United States v. Morton , 422 F. App'x 248 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4949
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL MORTON,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00729-MBS-11)
Submitted: April 4, 2011 Decided: April 7, 2011
Before WILKINSON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leslie Locklair, LOCKLAIR LEGAL SERVICES, LLC, Daniel Island,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Stanley Duane Ragsdale, John
David Rowell, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Morton appeals the 262-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute and to distribute fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Counsel for
Morton filed a brief in this court in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that she has found no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the
reasonableness of Morton’s sentence. Morton received notice of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but did not file
one. Because we find no meritorious grounds for appeal, we
affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court under
a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d
572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010). We begin by reviewing the sentence
for significant procedural error, including such errors as
“failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there
are no significant procedural errors, we then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account
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the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). “When
rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must make an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented.’”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly,
a sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the particular facts presented and must “‘state in open court’”
the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence. Id.
(quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010)). The
court’s explanation need not be exhaustive; it must be
“sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that the district
court has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007))
(alterations omitted).
We conclude that the sentence imposed by the district
court was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The
district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and
understood that it was advisory. Furthermore, it is apparent
that the court considered the arguments of the parties and had a
reasoned basis for its decision. The court made an
individualized statement explaining the sentence imposed. We
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presume that the sentence, at the bottom of the Guidelines
range, is reasonable; Morton has not rebutted that presumption.
Thus, we affirm the sentence imposed as reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Morton, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Morton requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Morton. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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