United States v. Julie Ann Johnson , 629 F. App'x 478 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4174
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JULIE ANN JOHNSON,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey,
District Judge. (2:14-cr-00012-JPB-JSK-1)
Submitted: July 30, 2015 Decided: October 27, 2015
Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curium opinion.
L. Richard Walker, Patrick I. Holbrook, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant.
William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West
Virginia, Stephen D. Warner, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Julie Ann Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving her right to appeal the denial of her suppression
motion, to possession of material used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6) and
843(d)(2). On appeal, Johnson contends that the search warrant
application failed to establish probable cause and that the
good-faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
I.
On April 23, 2013, Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington of the
Randolph County Sherriff’s Department applied for a warrant to
search Johnson’s home. The search warrant affidavit stated, in
relevant part, that (1) on April 13, 2013, Corporal Vanscoy
issued Johnson a citation for stealing twelve lithium batteries
from a local WalMart; (2) Corporal Talkington reviewed security
footage and a sales receipt from the same WalMart, indicating
Johnson had purchased airline tubing and Coleman Fuel--materials
commonly used in methamphetamine production--from the same
WalMart and left in a car owned by Craig Hensley (“Hensley”);
and (3) Corporal Vanscoy completed a National Precursor Log
Exchange (“NPLEX”) search that revealed that Johnson and Hensley
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had purchased pseudoephedrine during March and April of 2013. A
Randolph County magistrate approved the warrant application.
Law enforcement promptly executed the search warrant at
Johnson’s residence and recovered items associated with
methamphetamine production, including methamphetamine
manufacturing instructions, ice compressors, clear tubing,
pseudoephedrine, and other drug paraphernalia. A federal grand
jury indicted Johnson in the Northern District of West Virginia
for two counts of possession of material used in the manufacture
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6) and
843(d)(2), and four counts of possession of pseudoephedrine to
be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841 (c)(2).
Johnson moved to suppress the evidence seized from her
residence, claiming that the search warrant affidavit failed to
explicitly connect criminal activity to the place to be
searched, her residence. Johnson further argued that the good-
faith exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because
(1) the affidavit contained “numerous falsehoods”; (2) the
affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render reliance
on it entirely unreasonable; and (3) the magistrate merely
served as a “rubber stamp” for the police.
After a hearing, the federal magistrate judge recommended
granting Johnson’s motion to suppress. The magistrate judge
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concluded the affidavit failed to establish a sufficient nexus
to Johnson’s residence, as the affidavit did not suggest any
illegal activity occurred at Johnson’s residence. The
magistrate judge also concluded the good-faith exception to the
warrant requirement did not apply because the search affidavit
was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” as to render
police reliance on it unreasonable.
Notwithstanding the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the
district court denied Johnson’s motion to suppress, concluding
that the facts alleged in the affidavit were sufficient to
establish probable cause. Further, the district court concluded
that even assuming the warrant was invalid, “the officers’
reliance on the search warrant was objectively reasonable.”
After the district court denied Johnson’s motion to
suppress, Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea to one count
of possession of material used in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her
suppression motion. Johnson was sentenced to 57 months’
imprisonment. Johnson timely appealed, and this court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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II.
“We review factual findings regarding [a] motion to
suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United
States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2014). When the
district court has denied the motion, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government. United States v.
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). In cases where a
defendant challenges both probable cause and the applicability
of the good-faith exception, we may proceed directly to the
good-faith analysis without first deciding whether the warrant
was supported by probable cause. United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d
240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, because it was objectively
reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant, we conclude
the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies.
Thus, we need not decide whether the warrant lacked probable
cause.
III.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which protects individuals from “unreasonable searches,”
provides, that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To deter future police
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misconduct, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is generally barred from trial under the exclusionary rule.
United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2009).
However, "[u]nder the good[-]faith exception to the warrant
requirement, evidence obtained from an invalidated search
warrant will be suppressed only if the officers were dishonest
or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of
probable cause." United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1583
(4th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
926 (1984)).
Our case law establishes four situations in which an
officer’s reliance on a search warrant would not be considered
reasonable:
(1) the magistrate was misled by information in
an affidavit that the officer knew was false or would
have known was false except for the officer's reckless
disregard of the truth;
(2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his detached
and neutral judicial role;
(3) the warrant was based on an affidavit that
was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; and
(4) the warrant was so facially deficient, by
failing to particularize the place to be searched or
the things to be seized, that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
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United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). Under any of those
circumstances, the good-faith exception does not apply, and any
evidence gathered pursuant to the deficient warrant must be
excluded from trial. Andrews, 577 F.3d at 236.
