Merrill Lynch Business Financial Services, Inc. v. Targan , 276 F. App'x 309 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-2103
MERRILL LYNCH BUSINESS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT S. TARGAN,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
SHEILA TARGAN; CHARLES SCHWAB; SANDY SPRING BANK,
Garnishees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Charles B. Day, Magistrate Judge.
(8:05-cv-01251)
Submitted: April 10, 2008 Decided: May 7, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert B. Scarlett, SCARLETT & CROLL, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellant. Harry Martin Rifkin, COHAN, WEST, RIFKIN & COHEN,
P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -
PER CURIAM:
After a consent judgment was entered against Robert
Targan and in favor of Merrill Lynch Business Financial Services,
Inc., Merrill Lynch filed a writ of garnishment of funds held by
Targan and his wife with Charles Schwab & Co. Targan and his wife
filed separate motions to release the property from levy. The
district court referred the case to a magistrate judge for
discovery. Thereafter, the magistrate judge issued orders denying
the Targans’ motions and ordering the release to Merrill Lynch of
certain funds in the Charles Schwab accounts. Targan now appeals
from the magistrate judge’s orders denying his motion to release
property under levy and denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion.
We find that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to enter a
final order; therefore, we vacate the magistrate judge’s orders and
remand for further proceedings.
A magistrate judge may only enter a final appealable
judgment if the district court has properly referred the case to
the magistrate judge and the parties consent to the magistrate
judge entering a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2000).
Here, the magistrate judge was not directed to conduct any
proceedings other than discovery, and the parties did not consent
to final disposition by the magistrate judge as required by 28
U.S.C. § 636(c). Thus, the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to
enter a final order. See United States v. Bryson, 981 F.2d 720,
- 3 -
726 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858,
870 (1989). Accordingly, we vacate the orders entered by the
magistrate judge and remand this case for further proceedings. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
- 4 -