Pickworth v. Entrepreneurs' Organization , 261 F. App'x 491 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1198
KATE PICKWORTH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ENTREPRENEURS’ ORGANIZATION, f/k/a Young
Entrepreneurs’ Organization/World
Entrepreneurs’ Organization,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 07-1199
KATHERINE BEAUREGARD DAVIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ENTREPRENEURS’ ORGANIZATION, f/k/a Young
Entrepreneurs’ Organization/World
Entrepreneurs’ Organization,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cv-01205-TSE; 1:06-cv-01206-TSE)
Submitted: December 19, 2007 Decided: January 10, 2008
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brad D. Weiss, CHARAPP & WEISS, L.L.P., McLean, Virginia, for
Appellants. Jonathan W. Greenbaum, Emily K. Hargrove, NIXON
PEABODY, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Kate Jacobs Pickworth and Katherine Beauregard Davis
appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Entrepreneurs’ Organization (“EO”) on their claims of pregnancy
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material facts
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). We view all disputed facts in the light most
favorable to Pickworth and Davis, and draw all reasonable
inferences in their favor. See Tinsley v. First Union Nat’l Bank,
155 F.3d 435, 438 (4th Cir. 1998). Having reviewed the parties’
briefs, the joint appendix, the supplemental appendix, and the
district court’s order, we conclude the district court properly
determined that neither Pickworth nor Davis established that they
suffered from pregnancy discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm.
To support her claim of constructive discharge, Pickworth
was required to prove: (1) the action complained of was
deliberately done; and (2) her working conditions were intolerable.
Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 237 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc). Pickworth failed to satisfy either of these
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requirements. The record shows EO contemplated Pickworth’s
continued employment when they informed her of changes to her
position. In addition, Pickworth admitted that her working
conditions were not intolerable, and that she resigned on account
of her perception that the proposed changes to her responsibilities
constituted a demotion and would be detrimental to her career. On
this view of the evidence, the district court properly concluded
Pickworth had not established a claim of constructive discharge.
See Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting
dissatisfaction with assignments, the perception of unfair
criticism, or difficult working conditions do not amount to
intolerable conditions).
We also conclude the district court properly determined
Davis failed to establish a prima facie showing of pregnancy
discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination, Davis was required to show: (1) she is a member of
a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action;
(3) that at the time of the adverse action, she was performing at
a level that met EO’s legitimate job expectations; and (4) the
position was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the
protected class. Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir.
2005). Davis failed to establish that she was performing at an
acceptable level at the time she was terminated. In addition, the
record shows that Davis’ replacement was pregnant at the time she
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was promoted to Davis’ former position. And even if Davis had set
forth a prima facie case, she failed to show that EO’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination — poor performance
and insubordination — were pretextual. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). The district
court thus properly determined Davis’ pregnancy discrimination
claims failed.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court
granting EO’s motions for summary judgment and dismissing
Pickworth’s and Davis’ actions. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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