Gaskins v. BFI Waste Services, LLC , 281 F. App'x 255 ( 2008 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-1001
    DELBERT GASKINS; ARNOLD WHITE,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.
    BFI WASTE SERVICES, LLC,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
    Judge. (1:02-cv-01832-GBL)
    Argued:   January 29, 2008                 Decided:    June 16, 2008
    Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Raymond Charles Baldwin, SEYFARTH & SHAW, L.L.P.,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellant.       Christopher Edwin Brown,
    Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jessica G. Taverna,
    SEYFARTH & SHAW, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Defendant BFI Waste Services, LLC, appeals from the district
    court’s December 8, 2006 Memorandum Order awarding costs and
    attorney’s fees to plaintiffs Arnold White and Delbert Gaskins.
    See White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, No. 1:02-cv-01832 (E.D. Va.
    Dec. 8, 2006) (the “Award”).1        White and Gaskins prevailed, after
    a jury trial, on race-based hostile work environment claims they
    pursued against BFI under both the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    , and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
    U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.         As a result, they were entitled to
    utilize the applicable fee-shifting provisions of Title 42 and
    recover their costs and attorney’s fees from BFI.         On appeal, BFI
    challenges    the   propriety   of   the   Award,   contending   that   the
    plaintiffs’ fee petition was not timely filed. As explained below,
    we vacate the Award and remand.2
    1
    The Award may be found at J.A. 221-42. (Citations herein to
    “J.A.   ” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed in this
    appeal.)
    2
    Because we vacate the Award, we need not reach BFI’s
    alternative contentions in this appeal:      that, if an award of
    attorney’s fees was appropriate, the district court abused its
    discretion in making the Award because the plaintiffs failed to (1)
    properly establish the applicable hourly rates, or (2) provide
    adequate documentation of time expended.
    2
    I.
    In 2002, White and Gaskins initiated separate civil rights
    complaints against BFI, their employer, alleging that they had been
    subjected to race discrimination, and asserting claims under § 1981
    and Title VII.   In disposing of those claims, the district court,
    in June 2003, first granted summary judgment to BFI in White’s
    case.   In July 2003, the court made a separate summary judgment
    award to BFI in Gaskins’s case.    We consolidated their subsequent
    appeals and, by our decision of July 14, 2004, partially reversed
    the district court.   See White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 
    375 F.3d 288
     (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment awards on racially
    discriminatory compensation claims, but reversing on claims of
    racially hostile work environment).
    On remand, the hostile work environment claims were tried in
    December 2004 before a jury in Alexandria, and a verdict for both
    compensatory and punitive damages was returned in favor of the
    plaintiffs. The verdict awarded White and Gaskins $600,000 each in
    compensatory damages, plus $2 million each in punitive damages.
    BFI then moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule
    of Civil Procedure 50(b), and alternatively for a new trial nisi
    remittitur under Rule 59.   In its Memorandum Opinion and Order of
    June 17, 2005 (the “Judgment”), the district court denied the Rule
    50(b) motion, but granted in part the Rule 59 new trial motion.   To
    avoid an improper double recovery to the plaintiffs on the § 1981
    3
    and Title VII claims, the court reduced the compensatory damage
    awards   to    $300,000    each,   and       attributed    the   awards    to   the
    plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims.         The court also reduced the punitive
    damage awards to $600,000 each.               The plaintiffs did not file a
    petition for costs and attorney’s fees within fourteen days of the
    entry of the Judgment, however, as required by the operative
    version of Rule 54(d)(2)(B) (mandating that, “[u]nless otherwise
    provided by statute or order of the court, the motion [for costs
    and attorney’s fees] must be filed no later than 14 days after
    entry of judgment”).3
    With no fee petition having been filed, BFI appealed from the
    Judgment on July 15, 2005, and the plaintiffs filed timely cross-
    appeals.      On May 23, 2006, in disposing of the second round of
    appeals in this litigation, we determined that the evidence was
    insufficient to support the punitive damage awards but otherwise
    affirmed.      See White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 198 F. App’x 283
    (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished per curiam).                 On July 18, 2006, we
    denied   the    parties’    cross-petitions        for    rehearing   en    banc.
    Immediately thereafter, on July 26, 2006, our mandate issued,
    remanding the case to the district court.
    On August 25, 2006, the district court, acting sua sponte,
    entered an order directing the plaintiffs to move for costs and
    3
    Rule 54 was recently amended, effective December 1, 2007, as
    part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules.
    4
    attorney’s fees by September 5, 2006, and scheduling a hearing on
    any such motion for October 13, 2006 (the “Sua Sponte Order”).
