Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Group, Inc. , 311 F. App'x 586 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1596
DECISION INSIGHTS, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SENTIA GROUP, INCORPORATED; THOMAS H. SCOTT; MARK
ABDOLLAHIAN; JACEK KUGLER; BRIAN EFIRD,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00766)
Argued: September 25, 2008 Decided: February 12, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and
Richard L. VOORHEES, United States District Judge for the
Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Nicholas Hantzes, HANTZES & REITER, McLean, Virginia, for
Appellant. Edward Francis O’Connor, O’CONNOR, CHRISTENSEN &
MCLAUGHLIN, Irvine, California, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Decision Insights, Inc. (“DII”) appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims in favor of
Sentia Group, Inc. (“Sentia”), Mark Abdollahian (“Abdollahian”),
Brian Efird (“Efird”), Jacek Kugler (“Kugler”), and Thomas H.
Scott (“Scott”). DII also appeals an adverse sanctions ruling
for purported discovery violations.
The underlying civil action arises from a dispute between
DII and Sentia surrounding the latter’s development and use of a
competing software application that implements a decision-making
model using expected utility theory. 1 More specifically, DII
alleges that Abdollahian, Efird, Kugler, and Carol Alsharabati
(“Alsharabati”), who was not named as a defendant, disclosed
trade secrets to Sentia in violation of Virginia’s Trade Secret
Misappropriations Act, Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-336. DII also
asserts that Efird, Kugler, and Abdollahian breached their
respective contractual and fiduciary obligations by disclosing
other confidential and proprietary information protected by DII.
DII alleges that Scott conspired with Sentia to induce DII’s
former employees to breach their agreements with DII. Because
the district court did not consider DII’s software compilation
1
Expected utility theory, described below, encompasses
several disciplines, including mathematics, economics, political
science, and psychology.
2
claim as a separate and independent alleged trade secret, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
I.
A.
DII first developed software called a “Dynamic Expected
Utility Model” (“EU Model”) in the nineteen-eighties. 2 The EU
Model, DII’s primary asset, is an analytical tool used in
preparing negotiating strategies by assessing risk, comparing
the impact of differing operating positions, and detailing
trade-offs among various alternatives. 3 DII has used the EU
2
DII’s “Dynamic Expected Utility Model” (“EU Model”) is
also known as DII’s “Political Analysis Information System”
(“PAIS”) software.
3
DII first defines the component issues and then implements
state-of-the-art data collecting procedures (including
utilization of a subject area expert), in order to identify the
key data relative to each of the following:
1) identification of the stakeholders (i.e., groups,
individuals, companies or governments) with potential
interest in issue;
2) identify and quantify the policy positions of each
stakeholder;
3) identify and quantify the resources that each
stakeholder may employ to influence their or its
preference on the issue; and
4) identify and quantify the actual importance each
stakeholder attaches to the policy outcome, thereby
deriving their salience toward the issue.
(JA at 888-89) After research and data collection, numerical
values are associated with the responses to these four elements.
(Continued)
3
Model in the operation of its business since its inception in
1989. DII owns the assets, copyright, and all proprietary rights
to the EU Model.
Dr. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (“Dr. Bueno de Mesquita”), a
former employee of DII and leading published authority on
expected utility theory generally, created the original source
code for DII’s software in the mid-1980s. 4 Gary Slack (“Slack”),
a DII analyst and member of DII’s Board of Directors, modified
and updated DII’s software in the early 1990s. Slack testified
that he and Dr. Bueno de Mesquita essentially wrote DII’s
software program from scratch.
In 1998, DII hired Carol Alsharabati to make additional
modifications to the EU Model. Alsharabati, who then lacked any
formal or informal computer programming training, was provided a
copy of DII’s computer code and required to sign a
Based on this data, the EU Model computer software calculates
dynamic bargaining positions with respect to stakeholder
positions over bargaining rounds based on calculating and
predicting changes in stakeholder positions.
4
The terms “source code” or “code” refer to “a document
written in computer language which contains a set of
instructions designed to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer to bring about a certain result.” Trandes Corp. v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 655 (4th Cir. 1993).
4
confidentiality agreement. 5 Alsharabati’s work with DII was her
first experience writing code for an EU Model. Alsharabati had
a copy of the DII code on her computer but testified that she
erased it after her work for DII was complete. Alsharabati
concedes she gained valuable experience while working on the DII
project.
