United States v. Daniels , 189 F. App'x 199 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5016
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RANDALL LEE DANIELS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(CR-04-132-MBS)
Submitted: June 23, 2006 Decided: July 10, 2006
Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James T. McBratney, Jr., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Jane B. Taylor,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Randall Lee Daniels pled guilty to being a member of a drug
conspiracy and a money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 21
U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2006), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2000). The district court
sentenced Daniels to a term of 360 months imprisonment for the drug
conspiracy count, and 240 months for the money laundering count, to
run concurrently. On appeal, Daniels challenges only his sentence.
He contends that the district court impermissibly relied on
statements he gave pursuant to a valid proffer agreement. We
affirm.
On March 17, 2004, Daniels executed a proffer agreement* with
the Government in which he agreed “to be fully truthful and
forthright” concerning the investigation into his offense, and “to
submit to polygraph examination(s)” if requested. In turn, the
Government agreed that it would not use any “statements made or
other information” Daniels provided against him. The agreement
specified that Daniels’s “failure to be fully truthful and
forthright at any stage will, at the sole election to the
*
A “proffer agreement” is an agreement between the Government
and a defendant in a criminal case “that sets forth the terms under
which the defendant will provide information to the government”; it
“defines the obligations of the parties and is intended to protect
the defendant against the use of his or her statements.” United
States v. Lopez, 219 F.3d 343, 345 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000). On January
28, 2005, ten months after executing the proffer agreement, Daniels
signed a written plea agreement.
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Government, cause the obligations of the Government within this
Agreement to become null and void.” A failure to pass a requested
polygraph exam “to the satisfaction of the Government” would
similarly constitute a breach of the agreement, negating the
Government’s obligations. If Daniels breached his obligations
under the agreement, the proffer agreement expressly authorized the
Government to “use for any purpose any and all statements made and
other information provided by [Daniels] in the prosecution of
[Daniels] on any charge.”
Daniels argues that the district court erred in concluding
that he breached the proffer agreement by failing the government
administered polygraph exam. We disagree. A proffer agreement
operates like a contract; accordingly, to discern whether Daniels
breached the agreement, we must examine its express terms. United
States v. Lopez, 219 F.3d 343, 346 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Cobblah, 118 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1997)). Here, the
contract terms explicitly require that Daniels be truthful and that
he pass a polygraph test “to the satisfaction of the Government” if
requested to undergo such a test. Indisputably, he failed to pass
the given polygraph test, thereby clearly breaching the terms of
the agreement.
Accordingly, because Daniels breached the proffer agreement,
we conclude that Daniels’s other contentions -– namely, that the
district court impermissibly enhanced his sentenced based on
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statements he made during the proffer interview –- lack merit.
Under the precise terms of the proffer agreement itself –- which
Daniels signed –- any breach by Daniels renders the Government’s
obligations null and void, and permits the Government to use
Daniels’s statements to prosecute him. The district court thus did
not err in relying on Daniels’s own statements and admissions to
establish the factual predicates necessary to enhance his sentence
under the Guidelines.
We further find that the district court did not violate United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) in sentencing Daniels.
Rather, the court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, made appropriate
enhancements based on Daniels’s own admissions, and imposed a
reasonable sentence within the Guidelines range. See United States
v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006).
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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