Robinson v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety , 222 F. App'x 330 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1384
TYRONE LORENZO ROBINSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
TONYA LEDELL ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
versus
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY;
THE SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL; JOSEPH
FRANKLIN CLIPSE, Public Safety Trooper First
Class,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 06-1741
TYRONE LORENZO ROBINSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
TONYA LEDELL ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
versus
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY;
THE SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL; JOSEPH
FRANKLIN CLIPSE, Public Safety Trooper First
Class,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District
Judge. (2:05-cv-03198-SB)
Submitted: February 9, 2007 Decided: March 28, 2007
Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Tyrone Lorenzo Robinson, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Lorenzo Robinson appeals the district court’s
orders dismissing, sua sponte, his complaint filed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000), and denying his motions for reconsideration.
Robinson asserts on appeal that he should have been allowed to sue
Officer Clipse in his individual capacity and that the district
court erred by dismissing his action. Robinson also contends that
the court improperly resolved a factual dispute in finding that
Clipse was entitled to qualified immunity.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court made an improper credibility finding in determining
that Clipse was entitled to qualified immunity. In support of his
claim that Clipse used excessive force in violation of Robinson’s
Fourth Amendment rights, Robinson submitted affidavits from two
witnesses and also submitted a copy of the transcript of his state
court trial at which Clipse testified about the events surrounding
Robinson’s arrest. The district court concluded that the
affidavits did not refute Clipse’s state court trial testimony.
However, in his complaint sworn under penalty of perjury, Robinson
contradicted the version of events to which Clipse testified in the
state court trial. See Vathekan v. Prince George’s County, 154
F.3d 173, 179-80 (4th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment where
disputed facts existed as to events surrounding use of force);
Rainey v. Conerly, 973 F.2d 321, 324 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that
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district court properly denied defendant’s immunity-based summary
judgment motion because “a determination of what actually happened
is absolutely necessary to decide whether [defendant] could
reasonably have believed that his actions were lawful”).
Accordingly, we vacate the portions of the district
court’s orders in which the court found that Clipse was entitled to
qualified immunity and remand for further proceedings in the
district court. We affirm the remainder of the district court’s
orders, grant Robinson’s motions to add Clipse as a party* and to
amend and supplement his informal brief, and deny his motion to
appoint counsel. We also deny Robinson’s motion for oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
*
We note that, in footnote one of its order denying the motion
for reconsideration, the district court explicitly denied
Robinson’s motion to amend his complaint to add a claim against
Clipse in his individual capacity. However, the district court
effectively made Clipse a party by concluding that he was entitled
to qualified immunity--a defense that is available only to a person
sued in his individual capacity. See Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors,
447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006).
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