United States v. Walker , 293 F. App'x 991 ( 2008 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-4913
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DEVON SHERMAIN WALKER, a/k/a Devon Sherman Walker,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
    District Judge. (1:07-cr-00077-WLO)
    Submitted:   September 10, 2008         Decided:   September 25, 2008
    Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Robert A.
    J. Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Devon Shermain Walker pled
    guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).                  At
    sentencing,   the    district     court   found   that   Walker’s    prior
    convictions classified him as an armed career criminal under the
    Armed Career Criminal Act, 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (e) (“ACCA”).           Walker
    was sentenced to a term of 180 months’ imprisonment.            Finding no
    error, we affirm.
    Following United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005),
    appellate review of a district court’s imposition of a sentence is
    for abuse of discretion.     Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    ,
    597 (2007); United States v. Pauley, 
    511 F.3d 468
    , 473 (4th Cir.
    2007).   The appellate court must first ensure that the district
    court committed no procedural error, such as “failing to calculate
    (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
    Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
    selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
    to   adequately   explain   the    chosen   sentence     —   including   an
    explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”            Gall,
    
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    .
    Walker claims the district court erred in classifying him
    as an armed career criminal.        A defendant qualifies as an armed
    career criminal under 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (e)(1) if he has three prior
    2
    convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense.                   In
    determining whether a crime is a violent felony within the meaning
    of the ACCA, the offense is considered generically in terms of how
    the law defines it and not in terms of how an individual offender
    might have committed the offense on a particular occasion.                  
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (e)(1), (e)(2)(B); Begay v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 1581
    , 1584 (2008).   Walker concedes he has two qualifying violent
    felony convictions, but he contests the use of a 2005 North
    Carolina felony conviction for Habitual Misdemeanor Assault as the
    third qualifying offense.    See 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2
     (2005).1
    Walker   argues   that   
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2
       is    a
    recidivist felony and not a violent felony for the purposes of the
    ACCA enhancement.2    However, “an offense committed by a repeat
    offender is often thought to reflect greater culpability and thus
    to merit greater punishment.       Similarly, a second or subsequent
    offense is often regarded as more serious because it portends
    greater future danger and therefore warrants an increased sentence
    for purposes of deterrence and incapacitation.”          United States v.
    Rodriguez, 
    128 S. Ct. 1783
    , 1789 (2008).          The Supreme Court in
    1
    Walker pled guilty to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2
     after he
    committed three misdemeanor assaults.
    2
    Although 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2
     states that convictions
    pursuant to that statute “shall not be used as a prior conviction
    for any other habitual offense statute,” federal law governs
    whether a particular state conviction is a qualifying predicate
    offense under the ACCA. 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(20) (2000).
    3
    Rodriguez rejected the argument that a defendant is punished under
    federal law for being treated as a recidivist under state law,
    noting that “ACCA is itself a recidivist statute.”         
    Id.
       In
    addition, 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2
     is not a sentencing enhancement
    but a substantive felony offense.     See State v. Smith, 
    533 S.E.2d 518
    , 520 (N.C. App. 2000).   We thus conclude the district court did
    not err when it classified Walker as an armed career criminal under
    the ACCA.
    Accordingly, we affirm Walker’s sentence.   We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-4913

Citation Numbers: 293 F. App'x 991

Judges: Michael, Traxler, Shedd

Filed Date: 9/25/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024