During their work on behalf of DII, Abdollahian, Efird, and
Kugler all worked with Alsharabati and had access to the DII
source code for the EU Model and the other alleged confidential
and proprietary materials DII now seeks to protect. 6 Both
Abdollahian and Efird entered into Trade Secret Nondisclosure
Agreements (“Agreements”) with DII. 7 Efird’s contract also
included a restrictive covenant not to compete. Kugler executed
an Agreement that was never signed by DII. Between October 2001
and December 2002, Abdollahian, Efird, and Kugler all left DII
to form Sentia Group, Inc.
5
Alsharabati, who describes herself as “self-taught” in the
field of computer programming, has masters and doctorate degrees
in political science.
6
Abdollahian was in an exclusive consulting role with DII
between 2000 and 2002. Efird was employed with DII during the
same time period. Kugler was a director and major owner of
stock in DII through December 2002.
7
Abdollahian refused to sign a Consultant Agreement
presented to him by DII in 1997.
5
B.
On November 5, 2002, Abdollahian, Kugler, and Scott
incorporated Sentia Group, Inc. Scott was appointed Sentia’s
Chief Executive Officer, Abdollahian became Sentia’s Chief
Operating Officer, and Efird became an executive vice president.
Kugler, a major shareholder, performed consultant work.
According to Scott, Sentia was initially formed with the
idea that Sentia would obtain a software license from DII and
the two companies would divide responsibilities based upon
geographic territory. In late 2002, while acting on behalf of
Sentia, Kugler attempted to negotiate a nonexclusive worldwide
royalty license with DII but the parties did not reach
agreement.
Rather than continue to negotiate with DII, Sentia decided
to develop its own software application to perform the same
essential functions and analysis as DII’s software. Sentia
sought legal advice and was advised in December 2002 as follows:
“[W]e emphasize that preferably any individuals who had contact
with or access to the code of the prior company not be involved
in development of the new software program.” (JA at 790) Counsel
cautioned Sentia that if this were deemed unavoidable given the
requisite expertise, the “new code [should] bear no resemblance,
functionally, structurally, or otherwise, to the code of the
prior company.” (JA at 790) Sentia’s counsel also suggested that
6
Sentia carefully document aspects of the development process -
its intended function as well as design development and actual
development. 8 (JA at 791)
At the suggestion of Abdollahian, Kugler, or both, and
notwithstanding counsel’s advice, Sentia hired Alsharabati to
develop software for Sentia. Working with a group of software
students with no prior experience in EU Models, Alsharabati
wrote Sentia’s first code in what DII describes as “record
time,” or approximately six weeks. 9
According to DII, Sentia’s software is the same as its own
EU Model in terms of method. DII alleges that in running both
programs, its comparisons obtain “equal results.” 10 DII contends
that achieving equal results is not possible unless all of the
8
The same letter explained counsel’s understanding that
because Sentia sought to implement “vastly new and improved
theoretical models, and that any theoretical models used by the
prior company have largely been the subject of academic
publications and are well known in the field, it appears
possible to develop a new software program that has no
substantial similarity to the software program used by the prior
company.” (JA at 790-91)
9
Sentia’s software was initially named the “Machiavelli”
code, and later referred to as the “Senturion” application or
model. Although presently in different computer languages, the
first version of Sentia’s code was in the same computer language
as DII’s code – Visual Basic.
10
DII explains that when it compares the two programs,
Sentia’s output results are identical to DII’s model “to 2
decimal places of accuracy.”
7
parameters, variables and sequencing associated with the
expected utility are equal. DII also claims that the Machiavelli
code contains portions of DII’s source code which are “commented
out” and that this fact provides “proof positive” that Sentia
used the DII code as a reference in writing the Sentia software
program. 11
DII asserts that Sentia is conducting business in direct
competition with DII and using the EU Model in its business to
DII’s detriment.
C.
DII commenced its suit on June 30, 2006, and alleged causes
of action for breach of contract (Count I), conspiracy to commit
breach of contract (Count II), conspiracy to injure another in
trade, business or profession (Count III), misappropriation of
trade secrets (Count IV), breach of fiduciary duty (Count V),
and conversion (Count VI). 12
11
Here, the term “comment” refers to computer language in a
source code that is not part of the functional code, but
functions instead as a guide to future programmers working with
the source code and a mechanism for explaining changes in the
development of the code.
12
DII does not advance its claims for conspiracy to commit
breach of contract, conspiracy to injure another in trade,
business or profession, breach of fiduciary duty, or conversion
on appeal and is therefore deemed to have abandoned those
particular claims. Thus, only Counts I and IV remain.
