United States v. Banks ( 2006 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5104
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RONALD DELANEY BANKS, a/k/a Floyd Banks, a/k/a
    Jerry J. Banks, a/k/a Ronald Dleian Banks,
    a/k/a Ronald H. Banks, a/k/a Ronald Harlain
    Banks, a/k/a Delaney Banks, a/k/a King,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District
    Judge. (CR-05-218)
    Submitted:   June 14, 2006                    Decided:   July 6, 2006
    Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael S. Nachmanoff, Acting Federal Public Defender, Nia Ayanna
    Vidal, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for
    Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Patrick F.
    Stokes, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronald   Delaney   Banks   was   convicted   for   armed   bank
    robbery, using a firearm during the robbery, and possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon.    On appeal, he challenges the denial
    of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his car after he
    was arrested.   We affirm.
    The following evidence was presented at the suppression
    hearing:   At 9:55 a.m. on April 5, 2005, a BB&T bank branch in
    Arlington, Virginia, was robbed at gunpoint.      The Arlington County
    Police Department issued a radio broadcast alert to its officers at
    9:56 that two black men, one much older than the other and in his
    sixties or seventies, had committed the robbery.         The alert also
    stated that one of the robbers was in dark clothing and that a gun
    had been made visible during the robbery.       Corporal Luke Hagloff,1
    an Arlington police officer, was patrolling near the bank, and he
    quickly set up surveillance at the 15th Street on-ramp to Route 1,
    which leads to the 14th Street Bridge and Washington, D.C.            This
    position was approximately one-half mile from the BB&T Bank. While
    the alert did not state that the robbers fled by car, Hagloff knew
    from his experience that people who commit bank robberies in this
    area often flee into Washington via the 14th Street Bridge.2
    1
    In the record, the Officer is referred to both as “Haglof”
    and “Hagloff”.
    2
    Hagloff also surmised that, because one person                  was
    significantly older, the robbers would likely flee by car.
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    From his surveillance position, Hagloff noticed Banks’
    car at 10:00, because (1) there was no front license plate, which
    could be a traffic violation;3 (2) there were two black males in
    the car that appeared to have the age differential announced in the
    broadcast message and at least one of them was in dark clothing;
    (3) both men studiously avoided looking at the officer as they
    drove past him; and (4) the officer saw that the car had a
    fraudulent Maryland temporary license plate affixed to the rear of
    the car, and Hagloff knew that criminals often use fake tags on
    getaway cars.   Hagloff followed the vehicle, turned on his lights
    and siren, and the defendant failed to immediately stop his car.
    Hagloff and Officers Pilco and Martin, who arrived on the scene,
    stopped the car and approached it with guns drawn. Hagloff ordered
    Banks out of the car, whereupon he was handcuffed and frisked.
    During the frisk, the officers recovered a loaded gun, and Banks
    was placed under arrest.   The subsequent search of the car yielded
    clothing matching the description of the robbers’ clothing, as well
    as the exact amount of money taken from the bank and a dye pack.
    Legal conclusions underlying the denial of a motion to
    suppress are reviewed de novo, while factual findings are reviewed
    for clear error.   United States v. Perkins, 
    363 F.3d 317
    , 320 (4th
    Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
    543 U.S. 1056
     (2005).   “An officer may,
    3
    The parties agree that, while each of the surrounding
    jurisdictions require permanent front tags, Maryland does not issue
    front temporary tags.
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    consistent   with   the   Fourth   Amendment,    conduct     a   brief,
    investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable
    suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”     Illinois v. Wardlow,
    
    528 U.S. 119
    , 123 (2000); Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 30 (1968).      To
    conduct a Terry stop, there must be “at least minimal level of
    objective justification for making the stop.” Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. at 123
    .   Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch, but less
    than probable cause and may be based on the collective knowledge of
    officers involved in an investigation.      
    Id. at 123-24
    ; see also
    United States v. Hensley, 
    469 U.S. 221
    , 232 (1985).        In assessing
    police conduct in a Terry stop, courts must look to the totality of
    the circumstances. United States v. Sokolow, 
    490 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1989).
    Officers conducting a lawful Terry stop may take steps
    reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety, check for
    identification, and maintain the status quo.    Hensley, 
    469 U.S. at 229, 235
    ; see also United States v. Moore, 
    817 F.2d 1105
    , 1108 (4th
    Cir. 1987) (brief but complete restriction of liberty is valid
    under Terry).   Once a vehicle is properly stopped, officers are
    permitted to remove passengers from the vehicle.           Maryland v.
    Wilson, 
    519 U.S. 408
    , 415 (1997).      In addition, a police officer
    may conduct a pat-down search of an individual stopped in a Terry
    situation if he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
    person is involved in illegal activity and is armed.             United
    States v. Raymond, 
    152 F.3d 309
    , 312 (4th Cir. 1998).      The standard
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    justifying such a pat-down search is not onerous. United States v.
    Swann, 
    149 F.3d 271
    , 274 (4th Cir. 1998).
    After a careful review of the record, we find that
    Hagloff had reasonable suspicion sufficient to conduct a Terry
    stop. Further, because Hagloff had a reasonable suspicion that the
    occupants of the car were involved in an armed robbery, the
    officers were justified in drawing their weapons, removing Banks
    from the car, and handcuffing and frisking him.   It is undisputed
    that, once the officers recovered a gun from Banks, there was
    probable cause to arrest him.4
    Accordingly, because the stop and brief restraint of
    Banks were proper under Terry, we affirm.   We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    Banks also appears to challenge the district court’s finding
    that Hagloff observed what he testified that he observed.      The
    court’s conclusions were not clearly erroneous.
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