United States v. Reynolds ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5002
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TIMOTHY ARNOLD REYNOLDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:02-cr-00390-JAB-1)
Submitted: April 7, 2011 Decided: April 15, 2011
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke,
Assistant Federal Publice Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Michael F.
Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2003, Timothy Arnold Reynolds pleaded guilty to
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006), and
the district court sentenced him to sixty-four months of
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
Subsequently, Reynolds pleaded guilty to violating the terms of
his supervised release and the court sentenced him to eighteen
months of imprisonment. Reynolds now appeals, arguing that the
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable. Finding no error,
we affirm.
This court reviews a sentence imposed as a result of a
supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence
was plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). The first step in this analysis is a
determination of whether the sentence was unreasonable. Id. at
438. This court, in determining reasonableness, follows
generally the procedural and substantive considerations employed
in reviewing original sentences. Id. On review, we will assume
a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and
the exercise of discretion. Id. at 439.
Although a district court must consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines along
with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), “‘the court ultimately has broad
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discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.’” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a sentence
imposed after a revocation is not unreasonable, we will not
proceed to the second prong of the analysis—whether the sentence
was plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence
imposed by the district court is reasonable, and therefore we
have no need to consider whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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