Double Diamond Properties, LLC v. BP Products North America, Inc. ( 2008 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-1539
    DOUBLE DIAMOND PROPERTIES, LLC; CYPRESS          POINT   CITGO,
    INCORPORATED, trading as Bayside BP,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED, f/k/a Amoco Oil
    Company,
    Defendant - Appellee,
    v.
    PAPCO, INCORPORATED,
    Movant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District
    Judge. (2:06-cv-00226-WDK)
    Submitted:    March 20, 2008                  Decided:   May 13, 2008
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Peter G. Zemanian, ZEMANIAN LAW GROUP, Norfolk, Virginia, for
    Appellants.  David M. Harris, Lizabeth M. Conran, GREENSFELDER,
    HEMKER & GALE, P.C., St. Louis, Missouri; William F. Devine,
    WILLIAMS MULLEN, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Double Diamond Properties, LLC (“Double Diamond”),* a
    Virginia Limited Liability Company that owns and operates a gas
    station on Haygood Road in Virginia Beach (the “Haygood station”),
    appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment on
    Double Diamond’s complaint for declaratory relief and damages under
    Virginia state law against BP Products North America, Incorporated,
    formerly known as Amoco Oil Company (“BP”), a Maryland corporation
    with its principal place of business in Illinois.   Double Diamond
    seeks relief from the operation of a restrictive covenant in favor
    of BP in the deed to a parcel of property where Double Diamond
    operates the Haygood station.    The district court found that the
    deed restriction was enforceable as it is applied against Double
    Diamond.   We affirm.
    Double Diamond purchased the Haygood station in January
    2006 from Canal Enterprises, LLC (“Canal”).    Canal purchased the
    Haygood station from Amoco in 2001, subject to a deed restriction
    that provides in pertinent part:
    The Grantee herein covenants and agrees, for itself, and
    its heirs, executors, grantees, successors and assigns,
    that no part of the real estate herein conveyed, shall be
    used by said Grantee, its heirs, executors, grantees,
    successors and assigns, for the purpose of conducting or
    *
    Cypress Point Citgo, Incorporated, trading as Bayside BP,
    joined the lawsuit as an additional party plaintiff with claims
    based upon the same legal theory as those of Double Diamond.
    Cypress Point is also a party to this appeal. For the sake of
    clarity, we refer only to Double Diamond.
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    carrying on the business of selling, handling, or dealing
    in gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene, benzol, naphtha,
    greases, lubricating oils, or any fuel used for internal
    combustion engines, or lubricants in any form; unless the
    items sold, handled or dealt in are supplied, either
    directly or indirectly, from the Grantor.            This
    restriction binds and restricts the property as a
    covenant and restriction running with the land and is
    deemed to benefit Grantor as an owner or lessee of lands
    in the City of Portsmouth, Virginia metropolitan area or
    as the operator or supplier of retail operations in the
    City of Portsmouth, Virginia metropolitan area. Except
    as otherwise provided herein, this restrictive covenant
    will remain in full force for a term of ten (10) years
    from the date of this conveyance, whereupon this
    restrictive covenant will automatically lapse and
    terminate and be of no further force or effect.        If
    Grantor discontinues supplying gasoline to Grantee or an
    Affiliate (as hereinafter defined) of Grantee, or their
    respective heirs, executors, grantees, successors or
    assigns (unless such discontinuance is a result of the
    action of Grantee or an Affiliate of Grantee), on a
    direct or indirect basis for a period of thirty (30) or
    more consecutive days during such ten (10) year term,
    then, within thirty (30) days after receipt of Grantee’s
    written request therefor, Grantor, at Grantor’s sole
    option, shall either recommence supplying gasoline or
    terminate    the    foregoing    restrictive    covenant.
    Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, in the
    event the Dealer Supply Agreement with Grantee or an
    Affiliate of Grantee is terminated early pursuant to
    Section 27 of the Dealer Supply Agreement, this
    restrictive covenant shall remain in full force and
    effect for the remaining balance of the ten (10) year
    term of this restrictive covenant.
    In October 2005, BP assigned to Miller Oil Company
    (“Miller Oil”) its exclusive rights, pursuant to deed restrictions,
    to distribute BP fuel to several gas stations in the Virginia Beach
    area, including the Haygood station, which at the time was owned by
    Canal but not in operation.   The assignment was part of BP’s broad
    corporate strategy to transition from directly supplying retail
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    operations with BP fuel to indirectly supplying retailers through
    contracts with “jobbers” such as Miller Oil that would distribute
    BP fuel to the retailers.            Miller Oil paid BP for the rights to
    distribute fuel to the specified stations, with the expectation
    that the Haygood station in particular would generate approximately
    one million gallons per year in fuel sales.
