United States v. Holloway , 431 F. App'x 233 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LIONEL HOLLOWAY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00363-WDQ-1)
Submitted: May 4, 2011 Decided: May 25, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Joanna Silver, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, John W. Sippel, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lionel Holloway appeals the fifteen year sentence
imposed by the district court upon his plea of guilty to one
count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The Armed Career Criminal Act
mandated a sentence of at least fifteen years because Holloway
had three previous convictions for serious drug offenses. 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). We affirm.
Holloway asserts a conflict between mandatory minimum
sentences and the general sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006). Section 3553(a) requires a court to “impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve
the enumerated purposes of sentencing. Holloway argues that a
fifteen year sentence is greater than necessary to accomplish
those purposes in his case, and thus the district court violated
§ 3553(a) in imposing the minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1).
The Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is a
part, dictates that a defendant should be sentenced in
accordance with its provisions to achieve the purposes of
§ 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided.” 18
U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006). Courts have opined that mandatory
minimum sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus
do not conflict with § 3553(a)’s parsimony clause. See United
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States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004). Other
courts, while not directly ruling on the alleged tension, have
similarly rejected arguments that § 3553(a) authorizes deviation
from statutorily-mandated sentences. United States v. Cirilo-
Muñoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1103 (2010); United States v. Franklin, 499
F.3d 578, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Roberson, 474
F.3d 432, 436-37 (7th Cir. 2007). In addressing a related
issue, we have stated that “a district court has no discretion
to impose a sentence outside of the statutory range established
by Congress for the offense of conviction.” United States v.
Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005). We see little need
to expound further on this concept.
Holloway also claims procedural and substantive
unreasonableness with his sentence. We review a sentence under
a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review
requires us to inspect for procedural reasonableness by ensuring
that the district court committed no significant procedural
errors, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or failing
to adequately explain the sentence. United States v. Boulware,
604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 2010). We then consider the
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substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. On appellate review, a sentence within a properly-
calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
Holloway complains that the district court did not
explain its rationale for the sentence in adequate depth. After
properly calculating the Guidelines sentence, the sentencing
court recounted specific aspects of Holloway’s circumstances,
including his employment history, witness testimony in his
support, and the length of time since his last conviction. The
court set forth a sufficiently developed rationale to support
Holloway’s sentence. Moreover, a sentence at the minimum term
prescribed by law is per se reasonable. United States v.
Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, Holloway’s
unreasonableness arguments fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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