United States v. Lightner ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-7291
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DAVID FITZGERALD LIGHTNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior
District Judge. (3:93-cr-00133-RDP)
Submitted: January 29, 2008 Decided: February 22, 2008
Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Fitzgerald Lightner, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Fitzgerald Lightner appeals the district court’s
opinion “clarifying” his criminal judgment with respect to the
payment of the fine. On appeal, Lightner’s sole argument is that
the district court lacked authority to essentially modify his
criminal judgment. We agree and, accordingly, vacate and remand.
In 1994, David Fitzgerald Lightner was convicted of one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine
base, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and one count of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The criminal judgment
further provided for a $25,000 fine, to be paid “in installments
according to the schedule of payments as prepared by the Probation
Office.” This court subsequently held in United States v. Miller,
77 F.3d 71, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1996), that the sentencing court cannot
delegate the authority to schedule payment of a fine to a
non-judicial officer.
According to Lightner, an inmate at Bennettsville Federal
Correctional Institution, he was placed on refusal status for
failure to pay the $25,000 fine imposed as part of his May 1994
sentence. Lightner states that, when he appealed through
administrative remedies, he was removed from refusal status and
placed on temporary exempt status while the warden generated a
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letter to the sentencing judge requesting clarification on
Lightner’s judgment.
The district court, based on letters from the U.S.
Attorney’s Office and the Probation Office, responded, noting that
the sentencing judge in Lightner’s case had since retired and was
therefore no longer on the bench. The district court therefore
directed that the subject letter be treated as the court’s opinion
regarding Lightner’s judgment and commitment. The district court
stated that “Mr. Lightner should be participating in the Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) to satisfy his financial
obligation.” The district court noted that it believed “the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S. Probation Office concur with
this opinion.” As a consequence, Lightner was, according to him,
placed back on refusal status for failure to pay the fine.
Relying on United States v. Jones, 238 F.3d 271 (4th Cir.
2001), Lightner argues on appeal that the district court lacked
authority to essentially modify his criminal judgment. In Jones,
the district court ordered Jones to pay a fine of $10,000. In
Jones’ 1995 criminal judgment, the district court directed the
Bureau of Prisons to establish a payment schedule pursuant to the
IFRP and directed that upon Jones’ release from custody the
probation officer would establish, and could modify, a payment
schedule. 238 F.3d at 272. In light of Miller, the warden of the
correctional institution in which Jones was incarcerated sent a
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letter to the district court concerning the change in law. In
response, the district court sua sponte entered an order on October
13, 1999, amending Jones’ criminal judgment order to provide that
the $10,000 fine “shall be due and payable immediately.” On
appeal, this court held that the district court lacked authority to
amend Jones’ judgment, noting that the district court had no
authority to act based solely on a subsequent change in case law,
even though it was attempting to bring Jones’ sentence in
compliance with subsequent case law. Id. at 272-73.
In Jones, the district court clearly entered an order
amending Jones’ judgment to provide a different payment method than
that ordered in the original judgment. In this case, the district
court took a less formal approach, stating in its opinion letter
that it merely sought to “clarify the verbiage used in Mr.
Lightner’s Judgment and Commitment.” Although intended to clarify
the language of the sentencing court and to enforce the sentencing
court’s original intent, we find that the district court’s opinion
constituted an unauthorized amendment to the judgment. The
original judgment provides that the fine be paid according to the
schedule of payments prepared by the Probation Office. In its
opinion, the district court imposed the requirement that Lightner
participate in the IFRP. However informal and well-intended the
court’s letter, the practical effect of the clarification was
accomplishing “through the back door” what the district court was
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admonished from doing in Jones. Based on Jones, we find that the
court was unauthorized to “clarify” the judgment, which essentially
served to amend the judgment.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s opinion
regarding Lightner’s judgment, and to the extent that it replaced
the original judgment, we remand with instructions to reinstate the
original sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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