United States v. Tereshchuk , 193 F. App'x 188 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4968
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MYRON TERESHCHUK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(CR-04-451-RWT)
Submitted: February 28, 2006 Decided: August 1, 2006
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Paula Xinis, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, James M. Trusty, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Myron Tereshchuk pled guilty to one count of possession
of a biological agent or toxin without registration and one count
of possession of an unregistered destructive device, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 175b(c)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2000). Tereshchuk
was sentenced to a forty-one month term of imprisonment, to be
served consecutively to an undischarged term. We find no error and
affirm Tereshchuk’s sentence.
Tereshchuk contends that the district court erred in its
application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3 (2004)
because the court failed to discuss its reasons for imposing a
consecutive sentence. Though § 5G1.3(c) is termed a “policy
statement,” we enforce it as if it were a guideline. United
States v. Mosley, 200 F.3d 218, 222 n.5 (4th Cir. 1999). We review
legal questions involving the application of a guideline de novo.
United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 503 (4th Cir. 1996).
Section 5G1.3 provides that in “case[s] involving an
undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant
offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently,
or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to
achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” USSG
§ 5G1.3(c). In determining the manner in which the sentence should
be imposed, a district court is “constrained only by its
consideration of the factors mentioned in the commentary to
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§ 5G1.3(c).” Mosley, 200 F.3d at 223. The district court stated
that it considered the conduct underlying the prior conviction as
well as the length of the prior sentence, date of its imposition,
and the court in which it was imposed. Furthermore, the court
stated that it considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000)
factors. Therefore, we conclude the district court properly
applied § 5G1.3(c).
Accordingly, we affirm Tereshchuk’s sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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