    Responding thereto, the plaintiffs, on September 5, 2006, filed for
    the first time a petition for costs and attorney’s fees, seeking an
    award under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    (b) (the “Fee Petition”).                The Fee
    Petition — requesting more than $427,000 — was filed more than
    fourteen months after the entry of Judgment on June 17, 2005.4
    In its opposition to the Fee Petition, BFI urged the district
    court to summarily reject it, because it had not been timely filed
    under Rule 54(d)(2)(B).           In reply, the plaintiffs requested the
    court to deem the filing deadline extended by its Sua Sponte Order.
    They also asserted that their Fee Petition had been timely filed,
    in   any   event,   under   the    excusable   neglect   provision   of   Rule
    6(b)(2).5    In so asserting, the plaintiffs relied on the Supreme
    4
    Although prevailing parties on § 1981 and Title VII claims
    may be awarded costs and attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting
    provisions of 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1988
    (b) and 2000e-5(k), respectively,
    the   plaintiffs   nevertheless  entered   into  contingent   fee
    representation agreements with their counsel. Pursuant thereto,
    they agreed to compensate their lawyers with 40% of any recovery
    from BFI “by settlement or otherwise.” J.A. 212. Independent of
    the Fee Petition, the plaintiffs have paid their counsel at least
    $240,000 under the contingent fee agreements. At oral argument in
    this appeal, counsel represented that, if the Award is sustained,
    the contingent fee payments will be returned to the plaintiffs.
    5
    Under the operative version of Rule 6(b)(2), relating to the
    enlargement of specified time periods for action, a trial court may
    “in its discretion . . . upon motion made after the expiration of
    the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to
    act was the result of excusable neglect.” Like Rule 54, Rule 6 was
    amended, effective December 1, 2007, as part of the general
    restyling of the Civil Rules.
    5
    Court’s    explanation       and   application     of    the   excusable    neglect
    doctrine in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates
    Ltd. Partnership, 
    507 U.S. 380
     (1993), maintaining that their
    neglect    with    respect    to   the     Fee   Petition’s    tardy   filing     was
    excusable    for    at   least     three    reasons:     (1)   BFI   had   not    been
    prejudiced by the tardy filing; (2) the filing delay did not have
    an appreciable impact on the proceedings; (3) the lawyers acted in
    good faith when they mistakenly interpreted Rule 54(d)(2)(B) to
    authorize their Fee Petition to be filed after resolution of the
    appeal process.      At the Fee Petition hearing conducted on October
    13, 2006, BFI argued that the Fee Petition could not, simply on the
    basis of counsel’s error in interpreting Rule 54(d)(2)(B), be
    considered or ruled upon by the court.                   BFI maintained that a
    “misreading [of] the rule is not excusable neglect,” and that the
    court’s Sua Sponte Order “would not have mitigated or modified the
    unambiguous requirements of Rule 54.”              J.A. 200.
    In making the Award on December 8, 2006, the district court
    rejected    BFI’s    position      and   ruled    that   the   Sua   Sponte      Order
    satisfied the requirement of an “order” under Rule 54(d)(2)(B),
    thus rendering the fourteen-day deadline of the Rule inapplicable
    to the Fee Petition. The court made no assessment or determination
    of the Rule 6(b)(2) excusable neglect question, however, and
    proceeded to grant the Fee Petition and make the Award “because
    [p]laintiffs timely filed the Petition pursuant to a Court order
    6
    [i.e., the Sua Sponte Order].”    Award 6.   The Award was for the
    aggregate sum of $427,374 in costs and attorney’s fees.      BFI has
    appealed from the Award, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    II.
    We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s extension
    of a filing deadline.    See Thompson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
    Co., 
    76 F.3d 530
    , 532 (4th Cir. 1996).   We exercise plenary review,
    however, over legal interpretations of the applicable procedural
    rules.   See Payne ex rel. Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 
    439 F.3d 198
    ,
    203 (4th Cir. 2006) (observing that appellate review of legal
    interpretations of federal procedural rules is de novo).
    III.
    BFI pursues two contentions on appeal.     First, it maintains
    that the district court erred in excusing the untimely filing of
    the Fee Petition by characterizing its Sua Sponte Order as an
    “order” within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(2)(B).          Second, BFI
    asserts that the court erred in ruling on the Fee Petition — filed
    more than fourteen months out of time — without first making the
    finding of excusable neglect mandated by Rule 6(b)(2).    We examine
    these contentions in turn.
    7
    A.