8
The parties grappled with the framing of the legal issues
before the district court. On February 13, 2007, the magistrate
judge granted partial relief on a motion to compel filed by
Sentia. The magistrate judge determined that DII’s discovery
responses were inadequate, in part, due to DII’s failure to
identify its trade secrets with specificity. The magistrate
judge held Sentia’s request for monetary sanctions in abeyance
and directed DII to produce:
“[A] clear and express verified statement containing
only those items which Plaintiff considers to be
actual trade secrets and which Plaintiff has
reasonable grounds to believe were misappropriated by
Defendant. Plaintiff shall clearly differentiate
between the material which is public knowledge from
that material which is allegedly Plaintiff’s trade
secret, proprietary, or confidential material.”
(JA at 281)(emphasis added).
On February 20, 2007, Sentia filed a second motion for
sanctions claiming that DII’s Fourth Supplemental Answer to
Interrogatories was still deficient. DII’s Fourth Supplemental
response separately identified each of the twelve components of
the code as processes implemented within the code. DII
attempted to identify each individual component by including the
lines of source code (i.e., mathematical equations) that
corresponded to each. DII’s response unequivocally identified as
a trade secret its entire DII source code as a total
compilation.
9
On February 23, 2007, the magistrate judge conducted a
hearing to resolve several discovery disputes, including
Sentia’s motion for sanctions. Sentia argued that because DII
did not allege Sentia copied its code, the only thing left was
DII’s claim regarding the 12 processes. 13 The parties engaged in
a lengthy debate over whether lines of code were sufficient to
identify and define the alleged proprietary process claims.
Sentia argued that, as framed by DII, Sentia was unable to
defend on the trade secret claims.
On March 2, 2007, DII produced to Sentia an expert report
prepared by Gary Slack containing additional narrative and
detailed flow charts showing the structure of the code and
identifying each alleged proprietary process. The same report
contained the identity and description of the alleged
proprietary processes, the variables, the constants and the
parameters. Slack’s report also explained how the DII code
operates as a whole.
On March 5, 2007, the magistrate judge directed DII to
produce by March 9, 2007, “to the extent they exist, all
13
Sentia’s counsel made the following argument: “Remember
their specific representation isn’t that they [Appellees] copied
their code, although they say the entire code is trade secret,
because their own expert acknowledges we didn’t copy their code,
it’s what lies within the code.” (JA at 88, 91)
10
algorithms, block flow diagrams, narratives, and other documents
associated with the development of the twelve sections” of
software code DII asserts constitute trade secrets as well as
“all other sections of software code” DII has identified as its
trade secrets. 14 (JA at 125)(emphasis added) The magistrate judge
awarded Sentia the costs and attorneys’ fees associated with its
original motion to compel and its initial motion for sanctions.
On March 9, 2007, DII requested clarification as to whether
the magistrate judge contemplated production of existing
documentation only, or whether DII was expected to reverse
engineer algorithms from its current version of the source
code. 15 DII explained in its motion that, because the EU Model
was created over fifteen years ago, DII no longer had in its
possession documentation associated with the development of the
EU Model, including algorithms that would have been initially
14
An algorithm is “[a] step-by-step problem-solving
procedure, especially an established, recursive computational
procedure for solving a problem in a finite number of steps.”
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 45 (3rd
ed. 1992).
15
The term “reverse engineer” means “to analyze a product
to try to figure out its components, construction, and inner
workings, often with the intent of creating something similar.”
WEBSTER’S NEW MILLENIUM DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Preview ed.
2008), available at http://www.dictionary.com.
11
relied upon. 16 DII reiterated the significant costs (as much as
$100,000) associated with reverse engineering the existing
source code for the purpose of creating new algorithms. DII
also submitted additional expert reports by Dr. Bueno de
Mesquita and Andrew Fahey. 17
On March 16, 2007, the magistrate judge issued an order
clarifying his March 5, 2007 ruling. The magistrate judge
explained that at the sanctions hearing held on February 23,
2007, the Court told DII that “it was not required to create any
algorithms, block flow diagrams, narratives, and other documents
associated with the development of its software or engage in
reverse engineering, but that [DII] should search and produce
any such responsive documents which already exist.” (JA at 144)
The order then stated that in light of DII’s representation that
no such responses exist, “this discovery matter is closed.” (JA
16
DII explained that its failure to retain such records is
not suspect. According to DII, unavailability can be attributed
to the fact that once a software code is debugged and made
operational, the original algorithms are of little value.
Similarly, as the software code is improved upon, the original
algorithms are seldom updated or referenced.
17
The Bueno de Mesquita report addressed Sentia’s claim
that certain DII processes were in the public domain and could
not be considered trade secrets. The Fahey report sought to
identify the alleged proprietary portions of the DII code also
found within the Sentia code.
