United States v. Mendez-Reyes , 432 F. App'x 246 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4914
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    LUIS HERIBERTO MENDEZ-REYES, a/k/a Chrstian Torres, a/k/a
    Luis N. Reyes, a/k/a Luis H. Reyes, a/k/a Luis Mendez, a/k/a
    Luis Reyes, a/k/a Christian Torres, a/k/a Joaquin Andrades
    Mendes, a/k/a Luis Torres,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.  Claude M. Hilton, Senior
    District Judge. (1:10-cr-00090-CMH-1)
    Submitted:   May 23, 2011                     Decided:   May 27, 2011
    Before KING, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Geremy Kamens,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Research
    and Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
    Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Kondi J. Kleinman,
    Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Luis Heriberto Mendez-Reyes, a citizen of El Salvador,
    pled guilty without a plea agreement to illegally reentering the
    United    States        subsequent    to    a    conviction       for    an     aggravated
    felony, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a),(b) (2006), and was
    sentenced to a within-Guidelines sentence of thirty-six months
    in prison.        Mendez-Reyes claims on appeal that his sentence is
    unreasonable       because    the     district     court     failed      to     adequately
    explain the reasons behind the chosen sentence and failed to
    address his argument for a downward variance.                      Finding no error,
    we affirm.
    We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse
    of discretion standard.             Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51
    (2007).       This        review     requires     consideration          of     both       the
    procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence.                                 Id.;
    see United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 575 (4th Cir. 2010).                                   A
    sentence imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range
    is presumed reasonable by this court.                   United States v. Mendoza-
    Mendoza, 
    597 F.3d 212
    , 217 (4th Cir. 2010).
    In    determining        the    procedural      reasonableness              of    a
    sentence,     we    consider        whether      the    district        court       properly
    calculated        the     defendant’s       Guidelines       range,       treated             the
    Guidelines    as        advisory,    considered        the   
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    (2006),     factors,       analyzed        any   arguments        presented         by    the
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    parties,     and    sufficiently          explained          the    selected      sentence.
    Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    .          “Regardless of whether the district court
    imposes an above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must
    place on the record an individualized assessment based on the
    particular    facts     of    the    case    before       it.”       United     States     v.
    Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).        Where, as here, the district court imposes a
    within-Guidelines        sentence,          the       explanation        may    be       “less
    extensive,    while     still        individualized.”               United      States      v.
    Johnson, 
    587 F.3d 625
    , 639 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
    130 S. Ct. 2128
     (2010).        However, that explanation must be sufficient
    to   allow    for     “meaningful         appellate          review”     such     that    the
    appellate     court     need       “not     guess       at    the      district      court’s
    rationale.”         Carter,    
    564 F.3d at 329-30
          (internal      quotation
    marks   omitted).            The    district          court    is    not     required      to
    “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.”                             United
    States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 345 (4th Cir. 2006).                                     With
    regard to a sentence within the Guidelines range, “[g]enerally,
    an adequate explanation . . . is provided when the district
    court indicates that it is “rest[ing] [its] decision upon the
    Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a
    proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional
    mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that
    the case before him is typical.”                      United States v. Hernandez,
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    603 F.3d 267
    ,       271   (4th    Cir.   2010)    (quoting      Rita       v.   United
    States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 357 (2007)).
    Mendez-Reyes does not dispute that the district court
    properly     calculated         his    Guidelines     range      under    the    advisory
    Guidelines.        Rather, he argues that the district court failed to
    explain its reasons for the particular sentence it imposed and
    failed to address his primary argument for a downward variance
    sentence     —    the     unwarranted       sentencing     disparity       between      the
    “fast-track” districts and “non-fast-track” districts (including
    the Eastern District of Virginia).
    We        have    reviewed     the    transcript      of     Mendez-Reyes’
    sentencing hearing and find that the district court adequately
    explained        the    within-Guidelines          sentence      chosen    for       Mendez-
    Reyes.     Nor is Mendez-Reyes’ sentence unreasonable because the
    district     court       failed   to    address     his    argument       regarding     the
    sentencing disparity between “fast-track” and “non-fast-track”
    districts.        First, Mendez-Reyes would not qualify for the fast-
    track program, even if one existed in the Eastern District of
    Virginia, because he did not enter into a plea agreement and
    waive his rights to file pretrial motions, to appeal, and to
    challenge his conviction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .                             See United
    States   v.       Perez-Pena,         
    453 F.3d 236
    ,   238    (4th     Cir.      2006).
    Moreover, this court has found that disparities between fast-
    4
    track   and     non-fast-track    sentences    are   not    “unwarranted”
    sentencing disparities.       
    Id. at 244
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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