I-77 Properties, LLC v. Fairfield County , 288 F. App'x 108 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1790
I-77 PROPERTIES, LLC,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
FAIRFIELD COUNTY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief
District Judge. (3:07-cv-01524-JFA)
Submitted: June 6, 2008 Decided: July 30, 2008
Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hamilton Osborne, Jr., John A. Hodge, Alexander G. Shissias,
HAYNSWORTH SINKLER BOYD, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. James S. Meggs, Ian D. McVey, CALLISON, TIGHE &
ROBINSON, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
I-77 Properties, LLC (“I-77"), a South Carolina limited
liability company, appeals the district court’s order dismissing in
part and staying in part its complaint against Fairfield County,
South Carolina, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief,
and damages. I-77 was formed in 2003 for the purpose of operating
a Construction and Demolition Debris and Land-Clearing (“C&D”)
Landfill in Fairfield County. I-77 applied to the South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control (“DHEC”) for a
permit to operate a C&D Landfill in Fairfield County in 2005, and
leased a site in Fairfield County for use as a C&D Landfill in
February 2006. The site it selected is zoned “RD” under
Fairfield’s zoning ordinance. I-77 alleges that Fairfield’s Solid
Waste Management Plan, originally adopted in 1994 pursuant to the
South Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Management Act, S.C. Code §§
44-96-10 through 44-96-230 (2002 & Supp. 2007) (“Solid Waste Act”),
would have allowed the operation of a long-term C&D Landfill in
Fairfield County, up until Fairfield amended the Plan in May 2006
and January 2007.
In April 2006, I-77 applied to Fairfield for a
Certificate of Zoning Compliance for the site it had selected as a
C&D Landfill. In May 2006 and January 2007, before responding to
I-77's application, Fairfield adopted amendments to its Solid Waste
Management Plan that would prevent I-77 from operating a C&D
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Landfill on its chosen site. I-77 submitted a second application
for a Certificate of Zoning Compliance in April 2007, and Fairfield
contemporaneously proposed to hold a public hearing concerning an
ordinance that would prohibit the operation of landfills in
districts zoned RD. In May 2007, Fairfield denied I-77's
application based upon the proposed zoning ordinance, and DHEC
denied I-77's application based upon Fairfield’s amendments to its
Solid Waste Management Plan. I-77 filed an administrative appeal
of DHEC’s permit application denial.
In its complaint in the district court, I-77 argued that
Fairfield amended its Solid Waste Management Plan and adopted the
new zoning ordinance specifically to prevent I-77 from operating a
C&D Landfill on the proposed site, after I-77 applied for the
necessary permits and expended time and money preparing to open and
operate the landfill. I-77 sought a judgment declaring that
Fairfield’s amendments to its Solid Waste Management Plan have no
effect upon I-77's proposed C&D Landfill and that I-77 is entitled
to a Certificate of Zoning Compliance. I-77 also sought an
injunction directing Fairfield to issue a Certificate of Zoning
Compliance. I-77 claimed damages under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983(2000) and the South Carolina Constitution.
Fairfield filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice or
to stay the proceedings, arguing that the district court should
abstain from hearing I-77’s complaint, pursuant to Burford v. Sun
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Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), because the complaint seeks equitable
and injunctive relief and involves state law claims of substantial
public importance that should be decided through the administrative
appeal process.
The district court dismissed I-77’s claims for
declaratory relief without prejudice, and stayed I-77’s claims for
damages pending the outcome of the state administrative
proceedings, pursuant to Burford. The district court found that
this case involves local zoning law, an area of great public
concern, and determined that it would abstain from deciding I-77’s
claims for damages until the state administrative appeals process
was completed. The court found that the ongoing review available
in South Carolina’s administrative courts would be adequate to
address I-77’s equitable claims, and that allowing this case to go
forward in federal court would interfere with the state’s
established procedural mechanism. I-77 noted a timely appeal. We
have jurisdiction to review the district court’s abstention order
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996).
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the
Supreme Court held that federal courts sitting in equity may
decline to exercise their jurisdiction in special circumstances.
Accordingly, the judiciary should abstain from deciding cases that
present "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
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problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
the result in the case then at bar," or where adjudication in a
federal forum "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
We review a district court’s decision to abstain under
the Burford doctrine for an abuse of discretion. Martin v.
Stewart, 499 F.3d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court declared in Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), that dismissal based on abstention
principles is appropriate only where the relief sought is
equitable. Where the plaintiff seeks damages, federal courts may
not dismiss an action, but can stay proceedings to await conclusion
of the state action. See id. at 728-31. Because the district
court only dismissed I-77’s claims for equitable relief, and stayed
I-77’s claims for damages, the district court did not err under
Quackenbush if it properly abstained from hearing I-77’s equitable
claims pursuant to Burford.
In Pomponio v. Fauquier County Bd. of Supervisors, 21
F.3d 1319, 1324 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), we held that abstention
and dismissal were appropriate where federal constitutional claims
asserted by a real estate developer against a county boiled down to
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questions of state land use law. Id. at 1328. The developer had
claimed that the misconduct of county officials in rejecting his
subdivision plan violated federal due process and equal protection.
See id. at 1320. The crux of the case, however, was “[w]hether the
zoning ordinance was incorrectly construed.” Id. at 1322. We
concluded that “federal courts should not leave their indelible
print on local and state land use and zoning law by entertaining
these cases, and, in effect, sitting as a zoning board of appeals.”
Id. at 1327. Although we have recognized that Quackenbush
implicitly overruled that portion of Pomponio that permitted on
abstention grounds dismissal of a claim for damages, Front Royal &
Warren County Indus. Park v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 282
(4th Cir. 1998), it is still clear that federal courts may dismiss
claims for equitable relief on Burford abstention grounds while
staying action on claims for damages. Johnson v. Collins
Entertainment Co., 199 F.3d 710, 727-28 (4th Cir. 1999). Where, as
here, the underlying dispute revolves around a question of zoning
law, quintessentially a matter of state concern, Burford abstention
on the claims for equitable relief was entirely appropriate.
Johnson, 199 F.3d at 728-29; Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 721-22.*
*
I-77 relies on Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th
Cir. 1983). However, abstention was not at issue in Scott because
state review of the zoning claim had concluded prior to the filing
of the federal action. This procedural distinction renders Scott
inapplicable.
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I-77’s argument that its permit application was
wrongfully denied based upon the local zoning laws in effect at the
time it filed its application is still pending before South
Carolina’s administrative courts. In the event that those courts
determine I-77 was erroneously denied a permit, I-77 may return to
federal court to pursue its claims for damages pursuant to § 1983
and the South Carolina constitution. The district court will be
able to resolve I-77’s damages claims more readily after the state
courts have resolved the underlying zoning law issues.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing I-77’s equitable claims without prejudice and staying
the proceedings as to I-77’s damages claims.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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