12
at 144-45) Sanctions were imposed against DII for a total of
$13,256.25. 18
DII objected to the magistrate judge’s ruling. On March
30, 2007, the district court summarily affirmed the magistrate
judge’s March 5, 2007 Order, finding that the imposition of
sanctions was not “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” (JA at
224-25)
D.
Sentia moved for summary judgment on all of DII’s causes of
action. The district court heard oral argument and opined on
June 5, 2007, that summary judgment was proper on all of DII’s
claims. Regarding Claims III through VI, the district court
found that DII failed to meet its burden as to the existence of
a trade secret. The district court likewise based his ruling on
Counts I and II, the non-trade secret claims, on DII’s failure
to identify “any confidential or proprietary information
obtained by [Appellees] while employed at DII that were
thereafter misappropriated.” (JA at 271) The district court
also ruled that DII did not have an enforceable contract to
assert against Kugler.
18
After briefing, the magistrate judge held that DII was
subject to sanctions in the amount of $13,256.25. The award to
Sentia was based upon costs in the amount of $2,956.25 and
$10,300 in attorneys’ fees.
13
DII’s appeal is timely and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
On appeal, DII contends the trial court erred by finding,
as a matter of law, that DII failed adequately to identify any
trade secrets relating to its software. DII also challenges the
trial court’s rulings on its contractual claims as well as the
imposition of monetary sanctions for the alleged failure to
comply with its discovery obligations.
III.
This court reviews the district court’s decision granting
summary judgment de novo. See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508 (4th Cir. 2002).
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment may be granted where Athe pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986). A genuine issue exists only if Athe evidence
14
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party.@ Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Under Rule 56(e), “an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Thus, in order to
survive summary judgment, DII is required to produce evidence
setting forth specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. In conducting its analysis, the court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
A. Trade Secret Claims – Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-336The success of DII’s appeal largely depends upon whether
DII presented sufficient evidence at summary judgment in support
of its contention that its software may be deemed a trade
secret.
Virginia’s version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines
a “trade secret” as “information, including but not limited to a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
1. Derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
15
2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Va. Code. § 59.1-336 (emphasis added). 19
“The crucial characteristic of a trade secret is secrecy
rather than novelty.” Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting &
Packaging, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Va. 1990); Avtec Syss.,
Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 575 (4th Cir. 1994) (same). “The
secrecy need not be absolute; the owner of a trade secret may,
without losing protection, disclose to a licensee, an employee,
or a stranger, if the disclosure is made in confidence, express
or implied.” Dionne, 397 S.E.2d at 113 (citing Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974)); Trandes Corp. v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993). “Although
the subject of a trade secret may be novel in the sense that it
is something generally unknown in the trade or business,
“[n]ovelty, in the patent law sense, is not required for a trade
secret.” Id. (citing Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476.)
Whether or not a trade secret exists is a “fact-intensive
question to be resolved at trial.” Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan
Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 1999); Trandes,
996 F.2d at 661; Microstrategy, Inc. v. Li, 601 S.E.2d 580, 589
19
Virginia’s Trade Secrets Act is modeled after the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. See Dionne, 397 S.E.2d at 114; Avtec Syss.,
21 F.3d at 574 (Virginia’s statute “closely tracks the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act.”)
16
(Va. 2004)(“[T]he determination whether a trade secret exists
ordinarily presents a question of fact to be determined by the
fact finder from the greater weight of the evidence.”)
DII’s first trade secret claim is founded upon its software
as a total compilation. In addition, DII contends that twelve
specific functions within the DII Code amount to one or more
protected trade secrets. DII suggests that the proper analysis
is to evaluate each identified trade secret claim independently
as in Trandes. See e.g., Trandes, 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993)
(applying identical Maryland’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act in
post-trial context). We agree. Because the district court did
not consider whether DII’s entire software compilation might
qualify as a “trade secret” under the Virginia statute, we
remand to the district court with guidance as follows:
1. Software Compilation Claim
The district court found that, “Plaintiff [DII] could not
provide adequate identification of its trade secrets and
confidential information, making it almost impossible for this
Court and Defendants [Sentia] to ascertain what aspects of the
EU Model are trade secrets, and which portions of the code are
publicly available.” (JA at 270) The district court did not
address whether or not the software program, as a total
compilation, could qualify as a trade secret.
