United States v. Fernandez-Gomez , 341 F. App'x 949 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-5185
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TOMAS FERNANDEZ-GOMEZ, a/k/a Tomas Fernandes, a/k/a Oscar
    Perez, a/k/a Tomas Fernadezo Gomez, a/k/a Thomas Fernandez,
    a/k/a Fidel Antonio Fernandez Gomez, a/k/a Tomas Gomez,
    a/k/a Tomas Fernandez, a/k/a Pachecho Tomas Hernandez, a/k/a
    Fidel Antonio Fernandez,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.  Claude M. Hilton, Senior
    District Judge. (1:08-cr-00357-CMH-1)
    Submitted:    July 29, 2009                 Decided:   August 17, 2009
    Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Richard H.
    McWilliams, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria,
    Virginia, for Appellant.   Dana J. Boente, Acting United States
    Attorney, Kristin A. Taylor, Special Assistant United States
    Attorney,   Gene  Rossi,   Assistant  United  States  Attorney,
    Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Tomas Fernandez-Gomez was found guilty, following a
    jury trial, of illegal reentry after removal from the United
    States, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a) (2006).                       The district
    court sentenced him to time served, followed by two years of
    supervised release.         Fernandez-Gomez now appeals.
    Fernandez-Gomez’s       sole         claim    on   appeal    is    that    the
    district court erred in admitting two warrants of deportation
    into evidence.        He argues that the warrants were admitted in
    violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the
    Sixth Amendment.       He also argues that the warrants contain the
    observations     of   law    enforcement          officers     and    thus    cannot    be
    admitted pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B).
    We    review       evidentiary             rulings       implicating       the
    Confrontation Clause de novo.                    United States v. Abu Ali, 
    528 F.3d 210
    , 253 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 1312
    (2009).     In Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 53-54 (2004),
    the   Supreme    Court      interpreted          the     Confrontation        Clause   as
    barring “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who
    did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify,
    and   the   defendant       had   had    a       prior    opportunity        for   cross-
    examination.”     “As Crawford and later Supreme Court cases make
    clear, a statement must be ‘testimonial’ to be excludable under
    the Confrontation Clause.”              United States v. Udeozor, 
    515 F.3d
                                             2
    260, 268 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U.S. 813
     (2006)).         After reviewing the warrants of deportation in
    this   case,    we    find    that   they    are   nontestimonial         and    are
    therefore not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation
    Clause.    See United States v. Burgos, 
    539 F.3d 641
    , 645 (7th
    Cir.   2008)   (collecting       cases).      We   further    find    that       the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
    warrants pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B).                 Rule 803(8)(B)
    creates an exception to the hearsay rule for public records and
    reports   setting     forth    “matters     observed   pursuant      to    a    duty
    imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
    excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police
    officers and other law enforcement personnel.”                 Fed. R. Evid.
    803(8)(B).
    We find that the warrants of deportation in this case
    consisted of a “routine, objective, cataloging of [] unambiguous
    factual matter[s].”          United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 
    411 F.3d 1067
    , 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2005).              Additionally, the warrants and
    the notations on the back pages have “none of the features of
    the subjective report made by a law enforcement official in an
    on-the-scene    investigation,       which    investigative    reports          lack
    sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness because they are made
    in an adversary setting and likely to be used in litigation.”
    United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 
    617 F.2d 533
    , 535 (9th Cir.
    3
    1980)    (holding    exception       set       forth    in     Rule   803(8)(B)      was
    inapplicable to warrant of deportation where notation that alien
    was    deported    was    “ministerial,         objective       observation       [with]
    inherent reliability because of the Government’s need to keep
    accurate records of the movement of aliens”); see also United
    States v. Agustino-Hernandez, 
    14 F.3d 42
    , 43 (11th Cir. 1994)
    (holding that the admission of “routinely and mechanically kept
    I.N.S.   records,”       such   as   a   warrant       of    deportation,    does   not
    violate Rule 803(8)(B)).
    Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
    not err in admitting the warrants of deportation into evidence.
    We therefore affirm Fernandez-Gomez’s conviction and sentence.
    We    dispense    with   oral    argument       because      the   facts    and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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