Manalang v. Mukasey , 268 F. App'x 234 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1658
ELINOR PAULINO MANALANG,
Petitioner,
versus
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (A44-714-822)
Submitted: January 9, 2008 Decided: January 23, 2008
Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kim-Bun Thomas Li, LI, LATSEY & GUITERMAN, PLLC, Washington, D.C.,
for Petitioner. Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Linda S. Wendtland, Assistant Director, John C.
Cunningham, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Elinor Paulino Manalang, a native and citizen of the
Philippines, petitions for review orders of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the
immigration judge’s order finding her removable pursuant to INA
§ 237(a)(1)(G)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii) (West 2005 &
Supp. 2007) and INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(A), and
denying her several requests for relief. The record reveals
Manalang married a United States citizen in the Philippines while
she was still married to a Filipino citizen. She arrived in the
United States on a visa procured as a result of the marriage to the
United States citizen, despite the fact that her United States
citizen husband had asked for a divorce. Upon her arrival in the
United States, Manalang waited four months until she made contact
with him and then only by a telephone call. She made no attempt
during this period to fulfill the marriage agreement, cohabit,
share affection, or share resources. Manalang makes several
arguments challenging the Board’s findings, which we reject.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
We note Manalang did not contest removability for having
committed fraud or willful, material misrepresentation in receiving
her visa. See INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(A); INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(C). The failure to exhaust
a claim before the Board deprives this court of jurisdiction to
- 2 -
review the claim. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(d)(1) (West 2005); Asika
v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 264, 267 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004).
We further find the evidence did not compel a different
result. Administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (West 2005). This court will
reverse the Board “only if the evidence presented . . . was so
compelling that no reasonable fact finder could” fail to find that
the petitioner intended to fulfill her marriage contract. See Rusu
v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding
that Manalang did not intend to fulfill her marriage contract with
her United States citizen husband. Furthermore, the factual
findings made by the immigration judge and the Board as it denied
Manalang’s requests for discretionary relief will not be disturbed.
We find Manalang fails to establish that the immigration
judge had a personal bias against her or that she was unfairly
prejudiced by the immigration judge’s conduct. Rusu, 296 F.3d at
320.
We further find neither the immigration judge nor the
Board erred by not applying United States domestic law to the
question of the validity of Manalang’s second marriage in light of
the fact that Manalang, without citation or support, claimed the
marriage was valid under Filipino law. Furthermore, the issue at
- 3 -
the center of Manalang’s case is her deceptiveness and material
misrepresentation to government authorities regarding her first
marriage. The question of the legality of her second marriage is
secondary.
Finally, we find no merit to Manalang’s equal protection
argument or procedural due process claim.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
- 4 -