17
Understandably, identification of DII’s alleged trade
secrets presented difficulty for the court. As noted, supra, the
parties argued over DII’s actual legal theory. Sentia insisted
that because DII did not assert a copyright claim, the
application itself was not at issue. Sentia dedicated little
time to DII’s software compilation claim. Sentia’s expert
devoted only one paragraph within his original expert
declaration to this aspect of DII’s trade secret claim. Before
DII produced the flowchart and block diagram of its source code,
Dr. Alexander stated:
“I am unable to respond to the first
identification relating to the entire code to the
engine of DII’s software as a compilation.” In the
source code provided I can see numerous standard Basic
language extensions to Basic that Microsoft itself
would most likely consider proprietary. DII
proprietary contributions, if any, are not apparent
from the entirety of the code module.”
(JA at 200) Similarly, Dr. Alexander’s rebuttal report focused
almost entirely on DII’s twelve process claims. Citing no legal
authority, Sentia then faulted DII for its failure to produce
algorithms corresponding to its source code.
Our opinion in Trandes is instructive regarding DII’s
burden. Trandes involved a computer program that performed
survey calculations for the construction of subway tunnels. See
Trandes, 996 F.2d at 657. In addition to an independent software
compilation claim, the Trandes plaintiff alleged that both the
18
“specific engineering formulas and methods of calculation
embodied in the Tunnel System” and “the structure and
organization of the Tunnel system modules” constituted
additional trade secrets. Trandes, 996 F.2d at 661, 662 n.7.
These two claims were dismissed, however, because Trandes did
not provide “any information whatsoever about the formulas” and
likewise failed to explain “how the program was structured [or]
how the program was organized.” Trandes, 996 F.2d at 661-662(plaintiff is required “to describe the subject matter of its
alleged trade secrets in sufficient detail to establish each
element of a trade secret”). Although the Trandes plaintiff was
ultimately unsuccessful on two of its trade secret claims, we
determined that Trandes presented sufficient evidence that the
software itself, which was identified by source code and
produced at trial, constituted a trade secret. Trandes, 996
F.2d at 662-663. Accordingly, we upheld the jury’s verdict that
the software compilation was a protected trade secret. Id.Thus, Trandes teaches that a plaintiff’s alleged software
compilation trade secret is to be analyzed separate and apart
from other software trade secret claims, and that production of
source code is an acceptable method of identifying an alleged
compilation trade secret. Trandes, 996 F.2d at 661-63.
With respect to algorithms, DII represents that because its
code was created over fifteen years ago, it had none to produce.
19
However, in addition to producing a complete copy of its source
code, DII also presented detailed block diagram flow charts as
well as expert testimony in support of its position that its
source code is unique. Sentia’s own expert recognized that a
flow chart is an acceptable and “equally precise” alternative to
the production of algorithms for purposes of identification of
alleged proprietary software. (JA at 197-98)
DII produced its entire source code, as well as a flow
chart and narrative explaining its software program as a whole.
Accordingly, we remand DII’s software compilation claim to the
district court for independent consideration. On remand, should
the district court determine that DII adequately identified its
software compilation claim, the district court should then
consider the sufficiency of DII’s showing as to the existence of
a trade secret and thence a triable issue of fact. In doing so,
the district court should specifically address the relevant
criteria for establishing the existence of a trade secret under
Va. Code. § 59.1-336, namely, whether or not the compilation has
independent economic value, is generally known or readily
ascertainable by proper means, and is subject to reasonable
efforts to main secrecy. 20 If, in light of these statutory
20
On the question of whether or not DII’s software
compilation is generally known or readily ascertainable by
proper means, we refer the district court to our opinion in
(Continued)
20
criteria, the district court finds that a triable issue is
presented, it should next consider whether sufficient evidence
of misappropriation exists to survive summary judgment.
2. Twelve Process Claims
DII also alleges that each of twelve individual portions of
the program within its source code (i.e., the twelve process
claims) constitute a trade secret. The parties’ experts disagree
regarding the adequacy of identification and proprietary status.
DII attempts to identify each of the twelve individual
components by including the lines of source code that apply or
correspond to each. DII’s expert explains that the twelve
alleged trade secret functions “are not located in a single
location in the Code, and therefore cannot easily be isolated
independent of the other code as currently written . . . .” (JA
at 188) DII also contends that “the annotation of the Code
which identifies the location of each of the functions
eliminates this impediment to identifying their functions within
the Code.” (JA at 188) DII does not describe what the lines of
code teach, or how they translate to a protectable trade secret.
Servo Corp. of Am. v. Con. Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551, 554 (4th
Cir. 1968) (recognizing that plaintiff’s trade secret “might
consist of several discrete elements, any one of which could
have been discovered by study of material available to the
public . . . .”)
21
Sentia’s expert persuasively describes the difficulty in
analyzing the twelve processes independently. According to Dr.