    Also in October 2005, Canal entered into an agreement to
    sell   the    Haygood      Station   to    Double    Diamond.    Double   Diamond
    negotiated        with   Miller    Oil    concerning    a   supply   agreement   in
    November 2005, but closed on the purchase of the Haygood Station in
    January 2006 without a supply agreement for BP fuel in place.
    Double Diamond then attempted to enter into a supply agreement for
    BP fuel with PAPCO, Inc., another jobber for BP.                PAPCO was unable
    to supply BP fuel for the Haygood station because BP had assigned
    the exclusive distributorship right from the deed to the Haygood
    station      to   Miller    Oil.     Double       Diamond   preferred   the   terms
    available under a supply contract with PAPCO to those available
    from Miller Oil because the cost of BP fuel from PAPCO was lower
    than the cost of BP fuel from Miller Oil, and because Miller Oil
    operates retail gas stations in the Virginia Beach market, whereas
    PAPCO does not compete in the retail market with Double Diamond.
    Double Diamond sought a declaratory judgment that the
    restrictive covenant is no longer enforceable, as well as damages
    based upon the difference in cost between obtaining BP fuel from
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    Miller    Oil    or    PAPCO.       Double    Diamond       argues      that:     (1)   the
    restrictive covenant is no longer enforceable according to its
    stated terms, because BP no longer benefits from the covenant as an
    owner or lessee of lands or as an operator or supplier of retail
    operations;      (2)    the     covenant     has    terminated       due     to   changed
    circumstances because the Haygood station is now supplied directly
    by a retail competitor, Miller Oil, that has the power to determine
    the wholesale price of fuel purchased by the Haygood station,
    rather than BP, which does not compete with the Haygood station in
    the retail market; and (3) the covenant has been invalidated by its
    unreasonable application to Double Diamond, because BP would earn
    the same profit margin on sales of fuel to the Haygood station
    through either Miller Oil or PAPCO.
    BP    moved       for   summary        judgment,       arguing      that    the
    restrictive covenant is enforceable according to its terms because,
    when read as a whole, the covenant benefits BP as either a direct
    or indirect supplier of fuel to retail operations, rather than only
    as a direct supplier of fuel.                Accordingly, BP claims that the
    covenant   did    not     become    unenforceable        when      BP   switched        from
    supplying fuel directly to retailers to supplying fuel indirectly
    through    jobbers.        BP    also   argued       that    the    covenant       is   not
    unreasonable as applied to Double Diamond, because it is applied in
    a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner.                      Although BP could
    earn the same profit margin on fuel sold to Double Diamond for the
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    Haygood station through a jobber other than Miller Oil, BP would be
    subject to a claim by Miller Oil that it breached the contract for
    the sale of its supply agreement for the Haygood station if Double
    Diamond were allowed to purchase BP fuel elsewhere, because part of
    the value of the supply agreements that Miller Oil purchased from
    BP included the anticipated profits from selling fuel to the
    Haygood station.
    BP also claimed that the marketability of its supply
    agreements to other jobbers throughout the country would be damaged
    if Double Diamond were able to avoid purchasing fuel from Miller
    Oil under this agreement.         BP argued that the circumstances under
    which   it   executed    the   restrictive      covenant       have    not   changed
    radically, so as to invalidate the covenant, because although
    Miller Oil, unlike BP, is allowed to operate retail gas stations
    that could compete with the Haygood station, Miller Oil does not
    operate any gas stations within two miles of the Haygood station.
    BP’s stated purpose for enforcing the restrictive covenant, to
    guarantee a market for its fuel, has not changed despite the move
    from    directly      supplying     retailers        to     supplying     retailers
    indirectly,    and,    therefore,      BP   argues    that    the     circumstances
    surrounding the covenant have not radically changed.
    The   district    court    granted      BP’s    motion    for   summary
    judgment, finding that the restrictive covenant remained valid
    according to its terms because BP still benefits from the covenant
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    as a supplier of fuel for retail operations, despite the fact that
    it now supplies fuel to retailers only indirectly.                The court
    reasoned that BP may benefit as either a direct or an indirect
    supplier   because   the   covenant   specifies     that   its   restriction
    terminates if BP stops selling fuel “on a direct or indirect
    basis.”    The inclusion of “indirect” in that provision would be
    meaningless if BP were to lose its status as beneficiary, thereby
    invalidating the covenant, by changing its operation from that of
    a direct supplier of fuel to that of an indirect supplier of fuel.
