United States v. Adams , 194 F. App'x 115 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5195
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMES EARL ADAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Malcolm J. Howard,
District Judge. (CR-05-8)
Submitted: August 3, 2006 Decided: August 17, 2006
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael R. Ramos, RAMOS AND LEWIS, L.L.P., Shallotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney,
Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Christine Witcover
Dean, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury found James Earl Adams guilty of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(e)(1). The district court sentenced Adams to 252 months of
imprisonment. Adams now appeals.
Adams first argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress based upon its finding that the police had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a limited search of his person.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). We review the factual
findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear
error and the legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Johnson,
400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2005). We construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below. United States
v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). Having thoroughly
considered all of the evidence under these standards, we conclude
that the district court did not err in denying Adams’ motion to
suppress.
Adams next argues that the district court erred by denying his
motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 29.
We review the denial of a Rule 29 motion de novo. United States v.
Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). Where, as here, the
motion was based on a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he
verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
2
support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact
could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
The elements of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) are: “(1)
the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable
by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the defendant
knowingly possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the possession was
in or affecting interstate commerce, because the firearm had
travelled [sic] in interstate or foreign commerce. . . .” United
States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). On
the record before us, we conclude that there is ample evidence to
support the jury’s verdict.
Finally, Adams argues that the district court erred by
admitting evidence of his seven prior felony convictions and
submitting this question to the jury. To establish a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that “the defendant previously had been
convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding
one year.” United States v. Gilbert, 430 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.
2005). Adams refused to stipulate to having been previously
convicted of any felonies. A special verdict form was provided to
the jury to determine whether Adams had been convicted of each of
3
his seven prior convictions. Although the Sixth Amendment does not
demand that the fact of a prior conviction used as a basis for a
sentencing enhancement be submitted to the jury, see United States
v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2005), it was not unfairly
prejudicial for the district court to submit this question to the
jury. Thus, we find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm Adams’ conviction. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4