United States v. Brooks ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4418
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BINICA NICOLE BROOKS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 07-4419
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BENJAMIN STEVEN DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 07-4999
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BARRY ELIJAH DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00005-MJG)
Submitted: August 27, 2008 Decided: September 22, 2008
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Alan Royce Lee Bussard, Towson, Maryland; Andrew C. White,
SILVERMAN, THOMPSON, SLUTKIN & WHITE, Baltimore, Maryland; Martin
H. Schreiber, II, LAW OFFICE OF MARTIN H. SCHREIBER, II, LLC,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Stephanie A. Gallagher, Barbara S. Sale, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Binica Nicole Brooks, Benjamin Steven Davis (“Benjamin”),
and Barry Elijah Davis (“Barry”) appeal their convictions relating
to the production of counterfeit checks. Brooks pled guilty to
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371(2000); Benjamin pled guilty to bank fraud and aiding and abetting
such fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344 (2000); and Barry
pled guilty to mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West
2000 & Supp. 2008). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Maryland state troopers obtained a search warrant for
Benjamin’s residence, describing it as a single-family home. When
the troopers executed the warrant in the early morning hours of
January 17, 2005, they found the first floor occupied, the second
floor empty, and a cluttered attic. After searching the residence,
the troopers seized evidence only from the first floor, where
Benjamin resided. In the past, the first and second floors had
been rented as separate units, but at the time of the search the
second floor had been vacant for four months.
The Appellants claim the search warrant was invalid
because it identified the residence as a single-family home when it
was a multi-unit dwelling. We review factual findings underlying
a district court’s suppression determination for clear error and
the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
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Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).
The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
requirement for particularity “ensures that the search will be
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers
intended to prohibit.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84
(1987). The particularity requirement is satisfied when an officer
in possession of a search warrant describing a particular place to
be searched can reasonably ascertain and identify the intended
place to be searched. United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 463
(4th Cir. 1988) (citing Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503
(1925)). Even if the description of the place to be searched is
mistaken, there is no Fourth Amendment violation when the officers
executing the search reasonably believe that the warrant is
sufficiently particular and that they are searching the correct
location. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84-89. An erroneous description
or a factual mistake in the search warrant will not necessarily
invalidate the warrant and the subsequent search. Owens, 848 F.2d
at 463-64.
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“The validity of the warrant must be assessed on the
basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty
to discover and to disclose, to the issuing Magistrate.” Garrison,
480 U.S. at 85. We conclude the troopers conducted a reasonable
investigation of the residence for the search warrant under the
circumstances. The investigation of the Davis residence occurred
late at night following Benjamin’s arrest. The troopers thus did
not have access to official records other than tax records that
bore no indication of whether the property was a multi-unit
dwelling. The warrant’s description of the property as a single
family residence was buttressed by a physical assessment conducted
by Trooper Lee Link. Although Link failed to notice that there
were two mailboxes, one black and the other white, affixed to the
residence and two doorbells on the doorframe, his ability to
discern the black mailbox and two doorbells was significantly
diminished by darkness and distance: he observed the residence at
night and from across the street. Although he drove past the home
several times, he understandably kept his distance to avoid
detection. Further, the black mailbox was camouflaged by the dark
coloring of the house, and the doorbells were small. Thus, both
would have been difficult to see at night from Link’s vantage
point. Accordingly, the warrant was valid at the time of its
issuance regardless of the fact that it contained a factual error
about the character of the residence.
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Appellants also claim that once the troopers entered the
residence, they should have known immediately it was a multi-unit
dwelling and should have terminated the search. The troopers
testified they had no indication the residence was divided into
multiple units, although the district court noted they should have
noticed the potential use of the second floor as a separate unit.
Even if the residence was a multi-unit dwelling and the troopers
should have known it upon entry, their conduct did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. There is no Fourth Amendment violation, despite
mistake or overbreadth in a warrant, if officers reasonably believe
the warrant is sufficiently particular and they are searching the
correct location. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84-89. In other words,
upon discovering the residence was a multi-unit dwelling, the
troopers would have been obligated to limit their search to the
area specified in the warrant. Id. at 86 (“If the officers had
known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two
apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third
floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they
would have been obligated to limit their search” to the apartment
that was the subject of the warrant). As the troopers focused
their search on the first floor where Benjamin resided and all the
evidence seized came from that area, the troopers’ actions were
reasonable and the district court correctly denied Appellants’
motion to suppress the evidence.
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Accordingly, we affirm Appellants’ convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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