Bell-Hayes v. Dewitt , 264 F. App'x 321 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1683
DONNA BELL-HAYES; JEFFREY HAYES, SR.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
ROBERT SKIPP DEWITT, Deputy, individually and
in his official capacity,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
HOWARD EWING, individually and in his official
capacity; CECIL COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; STATE OF MARYLAND,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge.
(1:05-cv-02384-MJG)
Argued: January 30, 2008 Decided: February 13, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Reversed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: John Francis Breads, Jr., LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSURANCE TRUST,
Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Sherwood Randolph Wescott,
WESCOTT ROWE, L.L.C., Salisbury, Maryland, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Michael S. Lewis, Michael F. Barnett, WESCOTT ROWE,
L.L.C., Salisbury, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Responding to a 911 call reporting a residential fire, police
and other emergency personnel went to the residence of Donna Bell-
Hayes and her husband, Jeffrey S. Hayes. Deputy Robert DeWitt
temporarily detained Mrs. Hayes while the fire department
investigated the cause of the fire. The Hayeses bring the instant
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), alleging that Deputy DeWitt’s
detention of Mrs. Hayes violated her Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unlawful seizures. Deputy DeWitt moved for summary
judgment, asserting that he did not violate Mrs. Hayes’ Fourth
Amendment rights by detaining her or, alternatively, that
principles of qualified immunity required judgment in his favor.
The district court denied the motion, finding that disputed issues
of material fact precluded a grant of summary judgment. Because
the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the Hayeses,
establish that Deputy DeWitt’s detention of Mrs. Hayes did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, we reverse.
I.
On November 4, 2003, Mrs. Hayes accidentally started a fire in
her residence by leaving a candle burning in her bathroom. Mr.
Hayes called 911 to report the fire; meanwhile Mrs. Hayes succeeded
in extinguishing the fire herself before the fire department
responded to the call.
3
Emergency personnel began to arrive at the Hayes residence at
around 9:15 in the morning, approximately fifteen minutes after Mr.
Hayes placed the 911 call. Mrs. Hayes explained that at that time
she was “upset,” “scared,” and “crying” due to the stress of the
fire; additionally, she was wearing only a tee-shirt. The first
member of the emergency response team to reach the Hayes residence
questioned Mrs. Hayes about the fire, but would not respond to her
repeated inquiries as to whether he was a member of the fire
department. Frightened at his lack of response, Mrs. Hayes locked
herself in the bathroom. Eventually a paramedic did persuade Mrs.
Hayes to leave the bathroom and a second paramedic began treating
her outside her home for smoke inhalation.
When Deputy DeWitt arrived at the Hayes residence, he and
Deputy Fire Marshall Howard Ewing approached Mr. Hayes. Ewing
asked Mr. Hayes if his wife had started the fire; Mr. Hayes replied
that he did not know. DeWitt then approached Mrs. Hayes, who was
being treated by a paramedic. Despite her statements that the fire
had started accidentally, DeWitt assertedly grabbed Mrs. Hayes’
arm, said that he was detaining her, and handcuffed her even though
she objected that the handcuffs caused her pain because of her
carpel tunnel syndrome. DeWitt brought Mrs. Hayes to the front of
the house, where Ewing questioned her about the cause of the fire.
The record contains no evidence of further contact between DeWitt
and Mrs. Hayes. DeWitt left the scene of the fire at approximately
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10:00; at that time Mrs. Hayes was still handcuffed. Several
minutes later, the fire department concluded its investigation and
the fire marshal reported that the fire had in fact been
accidental. At that time, another deputy removed Mrs. Hayes’
handcuffs and an ambulance transported her to the hospital.
The Hayeses bring this suit against Deputy DeWitt and other
state and county defendants, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violations of Mrs. Hayes’ Fourth Amendment rights, and
related state law claims. Mr. and Mrs. Hayes seek $3,000,000 in
compensatory damages, as well as interest and attorneys fees.
DeWitt moved for summary judgment, contending, inter alia, that the
undisputed facts establish that his detention of Mrs. Hayes did not
violate the Fourth Amendment or, alternatively, that he is entitled
to qualified immunity. The district court found that “there are
material facts in dispute regarding the seizure of Mrs. Hayes,” and
that on the Hayeses’ version of the facts, “there was simply no
reasonable justification for the seizure.” The court accordingly
denied DeWitt’s motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim and
on the defense of qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction to
consider DeWitt’s interlocutory appeal of the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 528 (1985).1
1
Of course, at this interlocutory stage we have no
jurisdiction to consider the district court’s resolution of any
other claims. We note that, relying on Behrens v. Pelletier, 516
5
II.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields police officers
“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To determine whether Deputy DeWitt is
entitled to qualified immunity, we must first determine whether the
facts, taken in the light most favorable to the Hayeses,
demonstrate that DeWitt violated Mrs. Hayes’ constitutional rights.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If so, we must then
ask whether the right asserted was clearly established at the time
of the events at issue. Id. We review the district court’s ruling
on a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Garofolo v.
Donald B. Heslep Assocs., Inc., 405 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2005).
The Hayeses contend that the facts outlined above allege a
claim that DeWitt detained Mrs. Hayes in violation of her Fourth
U.S. 299 (1996), and Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), the
Hayeses contend that asserted disputes as to material facts deprive
us of jurisdiction even to consider the qualified immunity appeal.
They misread Behrens and Johnson, however. These cases recognize
that, for purposes of qualified immunity, questions of law are
immediately appealable even if the district court also finds that
there are controverted issues of material fact. See Behrens, 516
U.S. at 312-13 (“Denial of summary judgment often includes a
determination that there are controverted issues of material fact,
and Johnson surely does not mean that every such denial of summary
judgment is nonappealable.”) (emphasis in original) (internal
citation omitted).
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Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures. DeWitt responds
that the seizure was a proper investigative detention under Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Terry holds that police officers may briefly detain an
individual if they have a reasonable suspicion, based on
articulable facts, that “criminal activity may be afoot.” 392 U.S.
at 30. “[R]easonable suspicion” is “a less demanding standard than
probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence,” but requires “more than an inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
When DeWitt responded to the call reporting the fire at the
Hayes residence, fire department officials had advised that “a
female subject was barricaded in the residence and refusing to come
out.” The Hayeses have acknowledged that at this juncture Mrs.
Hayes had indeed locked herself in the bathroom and refused to come
out. Upon his arrival at the Hayes home, DeWitt noted that Mrs.
Hayes was behaving irrationally; again, both Mr. and Mrs. Hayes
have acknowledged that Mrs. Hayes was in a highly agitated state.
DeWitt knew that the fire department’s investigation into the cause
of the fire was ongoing, so the department had not yet ruled out
the possibility of arson. Again, Mr. and Mrs. Hayes offer no
contrary evidence.
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The parties do not agree on other facts surrounding DeWitt’s
seizure of Mrs. Hayes. But based on the above undisputed facts, it
is clear that DeWitt had “at least a minimal level of objective
justification” for briefly detaining Mrs. Hayes while the fire
department was actively investigating a possible act of arson.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. The district court erred in holding to
the contrary.2
III.
Because the undisputed facts establish that Deputy DeWitt’s
detention of Donna Bell-Hayes was constitutional, the judgment of
the district court denying DeWitt’s motion for summary judgment is
REVERSED.
2
Since DeWitt’s detention of Mrs. Hayes was constitutional
under Terry, we need not consider whether it could be justified as
a mental health seizure. See Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d
960, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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