United States v. Harmer ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4213
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    CHARLES MONTEZE HARMER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CR-
    03-216-CCB)
    Submitted:   May 8, 2006                      Decided:   May 23, 2006
    Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit
    Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael Wein, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.      Rod J.
    Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Angela R. White, Assistant
    United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Defendant Charles Monteze Harmer challenges his conviction and
    sentence for drug-related offenses.          Finding his arguments without
    merit, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    I.
    On November 6, 2002, after obtaining warrants, Maryland police
    searched two homes that defendant Charles Monteze Harmer allegedly
    utilized to facilitate drug trafficking. At one of the residences,
    police found several baggies of powder and crack cocaine hidden in
    a jar buried in the backyard.          Harmer was present at the other
    home, and he gave several incriminating statements to police.
    The state of Maryland charged Harmer with several drug-related
    offenses.     He moved to suppress the statements that he made to
    police   while   they   conducted    their    search,   claiming   that   the
    statements were involuntary.        The state court granted this motion,
    and the state subsequently dismissed its charges against Harmer.
    On May 1, 2003, the federal government indicted Harmer on drug
    offenses arising out of the same conduct.               He again moved to
    suppress his incriminating statements on the same grounds given in
    state court.      The district court held that most of Harmer’s
    statements were voluntary and admissible.          On October 15, 2004, a
    jury convicted Harmer of possession with intent to distribute at
    least five grams but less than fifty grams of crack cocaine, and of
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    possession with intent to distribute at least twenty-five grams and
    less than fifty grams of powder cocaine, both in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2000).      The district court sentenced Harmer to
    262 months in prison for possession with intent to distribute crack
    cocaine and 240 months in prison for possession with intent to
    distribute powder cocaine. The sentences ran concurrently. Harmer
    appeals.
    II.
    Harmer    initially    argues   that    double   jeopardy      barred   his
    federal    prosecution,    because   the    state   had   already    dismissed
    similar charges.     We disagree.          Applying the dual sovereignty
    doctrine, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that successive
    federal and state prosecutions for the same criminal acts do not
    violate double jeopardy. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 
    474 U.S. 82
    ,
    88-89 (1985); see also United States v. Alvarado, 
    440 F.3d 191
    , 196
    (4th Cir. 2006) (citing cases).             Double jeopardy thus did not
    preclude Harmer’s federal prosecution.
    Harmer is also mistaken to the extent he suggests that a
    collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy prohibited the
    federal government from presenting his incriminating statements at
    trial after a state court had suppressed their use in a state
    prosecution.    “[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply here because
    the federal government was not a party in the state court action.”
    3
    United States v. Safari, 
    849 F.2d 891
    , 893 (4th Cir. 1988); see
    United States v. Ricks, 
    882 F.2d 885
    , 889-90 (4th Cir. 1989).              The
    district court could determine anew that Harmer’s statements were
    voluntary and thus admissible.*
    Harmer next contends that the district court erred when it
    failed to give the jury an instruction defining reasonable doubt.
    Harmer’s argument is without merit, because we have repeatedly
    disapproved of attempts by trial courts to provide the jury with a
    definition of reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn,
    
    359 F.3d 666
    , 676 (4th Cir. 2004).
    Harmer lastly challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.                 In
    so doing, he “must overcome a heavy burden.”               United States v.
    Hoyte, 
    51 F.3d 1239
    , 1245 (4th Cir. 1995).                 We consider “the
    evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
    light    most   favorable   to    the   Government,”     and   must   affirm    a
    conviction if “the evidence adduced at trial could support any
    rational   determination     of    guilty   beyond   a   reasonable    doubt.”
    United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 863 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
    *
    Additionally, Harmer asserts that the federal government --
    by sentencing him under the United States Sentencing Guidelines and
    not under the state’s more lenient procedures -- improperly
    retaliated against him for raising a successful constitutional
    challenge in state court.     But there is no evidence that his
    federal sentence was imposed to punish him for his exercise of
    constitutional rights, as opposed to his participation in criminal
    activities. We also note that the district court’s sentence within
    the Guideline range was reasonable. See United States v. Johnson,
    No. 05-4378, slip op. at 3-4 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2006).
    4
    (internal quotation marks omitted).     We are satisfied that a
    rational jury could reasonably convict Harmer of both counts based
    on the evidence presented.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Harmer’s conviction and
    sentence.   We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5