Alexander, if each individual process is considered
independently, the information provided by DII is incomplete and
fragmented. We agree that the information on the twelve process
claims is presented by DII in such a way as to prohibit
meaningful analysis by Sentia, the court, or a jury. For this
reason, we find that DII has not met its evidentiary burden with
respect to the twelve process claims and we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue.
3. Other Proprietary Claims
DII’s other claims seek protection of DII reports
containing marketing and research material, specific information
identified in DII’s user manual, and specific client contact
information. The district court determined that Counts III
through VI “presuppose the existence of confidential information
and trade secrets” and that DII’s “failure to identify [any such
information] with reasonable particularity” required dismissal.
(JA at 270) As a result, these specific categories of alleged
proprietary materials were not discussed by the district court
at all. Depending on the circumstances, any of this information
could be characterized as trade secrets. (See Section “III,
A.”) On remand, the district court will have an opportunity to
22
consider DII’s other proprietary claims under the statutory
criteria consistent with this court’s opinion.
B. Contractual Claims
1. Trade Secret Nondisclosure Agreements
Abdollahian entered into an Agreement on December 12, 1994,
agreeing not to disclose DII’s proprietary information. Efird
signed a similar Agreement on April 3, 1998. The Agreements
entered into by DII’s former employees contain nearly identical
language and call for the application of Virginia state law.
The Agreements include provisions for assignment of work product
to DII and the return of confidential material upon agreement
termination. The confidentiality clauses, entitled “Covenant To
Retain Confidence,” read as follows:
The Consultant / Representative 21 acknowledges that he
will, as a result of an association with Decision
Insights, Inc., have access to and be in a position to
receive information of a confidential or proprietary
nature including trade secrets. The Consultant /
Representative agrees that he will not, during the
association with Decision Insights or thereafter,
disclose to anyone whomsoever or use in any manner
whatsoever any confidential or proprietary
information, whether patentable or unpatentable,
concerning any inventions, discoveries, improvements,
processes, methods, trade secrets, research or secret
data (including but not limited to, models, formulas,
computer programs and software developments), or other
confidential matters possessed, owned, or used by
21
In their respective Agreements, Abdollahian is identified
as a “Consultant” and Efird is identified as a “Representative.”
23
Decision Insights that may be obtained or learned by
the Consultant / Representative in the course of, or
as a result of his association with Decision Insights,
except as such disclosure or use may be required in
the normal course of doing business with Decision
Insights and pursuant to Decision Insights Inc.[‘s]
prior written consent.
(JA at 386-387) The Agreements provide that the agreement shall
continue to bind the parties after their association ends. (JA
at 387)
With respect to Abdollahian and Efird, the district court
did not discuss enforceability of the respective confidentiality
provisions. Rather, the district court relied upon an asserted
lack of evidence of a breach and simply stated that DII “failed
to come forward with any evidence identifying any confidential
or proprietary information obtained by Defendants while employed
at DII that were[sic] thereafter misappropriated.” (JA at 271)
Because this court has determined that remand is proper
with respect to DII’s claim that its software as a compilation
may constitute a trade secret, remand is also proper on the
contractual claims in order for the district court to address
DII’s contractual claims in light of its findings with respect
to the existence of a trade secret.
Kugler was presented with a similar Trade Secret
Nondisclosure Agreement but DII never executed it. DII contends
that the parties’ agreement is reflected within a document
signed by Kugler on January 30, 1998. (JA at 860-62) Per
24
handwritten additions to the typed text (initialed “JK”), the
Agreement carves out an exception for academic use of Kugler’s
work product. (JA at 861) DII posits that Kugler intended to be
bound to the terms set forth in the January 30, 1998 document,
particularly confidentiality and nondisclosure, notwithstanding
the fact that DII never executed the written contract.
DII relies upon the Virginia State Supreme Court’s opinion
in Manss-Owens, which held that “the mere fact that a written
contract was contemplated does not necessarily show that no
binding agreement had been entered into.” Manss-Owens Co. v.
H.S. Owens Son, 105 S.E. 543, 547 (Va. 1921). The rationale for
the rule is explained as follows:
The whole question is one of intention. If the parties
are fully agreed, there is a binding contract,
notwithstanding the fact that a formal contract is to
be prepared and signed; but the parties must be fully
agreed and must intend the agreement to be binding.
If though fully agreed on the terms of their contract,
they do not intend to be bound until a formal contract
is prepared, there is no contract, and the
circumstances that the parties do intend a formal
contract to be drawn up is strong evidence that they
did not intend the previous negotiations to amount to
an agreement.