    The court found that although the restrictive covenant does not
    expressly allow BP to assign exclusive rights to distribute fuel to
    particular stations to third-party suppliers, BP has the inherent
    authority to unilaterally choose how it distributes its products,
    regardless   of   the   covenant.     The   court    determined    that    the
    circumstances     surrounding   the   covenant      have   not   changed   so
    radically as to destroy its purpose to benefit BP as a refiner and
    supplier of gasoline, because BP still benefits from fuel sales as
    a result of the covenant, despite the fact that those sales are
    made through Miller Oil as an intermediate supplier.                 Double
    Diamond and Cypress Point noted a timely appeal.
    We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a
    written contract as a question of law.              See Seabulk Offshore,
    Ltd. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 
    377 F.3d 408
    , 418 (4th Cir. 2004).
    The interpretation of the restrictive covenant at issue is guided
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    by Virginia law.         Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F.,
    Inc., 
    211 F.3d 846
    , 850 (4th Cir. 2000).              A federal court sitting
    in diversity must “rule upon [Virginia] state law as it exists and
    not . . . surmise or suggest its expansion.”                   
    Id. at 850 n.3
    (internal quotes and citation omitted).
    (I) Enforceability of the Restrictive Covenant by its Stated Terms
    Under Virginia law, covenants restricting the free use of
    land are disfavored and must be strictly construed.                   Mid-State
    Equipment Co. v. Bell, 
    225 S.E.2d 877
    , 884 (Va. 1976).                   “[T]he
    person claiming the benefit of the restrictions must prove that the
    covenants are applicable to the acts of which he complains.”
    Sloan    v.   Johnson,   
    491 S.E.2d 725
    ,    727   (Va.    1997)   (citations
    omitted).      We will also apply Virginia principles of contract
    interpretation and “seek to determine the intent of the parties
    from the language expressed in the contract.”                Providence 
    Square, 211 F.3d at 850
    (citation omitted).            Contract terms that are clear
    and unambiguous will be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning,
    but extrinsic evidence may be used to interpret vague or ambiguous
    terms, and substantial doubts or ambiguity about the meaning of a
    restrictive covenant will be resolved in favor of the unrestricted
    use of land.      
    Id. (citations omitted). To
    enforce a real covenant in Virginia, a party must
    prove the following elements: (1) privity between the
    original parties to the covenant (horizontal privity);
    (2) privity between the original parties and their
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    successors in interest (vertical privity); (3) an intent
    by the original covenanting parties that the benefits and
    burdens of the covenant will run with the land; (4) that
    the covenant “touches and concerns” the land; and (5) the
    covenant must be in writing.
    Sonoma Dev., Inc. v. Miller, 
    515 S.E.2d 577
    , 579 (Va. 1999)
    (citation and footnote omitted).
    Double Diamond argues that the restrictive covenant has
    expired according to its terms because BP no longer benefits from
    the covenant as a direct supplier of fuel to the Haygood station.
    Double       Diamond    contends       that   the    language     in   the   covenant
    concerning direct or indirect supply of fuel relates only to the
    scope of the restriction, meaning that Double Diamond may comply
    with the restriction by purchasing BP fuel either directly or
    indirectly.         Double Diamond likewise contends that BP must benefit
    as a direct supplier of fuel if it does not benefit as an owner or
    lessee   of     land    or   as   a    fuel   retailer,     because    the   language
    describing the benefit to BP from the restriction does not include
    the description “indirect supplier.”
    We   find,    however,      that     BP   still   benefits    from    the
    restriction as an indirect supplier of fuel to the Haygood station.
    Arguably, BP would still benefit as a direct supplier of retail
    operations even if a particular retail operator chose to obtain its
    BP    fuel    indirectly,     thereby       maintaining     the   validity    of     the
    covenant while still giving meaning to the restriction.                      However,
    the    restriction       could        be   rendered      meaningless    under       this
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    construction if all retail operators in the area chose to obtain BP
    fuel indirectly, robbing BP of its status as a direct supplier
    through no action of its own.      We conclude that the term “supplier”
    in the beneficiary sentence was intended to encompass acting as
    either an indirect supplier or a direct supplier, because both
    manners of supplying are contemplated by the description of the
    restriction.         The circumstances surrounding the covenant also
    indicate that BP was clearly contemplating that it would no longer
    own land or operate retail facilities in the area, and strongly
    indicate that BP contemplated phasing out its role as a direct
    supplier of fuel to retail operations, at the time the covenant was
    made.    Accordingly, because BP clearly benefits from the covenant
    as an indirect supplier of fuel, the covenant is still enforceable
    according to its terms.
    (II) Reasonableness of the Restrictive Covenant as Applied
    A restraint on alienation of property is valid if it is
    reasonable.      Carneal v. Kendig, 
    85 S.E.2d 235
    , 237 (Va. 1955)
    (citation omitted).       The determination of the reasonableness of a
    restraint on alienation requires balancing the policy in support of
    free alienation against the policy in favor of carrying out the
    wishes   of    the    grantor,   while   also   considering   whether   the
    limitation in question is favored or disfavored by the law.             
