United States v. Smiley , 194 F. App'x 168 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4844
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MONTRELL SMILEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District
Judge. (CR-05-80)
Submitted: June 30, 2006 Decided: August 14, 2006
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Matthew G. Kaiser, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Paresh S. Patel, Staff Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Montrell Smiley appeals his 120-month sentence imposed
after he pled guilty to one count of bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (f) (2000), and one count of interference with
interstate commerce by bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2000). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Smiley asserts that his sentence, which is fifteen months
above the recommended advisory guideline range of 84 to 105 months’
imprisonment, is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Smiley argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable
because the district court did not adequately consider the factors
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) or the
arguments of defense counsel. Smiley argues that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable because the district court found no
facts, other than those considered by the sentencing guidelines,
which justified Smiley’s above-the-guidelines sentence. Smiley’s
arguments are unavailing.
A post-Booker* sentence may be unreasonable for
procedural and substantive reasons. “A sentence may be
procedurally unreasonable, for example, if the district court
provides an inadequate statement of reasons . . . . A sentence may
be substantively unreasonable if the court relies on an improper
factor or rejects policies articulated by Congress or the
*
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Sentencing Commission." United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424,
434 (4th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054(2006). While a district court must consider the various factors
in § 3553(a) and explain its sentence, it need not “robotically
tick through § 3553(a)'s every subsection" or “explicitly discuss
every § 3553(a) factor on the record." United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). Even if the sentence exceeds
the advisory guideline range, it will generally be deemed
reasonable “if the reasons justifying the variance are tied to
§ 3553(a) and are plausible." Moreland, 437 F.3d at 434.
We find the district court’s explanations of its reasons
for sentencing Smiley satisfied these standards, and Smiley’s
sentence was therefore reasonable. The court cited several
§ 3553(a) factors in concluding that the guideline range was
inadequate. The court reviewed “the nature and circumstances of
the offense” and the “history and characteristics of the
defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), observing that Smiley served nine years
in prison for another string of robberies and had been out of jail
only eight months when he committed the instant offenses. With
respect to the need for the sentence imposed, the court went on to
consider the seriousness of the offense and the goals to promote
respect for the law, to deter criminal conduct, and to protect the
public. See § 3553(a)(2)(A),(B). The court concluded that the
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combination of Smiley’s past criminal history, the current offenses
and his drug addiction supported a higher sentence.
We conclude that the variance sentence imposed by the
district court was “selected pursuant to a reasoned process in
accordance with the law.” United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449,
457 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). We also
find that the extent of the variance, which was the minimum
sentence the district court found proper to impose under the
circumstances, was reasonable. See Moreland, 437 F.3d at 436 (“The
second question we must address is whether the extent of the
variance was reasonable.”). We therefore conclude that the
district court acted reasonably in imposing this variance sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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