    As explained above, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2)(B), a fee
    petition must be filed no later than fourteen days after entry of
    judgment, “[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
    court.”     Significantly, the plaintiffs have conceded in their
    appellate brief, and at oral argument as well, that their Fee
    Petition was untimely filed, in that it was not submitted within
    fourteen days of the entry of the Judgment.           In their brief, the
    plaintiffs acknowledge that, having “consulted [Rule 54(d)(2)(B)]
    at   the   conclusion   of   the   trial[,   they]   determined   (although
    incorrectly) that the entry of judgment that would trigger the 14-
    day deadline for [their] Attorney’s Fee Petition would occur after
    the resolution of the Appeal process and the entry of an amended
    order.”    Br. of Appellees 3.     Nevertheless, the district court, in
    making the Award, deemed its Sua Sponte Order to be an “order”
    within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(2)(B).         The Sua Sponte Order, as
    a result, exempted the Fee Petition from the fourteen-day deadline
    of Rule 54(d)(2)(B), and thus rendered it timely.            As explained
    below, we are, in these circumstances, unable to agree with the
    district court.
    The Sua Sponte Order was entered without any identifiable
    legal basis, particularly in light of the language of Rule 6(b),
    which controls the exercise of a trial court’s discretion to extend
    the filing deadlines established by the applicable rules, including
    8
    Rule 54(d)(2)(B). See Maybin v. Northside Corr. Ctr., 
    891 F.2d 72
    ,
    74 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Rules of civil procedure must be considered in
    relation to one another and construed together.”).     Specifically,
    the   operative   version   of   Rule   6(b)   identifies   only   two
    circumstances where a court may validly grant an extension of an
    applicable filing deadline:
    When by these rules . . . an act is required or allowed
    to be done at or within a specified time, the court for
    cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or
    without motion or notice order the period enlarged if
    request therefor is made before the expiration of the
    period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous
    order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of
    the specified period permit the act to be done where the
    failure to act was the result of excusable neglect . . .
    .
    The filing of a fee petition plainly constitutes an act “required
    . . . to be done . . . within a specified time” under Rule 6(b),
    and Rule 54(d)(2)(B) mandates that such a filing must occur “no
    later than 14 days after entry of judgment.”     After the fourteen-
    day deadline had expired, the district court was not empowered,
    under the plain terms of Rule 6(b)(1), to extend that deadline on
    its own motion.   Rather, the court was only empowered to grant such
    an extension under Rule 6(b)(2), upon a motion being made by the
    plaintiffs that was supported by a showing of excusable neglect.
    See Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
    378 F.3d 220
    , 226 (2d Cir.
    2004) (rejecting proposition that Rule 54(d)(2)(B)’s “introductory
    clause, ‘unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
    court,’ gives district courts carte blanche to extend the time to
    9
    move for attorneys’ fees after the deadline expires without having
    to find ‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 6”); see also Barghout v.
    Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, No. 96-2366, 
    1998 WL 193106
    ,
    at   *2-3   (4th   Cir.     Apr.    23,   1998)        (unpublished   per   curiam)
    (concluding that Rule 6(b) precluded court from granting untimely
    fee petition, where petitioner failed to request enlargement of
    time within Rule 54(d)(2)(B)’s fourteen-day deadline, and did not
    thereafter     move   for    extension         based    on   excusable   neglect).6
    Because     neither   of    the    Rule   6(b)    circumstances       for   a   valid
    extension of the fourteen-day filing deadline had occurred when the
    Sua Sponte Order was entered, those authorities must control, and
    the Sua Sponte Order was not an authorized extension order under
    Rule 6(b).7
    In these circumstances, the Sua Sponte Order simply did not
    exempt the Fee Petition from the fourteen-day filing deadline
    6
    Notably, the fourteen-day deadline established by Rule
    54(d)(2)(B) may be preempted by a local rule creating some
    different time frame for the filing of fee petitions. See, e.g.,
    Tancredi, 
    378 F.3d at 227
    . There is no such local rule in the
    Eastern District of Virginia.
    7
    The scope and purpose of Rule 54(d)(2)(B) would be undermined
    if district courts were authorized to consider untimely fee
    petitions sua sponte, without first finding excusable neglect. See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 advisory committee’s note (explaining that Rule
    54(d)(2)(B) time constraints promote fairness and judicial economy
    by: (1) providing notice of fee claim to opposing party before
    time for appeal elapses; (2) resolving fee disputes soon after
    trial, while counsel’s performance is “freshly in mind”; and, (3)
    consolidating appellate review of fee claims together with merits
    of case).
    10
    mandated    by    Rule    54(d)(2)(B).           The   district         court    erred    in
    characterizing its Sua Sponte Order as an “order” within the
    meaning of Rule 54(d)(2)(B), and the Fee Petition was thus untimely
    filed.
    B.
