United States v. Smith , 194 F. App'x 155 ( 2006 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4101
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    OLEN TYRONE SMITH,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
    (1:03-cr-00210-WDQ)
    Submitted:   August 2, 2006                 Decided:   August 14, 2006
    Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Francis A. Pommett, III, LAW OFFICES OF NATHANSON & POMMETT,
    Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.    Rod J. Rosenstein, United
    States Attorney, George L. Russell, III, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    This appeal is before the court after our limited remand
    for resentencing under United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005). Olen Tyrone Smith appeals the sixty-month sentence imposed
    after remand, on his convictions for possession with intent to
    distribute Phentermine HC1, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1)
    (2000), and interference with commerce by threats or violence, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    (a) (2000).           Smith challenges the
    reasonableness of this sentence, contending that it is longer than
    necessary to comply with the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).       We find, however, that the
    district court sentenced Smith only after appropriately considering
    and examining the sentencing guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors,
    as instructed by Booker.     We therefore affirm the sentence.
    This court reviews the imposition of a sentence for
    reasonableness.    Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61; United States v.
    Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005). After Booker, courts
    must   calculate   the   appropriate   guideline    range,   making   any
    appropriate factual findings. United States v. Davenport, 
    445 F.3d 366
    , 370 (4th Cir. 2006).       The court then should consider the
    resulting advisory guideline range in conjunction with the factors
    under 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and determine
    an appropriate a sentence.     Davenport, 
    445 F.3d at 370
    .       If the
    sentence exceeds the advisory guideline range, it will generally be
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    deemed reasonable “if the reasons justifying the variance are tied
    to § 3553(a) and are plausible.”         United States v. Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 434 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2054
     (2006).
    Smith contends that his sentence is unreasonable because
    consideration   of   the   §   3553(a)   factors   justifies   a   downward
    departure.   He asserts that, based on the nature of the drug at
    issue--a weight control drug, rather than a narcotic drug--and the
    fact that he believed that he was acting under a lawful order from
    his employer, as well as the fact that the force used was minimal--
    using a box to push the victim back through the exit doors and into
    some barrels--he should have received a downward departure from the
    advisory range.      The court considered these arguments and noted
    that the drug type was factored into the determination of the
    guideline range.     The court also noted that the jury disbelieved
    Smith’s defense that he believed he was acting pursuant to a lawful
    order from his employer.
    In imposing sentence, the district court increased the
    sentence above the advisory guideline range, explaining that the
    increase was based on facts learned at trial and based on the
    nature of the defendant.       The court also based the increase on the
    nature of the offense, noting that it was a “greed-driven offense,”
    and also noting that Smith had a prior conviction for a greed-
    driven offense.
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    Because the district court’s explanation for the sentence
    above    the    advisory   range   shows   that   the   court   appropriately
    considered the factors in § 3553(a) with respect to Smith and his
    offense and also that it considered Smith’s arguments for a lesser
    sentence, we find that the resulting sentence was reasonable.            See
    United States v. Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
    , 380 (4th Cir. 2006);*
    Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 546
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s sixty-month sentence.        We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    *
    We note that the district court did not make any findings on
    remand as to the amount of loss and therefore did not increase
    Smith’s sentence on this basis. Under Booker and Hughes, the court
    could have made the same amount-of-loss findings on remand that
    were made during the initial sentencing and Smith could have
    received the same sentence. See Davenport, 
    445 F.3d at 370
    .
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