On appeal, Johnson asserts the good-faith exception to the
warrant requirement does not apply because: (1) the search
warrant affidavit contained “numerous falsehoods”; (2) the
search warrant affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to
render reliance on it entirely unreasonable; and (3) the state
magistrate abandoned his neutral role and merely rubber stamped
the warrant. We analyze each argument below.
A.
First, Johnson alleges the good-faith exception does not
apply because the search warrant affidavit contains “numerous
falsehoods.” Specifically, Johnson points to the officers’
statement in their affidavit that “Johnson and Hensley have been
actively purchasing pseudoephedrine based products during March
and April of this year.” J.A. 29. Johnson argues this
statement is false because only she purchased pseudoephedrine
products in March, while only Hensley purchased them in April.
We find this argument unpersuasive.
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The good-faith exception applies unless a magistrate is
misled by information an affiant knew to be false or would have
known was false but for the affiant’s reckless disregard for its
truth. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1156. Even if the officers’
statement were not literally true, Johnson has failed to show
that any alleged false statement was knowingly or recklessly
made. The NPLEX reports indicated that Hensley had purchased
pseudoephedrine products in April, but not March, whereas
Johnson had purchased pseudoephedrine products in March, but not
April. It was therefore reasonable for Corporals Vanscoy and
Talkington to infer from the information they obtained during
their investigation that Johnson and Hensley were engaged in a
joint venture to obtain methamphetamine materials. This
information includes the NPLEX reports, the video footage of
Johnson purchasing materials commonly used to make
methamphetamine from WalMart, and the video footage showing
Johnson leave WalMart in Hensley’s car. While we need not
decide whether the combination of these circumstances gives rise
to probable cause, we cannot say that Corporals Vanscoy and
Talkington made a statement they knew to be false or would have
known was false except for their reckless disregard for its
truth.
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B.
Next, Johnson alleges that it was unreasonable for the
officers to rely upon the warrant because the search warrant
affidavit allegedly failed to provide a sufficient nexus to
establish probable cause that methamphetamine materials could be
found inside Johnson’s home. We disagree.
An officer’s reliance on a warrant is not rendered
unreasonable even if the application fails to establish a
sufficient nexus between a target’s residence and the suspected
criminal activity. United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582
(4th Cir. 1993). We have applied the good-faith exception to
uphold the search of a suspect’s residence “on the basis of
(1) evidence of the suspect’s involvement in drug trafficking
combined with (2) the reasonable suspicion (whether explicitly
articulated by the applying officer or implicitly arrived at by
the magistrate judge) that drug traffickers store drug-related
evidence in their homes.” United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d
311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008).
Even assuming the affidavit failed to provide a sufficient
nexus to establish probable cause, we cannot say that its
absence is so severe so as to preclude reasonable reliance on
the warrant. To the contrary, “it is reasonable to suspect that
a drug dealer stores drugs in a home to which he owns a key.”
Id. at 218. Additionally, our case law establishes that
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disagreement among judges as to the existence of probable cause
indicates that an officer’s reliance on an affidavit was
objectively reasonable. See Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582 (citing
Leon, 468 U.S. at 926). Although the federal magistrate judge
in this instance concluded that the search affidavit failed to
establish probable cause that methamphetamine materials could be
found in Johnson’s home, two judicial officers--the state
magistrate who issued the warrant, and the district judge--
determined that the affidavit provided probable cause to search.
Given the circumstances, we cannot say that the officers’
reliance on the warrant was entirely unreasonable.
C.
Finally, Johnson argues that the magistrate functioned as a
rubber stamp for the police when he authorized the warrant. An
issuing magistrate acts as a rubber stamp for police when he
approves a “bare bones” affidavit. A “bare bones” affidavit is
one that contains “wholly conclusory statements, which lack the
facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can
independently determine probable cause.” United States v.
Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States
v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1311 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993)). An
affidavit is “bare bones” when an affiant merely recites the
conclusions of others without corroboration or independent
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investigation of the facts alleged. See, e.g., Wilhelm, 80 F.3d
at 120.
We see no basis for concluding that this affidavit was
“bare bones.” To the contrary, Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington
stated specific circumstances, including Johnson’s activities at
WalMart and the NPLEX reports, that suggested Johnson’s
involvement in methamphetamine manufacturing. Additionally,
Corporals Vanscoy and Talkington learned this information first-
hand during a ten-day investigation. Therefore, we cannot say
that this affidavit, based upon the affiants’ personal
knowledge, is “wholly conclusory,” such that a neutral
magistrate could not have independently determined probable
cause.
Thus, even assuming the alleged defects in the affidavit
demonstrate an absence of probable cause, we cannot conclude
that the officers’ reliance on the warrant was not in good
faith. Finding that the good-faith exception to the warrant
requirement applies, we need not decide whether probable cause
to issue the warrant existed.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
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