    We turn finally to the issue, first raised by the parties
    after entry of the Sua Sponte Order and the filing of the Fee
    Petition,    of    whether      the   Fee    Petition       was    viable       under    the
    excusable neglect provision of Rule 6(b)(2). On this point, we are
    confronted with the situation where, although the plaintiffs and
    BFI made excusable neglect arguments in the district court, the
    court made no assessment or ruling on the issue.                    That is, because
    the court ruled that its Sua Sponte Order rendered the Fee Petition
    timely, it had no reason to reach and address the excusable neglect
    contentions.       In this circumstance, we are unable to properly
    assess the contentions of the parties on the excusable neglect
    issue.   We conclude, however, that the plaintiffs, in view of our
    ruling concerning the Sua Sponte Order, should be accorded an
    opportunity (if they so choose) to pursue their excusable neglect
    contention in the district court.                The legal authorities governing
    the excusable neglect doctrine indicate that such a contention will
    present obvious difficulties, however, and, on this record, the
    plaintiffs       will    face   an    uphill      battle.         Our    precedent       has
    cautioned, in the context of an untimely notice of appeal, that
    11
    “‘excusable    neglect’   is    not   easily      demonstrated,      nor   was   it
    intended to be.”    Thompson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
    76 F.3d 530
    , 534 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming refusal to grant enlargement of
    time to file appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(1), because plaintiff
    failed to show excusable neglect).
    As the Supreme Court has recognized, “inadvertence, ignorance
    of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually
    constitute ‘excusable’ neglect.”           See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
    Brunswick     Assocs.   Ltd.    P’ship,     
    507 U.S. 380
    ,      392   (1993).
    Nevertheless,    the    Court   recognized        that    “it   is    clear   that
    ‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat ‘elastic concept’
    and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances
    beyond the control of the movant.”                 
    Id.
         The Pioneer Court
    explained that the determination of whether lawyer neglect can be
    deemed as “excusable” is “at bottom an equitable one, taking
    account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s
    omission,” including “the danger of prejudice to the [opposing
    party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on
    judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether
    it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the
    movant acted in good faith.”          
    Id. at 395
    ; see also 
    id. at 398
    (finding no error when debtor’s failure to file timely claim was
    deemed excusable, in the absence of “evidence of prejudice to
    12
    petitioner or to judicial administration . . ., or any indication
    at all of bad faith”).
    Obviously, a district court is vastly better positioned than
    a court of appeals to first evaluate the relevant circumstances
    concerning an excusable neglect determination — including an
    assertion    that   the   lawyers     have     mistakenly    interpreted      Rule
    54(d)(2)(B) to authorize the filing of a fee petition within
    fourteen days of the resolution of the appeal process.                See Pincay
    v. Andrews, 
    389 F.3d 853
    , 859 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
    proper weighing of Pioneer’s equitable factors should be left “to
    the discretion of the district court in every case”); see also
    United States v. Brown, 
    133 F.3d 993
    , 997 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A
    district court knows best the impact [an] error has on the court’s
    operation and calendar. It knows the attorney and his motives, the
    circumstances of the case and the judicial economy of excusing the
    neglect.”).
    In this case, there are potential competing interests to be
    weighed     concerning    whether     lawyer    neglect     should    be    deemed
    excusable.    For example, the plaintiffs’ lawyers should have known
    the correct answer on the filing question — that the district
    court’s resolution of BFI’s post-trial motions, on July 17, 2005,
    constituted the entry of Judgment under Rule 54(d)(2)(B), and that
    the   Fee    Petition     was   due    within     fourteen     days        thereof.
    Nevertheless, there are other interests that might be taken into
    13
    account.   For example, if the Fee Petition is denied on the sole
    basis of its tardy filing:
    •     The plaintiffs would be denied their statutory
    right to recover costs and attorney’s fees. And,
    absent a recovery against their own counsel for
    legal malpractice, they will have paid over
    $240,000 to their lawyers under the contingent fee
    agreements. See supra note 4;
    •     The plaintiffs’ lawyers would have prevailed in a
    difficult and time-consuming lawsuit (involving
    egregious conduct by BFI against White and
    Gaskins), yet not be fully compensated for their
    efforts, and perhaps be subjected to malpractice
    claims; and
    •     BFI, the wrongdoer — having engaged in racially
    hostile conduct against its employees — would
    receive a substantial financial windfall, solely
    due to the neglect of plaintiffs’ counsel.
    On the other hand, of course, BFI has borne the expense of a
    separate appeal of the Award, which — had the Fee Petition been
    timely filed — could have been reviewed on appeal almost two years
    ago. These circumstances, however, and perhaps others, are for the
    district court to first evaluate.    Although we are obligated to
    vacate the Award, we are satisfied to leave to the district court
    any determination of whether the plaintiffs are yet entitled to
    recover costs and attorney’s fees.
    14
    IV.
    Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the Award made by the
    district court, and remand without prejudice to such other and
    further proceedings, if any, that might be appropriate.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    15