-6188
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAR LEON PRESSEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00047-FL-1; 7:12-cv-00232-FL)
Submitted: June 25, 2014 Decided: September 15, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jamar Leon Pressey, Appellant Pro Se. William Miller Gilmore,
Assistant United States Attorney, Seth Morgan Wood, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamar Leon Pressey appeals the district court’s order
denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. In his
motion, Pressey attacked his career offender sentence in light
of our decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th
Cir. 2011) (en banc). The district court rejected the § 2255
motion on two grounds—as untimely under § 2255(f) and as barred
by the waiver of appellate and postconviction rights contained
in Pressey’s plea agreement. The district court granted a
certificate of appealability on both issues. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c) (2012). We review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Fulks, 683 F.3d 512, 516
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 52 (2013).
We have reviewed the record and affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Pressey’s § 2255 motion because the claim
raised by Pressey is barred by his waiver of postconviction
rights, and that waiver was properly invoked by the Government.
See United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“[W]e hold that a criminal defendant may waive his right to
attack his conviction and sentence collaterally, so long as the
waiver is knowing and voluntary.”). Pressey does not challenge
the validity of his waiver, but contends that it should not
foreclose his Simmons claim because he could not have reasonably
foreseen this dramatic change in law. However, Pressey “cannot
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invalidate his . . . waiver now to claim the benefit of
subsequently issued case law.” United States v. Copeland, 707
F.3d 522, 529 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013)
(rejecting similar Simmons claim in a direct appeal). The issue
Pressey raises is within the scope of his broad waiver and the
district court properly rejected it on this basis.
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the district
court. Because we conclude that the district court was correct
in enforcing Pressey’s waiver of his postconviction rights, we
need not and do not address the court’s ruling as to the
timeliness of the § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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