    Id. There is a
    distinction between the reasonableness of a restriction
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    on its face and the reasonableness of the restriction as applied,
    and a complaint must raise both issues in order for a court to
    properly consider them.   See Buchner v. Kenyon L. Edwards Co., 
    171 S.E.2d 676
    , 678 (Va. 1970).    A court must “consider (1) whether or
    not the agreement in question is reasonable as between the parties;
    and (2) if so, whether or not the agreement is injurious to the
    public interest by reason of its effect upon trade and, therefore,
    void.”   Klaff v. Pratt, 
    86 S.E. 74
    , 77 (Va. 1915).
    Double Diamond argues that the restrictive covenant is
    unreasonable as applied because the requirement that only BP fuel
    be sold at the Haygood station is unreasonable when applied in
    conjunction with Miller Oil’s exclusive right to distribute BP fuel
    to the Haygood station, because Miller Oil competes in the retail
    fuel market and because BP earns the same profit on fuel it
    supplies regardless of whether it uses Miller or another supplier.
    This argument presents a more difficult question. On the one hand,
    as the district court noted, BP possesses an inherent right to
    determine how it supplies retailers with fuel in the market, so the
    right to supply retailers through distributors with exclusive
    supply agreements does not have to be created by the restrictive
    covenant itself.   However, BP’s decision to supply fuel to the
    Haygood station through an exclusive distributorship agreement with
    Miller Oil has a greater impact on Double Diamond as a consequence
    of the restrictive covenant.   Because Double Diamond cannot choose
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    to   reject    Miller   Oil   as   a   supplier,    the     covenant     accords   a
    potential retail competitor great control over the price of the
    fuel supply for the Haygood station.
    If   Double   Diamond    were     allowed    to   comply   with   the
    restrictive covenant by purchasing BP fuel for the Haygood station
    through the supplier of its choice, the burden of the restrictive
    covenant on the Haygood station and its owner, Double Diamond,
    would be reduced, because Double Diamond could negotiate a lower
    price for its fuel supply.         The burden is arguably no greater than
    it would be if BP were the sole direct supplier of its fuel,
    however, because Double Diamond would have no choice as to the
    terms of its fuel supply agreement with BP.               Although Miller Oil is
    a potential competitor with Double Diamond in the retail market,
    there is evidence in the record that Miller Oil does not operate
    any retail gas stations within two miles of the Haygood station,
    and is therefore not currently in direct competition.                     Although
    this is a close issue, the standard for reasonableness established
    by Virginia courts does not clearly compel the invalidation of the
    restrictive covenant as applied to Double Diamond.                Because we are
    sitting in diversity jurisdiction, we decline to surmise or suggest
    the expansion of Virginia law in this case by holding that the
    restrictive covenant is unreasonable as applied.
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    (III) Validity of the Restrictive Covenant in Changed Circumstances
    A   change   in    circumstances     that   is    “so   radical   as
    practically to destroy the essential objects and purposes of the
    [covenant]” will render a restrictive covenant null and void.
    Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Ctr. Assocs., L.P. v. Smith, 
    568 S.E.2d 676
    , 680 (Va. 2002).           “The determination of the degree of
    change necessary to have this effect is inherently a fact-specific
    analysis in each case.”        
    Id. In order to
    determine the extent of
    the restriction imposed by a covenant, a court should “look to the
    substance   -   not   the     label   -   of   the   activity   sought   to   be
    restricted.”     Providence 
    Square, 211 F.3d at 851
    .
    Double Diamond argues that the restrictive covenant has
    expired due to changed circumstances because BP has radically
    altered its business practices by discontinuing its operations as
    a direct supplier of fuel to retail operations, instead supplying
    fuel for retail operations only indirectly.                  We hold that the
    circumstances     surrounding     the     covenant    have    not   changed   so
    radically as to destroy the primary purpose of the covenant for its
    beneficiary, BP, namely to ensure a continuing retail market for
    its fuel in the Virginia Beach area.           Although BP now benefits from
    the covenant as an indirect supplier of fuel, rather than a direct
    supplier, the essential purpose, to ensure an ultimate retail
    market for BP fuel, is still being met.               Although arguably the
    covenant did not expressly restrict the retailer’s choice of
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    supplier for BP fuel, the district court properly found that BP had
    the power to determine the terms under which it would supply fuel
    to retailers before the covenant was in place.   The circumstances
    surrounding the covenant have not radically changed merely because
    BP has opted to exercise that pre-existing right, and BP’s ultimate
    purpose in enforcing the covenant is still served.
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
    court’s judgment in favor of BP and against Double Diamond and
    Cypress Point.   We dispense with oral argument because the facts
    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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