If it appears from the evidence that the minds of the
parties have met; that, on the one side, there was a
proposition for a contract, which proposition has been
accepted by the other party; that the terms were in
all respects agreed upon; and that a part of the
mutual understanding was that a written contract
embodying those terms should thereafter be executed by
the respective parties – there results an obligatory
contract which neither party is at liberty to
repudiate.
25
Manss-Owens Co., 105 S.E. at 547 (quoting Boisseau v. Fuller, 30
S.E.457 (Va. 1898)); see also Charbonnages de France v. Smith,
597 F.2d 406, 414-16 (4th Cir.1979) (explaining that questions
of mutual assent and the parties’ intentions are
“quintessentially disputes about ‘states of mind’” and that
“subjective states and objective manifestations of intention
present interpretive issues traditionally understood to be for
the trier of fact.”)
DII claims a genuine issue of material fact exists with
respect to whether Kugler intended to be bound in light of
Kugler’s deposition testimony that he had an agreement with DII
that he could use DII’s technology for academic purposes. (JA at
1376-77) According to DII, it would never have shared its
proprietary information with Kugler had he not intimated
agreement not to disclose its trade secret and confidential
information. In fact, after their disassociation, on January
22, 2003, Kugler wrote to DII to assure the company that he had
no intention of disclosing or making improper use of any
confidential DII information. In the same letter, Kugler refers
to the modifications he made to the January 30, 1998 document
and states, “it is unclear to me if the agreement was
consummated or to what extent the terms of such an agreement are
even enforceable.” (JA at 864, 1378) For these reasons, we also
26
remand as to this issue. Should the district court determine on
remand that DII in fact possessed trade secret, confidential, or
proprietary information, the district court should likewise
consider whether an implied agreement existed between DII and
Kugler as suggested by DII that prohibited Kugler from
disclosing this information. 22
2. Non-Competition Clause
Efird’s Agreement contained a non-competition clause or
restrictive covenant. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement reads in
pertinent part:
[D]uring the term of this agreement and for a period
of two years after termination of association, the
representative shall not, for any reason, directly or
indirectly, enter into or engage in any business
competition with the precise business as it now exists
[or] may exist at any time during the period of the
representative’s engagement . . . .
(JA at 387) The restrictive covenant seeks to prohibit Efird
from directly or indirectly engaging in any “business
competition” with DII’s “precise business as it now exists [or]
22
Sentia’s brief is of little help. Sentia fails to cite to
the record, or any case law, in support of its argument that the
district court correctly found, as a matter of law, that no
contract existed. In addition, Sentia confuses Abdollahian and
Kugler in its terse discussion of the contractual claims.
(Sentia claims that the Abdollahian contract was never signed by
DII. That is incorrect. Rather, the Kugler agreement is the one
DII never executed.)
27
may exist at any time during the period of [Efird’s] engagement”
with DII.
Under Virginia law, the following criteria determine
the validity of non-competition agreements:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the
employer, reasonable in the sense that it is no
greater than is necessary to protect the employer
in some legitimate business interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the
restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not
unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his
legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the
standpoint of a sound public policy?
Non-competition covenants which pass these tests in
the light of the facts of each case will be enforced
in equity.
Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 389
S.E.2d 467, 470 (Va. 1990) (quoting Roanoke Eng’g Sales v.
Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Va. 1982)). In other words, the
Court must determine whether the non-competition clause or
restraint is greater than necessary to protect DII’s interest or
unreasonable in limiting Efird’s ability to obtain other
suitable employment. See Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care,
Inc., 389 S.E.2d at 470.
Virginia law does not generally favor restrictive covenants
because such covenants are a restraint on trade. See Grant v.
Carotek, 737 F.2d 410, 411-412 (4th Cir. 1984). For this reason,
restrictive covenants are strictly construed against the
28
employer. Grant, 737 F.2d at 412; accord Roanoke Eng’g Sales
Co., 290 S.E.2d 882 (Va. 1982) (other citations omitted).
Moreover, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
restraint is reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
Id. (citing, inter alia, Richardson v. Paxton Co., 127 S.E.2d
113 (Va. 1962)).
In this case, Sentia attacks this provision of Efird’s
contract as ambiguous and overbroad. Sentia’s chief criticism
of the non-competition agreement is that the contract is vague
regarding the business of the company. Indeed, the district
court found the non-compete unenforceable on this basis. 23
Construing the non-compete clause against the employer, the
district court determined that the clause was “broader than
necessary” to protect DII’s legitimate business interests and
“unduly restrictive of Efird’s efforts to pursue his
livelihood.” (JA at 273)
In evaluating the reasonableness of the restraint from the
employer’s perspective, the first inquiry necessarily requires
the court to consider the nature of the legitimate business
23
Based on the purported lack of evidence establishing that
DII’s business was conducted worldwide, the district court also
found the absence of a geographic limitation unreasonable. The
district court likewise found the two-year time limitation
unreasonable. Given our analysis, we need not discuss these
issues.
29
interest at stake, namely, whether DII possessed trade secrets
or other confidential and proprietary information. See Meissel
v. Finley, 95 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Va. Ct. App. 1956) (“The
possession of trade secrets and confidential information is an
important consideration in testing the reasonableness of a
restriction on competition.”)(citing Stoneman v. Wilson, 192
S.E. 816, 819 (Va. 1937)); But see Paramount Termite Control
Co., Inc. v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 925 (Va. 1989) (“Although
often used as a justification for non-competition agreements, it
is not necessary that the employees actually had acquired or
possessed specific information that could be legally defined as
confidential or a trade secret, . . . .”)(internal quotations
omitted). Here, the district court determined, in effect, that
DII did not have any legitimate business interests worthy of
protection. As a result, the district court’s analysis of the
restrictive covenant was likely skewed by its conclusion that
DII failed to demonstrate the existence of a trade secret.
Each of Virginia’s tests for validity of a non-competition
clause prompts a reasonableness inquiry in which the analysis
would necessarily include consideration of the existence of a
trade secret to be protected. More importantly, the competing
interests of the employer and employee must be balanced by the
court and then squared with public policy. As explained by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, “[t]hese standards have been
30
developed over the years to strike a balance between an
employee’s right to secure gainful employment and the employer’s
legitimate interest in protection from competition by a former
employee based on the employee’s ability to use information or
other elements associated with the employee’s former
employment.” Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations
Servs., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (Va. 2005) (citing Worrie v.
Boze, 62 S.E.2d 876, 882 (1951)). For these reasons, we
conclude that remand is also proper on this issue so that the
requisite balancing and analysis may be conducted by the trial
court.
IV.
DII’s final argument on appeal is its challenge of the
district court’s March 5, 2007 Order imposing monetary sanctions
for alleged failure to comply with discovery obligations. The
district court’s decision to affirm the magistrate judge’s
sanctions order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
642 (1976).
The sanctions order was driven by the district court’s
concern that DII, for strategic reasons, refused adequately to
identify its purported trade secrets. However, the record tends
to show that both the magistrate judge and district court were
31
hampered by less than thorough showings by the parties and did
not come to understand fully the contours of DII’s compilation
argument.
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
imposition of sanctions for discovery violations. 24 Rule
37(a)(5)(A)(ii) provides that a district court “must not” order
sanctions if the opposing party’s nondisclosure was
“substantially justified.” A legal position is “substantially
justified” if there is a “genuine dispute” as to proper
resolution or if “a reasonable person could think it correct,
that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” See
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565-66 n.2 (1988).
As noted, the alleged factual basis for the imposition of
sanctions was that DII repeatedly responded inadequately to the
discovery requests of Sentia, namely, identification of what it
contended constituted trade secret material. To the extent DII
was deemed to have failed in its efforts adequately to identify
the twelve processes it contended were trade secrets, we agree
with the district court. (Section “III, A, 2,” supra) However,
the parties also legitimately disagreed about what was required
by DII in terms of identification.
24
The magistrate judge did not explain what provision of
Rule 37 he was applying.
32
As for the software compilation, DII argues first that the
magistrate judge did not expressly direct DII to produce
existing algorithms or other developmental documents prior to
March 5, 2007. In fact, DII contends that the first time
algorithms were even requested by Sentia was during the February
23, 2007 hearing on Sentia’s motion for sanctions. The record
confirms DII’s representation. (JA at 90-91, 95) Sentia
originally requested, and the magistrate judge first ordered, a
narrative description of the alleged trade secrets. In producing
the Slack report, DII complied with the February 17, 2007 Order.
Here, the parties had a “genuine dispute” as to the method
of identifying the alleged trade secrets. Algorithms were not
designated by Sentia or the court as the preferred method of
identification prior to February 23, 2007. In addition, DII had
reasonable cause to believe its production was sufficient in
light of our holding in Trandes. See Maddow v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., Inc., 107 F.3d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1997) (reliance on case
law is a relevant consideration in determining whether or not a
party’s actions during a discovery dispute are justified).
Accordingly, we find that DII’s failure to produce algorithms
was “substantially justified.” For these reasons, the
imposition of sanctions was not appropriate. On remand, the
district court is instructed to vacate this portion of its
33
earlier order and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
guidance herein provided.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
34