United States v. Pierce , 196 F. App'x 145 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4332
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DONNELL PIERCE, a/k/a Nut,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 04-4333
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WARREN BLOUNT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge.
(CR-03-04)
Submitted: July 31, 2006 Decided: August 25, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
G. Arthur Robbins, CHESAPEAKE MERIDIAN, Annapolis, Maryland, Gary
A. Ticknor, LAW OFFICE OF GARY A. TICKNOR, Elkridge, Maryland, for
Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Craig M.
Wolff, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Warren Blount and Donnell Pierce were convicted of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and
possession with intent to distribute heroin. The Appellants
challenge their convictions and sentences. We affirm their
convictions, and vacate and remand their sentences for
resentencing.
Prior to the jury’s deliberations, Defendants requested
that the court define reasonable doubt for the jury using a
standard jury instruction. The court denied the requested
instruction based on this court’s precedent. The jury did not
request a supplemental instruction on reasonable doubt.
The trial court’s failure to define “reasonable doubt”
cannot be considered error. This court has expressed its
disapproval of attempts by trial courts to define the term
“reasonable doubt”, see United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486
(4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1300 (4th
Cir. 1995), and held “that efforts to define reasonable doubt are
likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept . . . .” United
States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998). This court
has further stated that it is “convinced ‘that the term reasonable
doubt has a self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror
which judicial efforts to define generally do more to obscure than
to illuminate.’” United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694, 698 (4th
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Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 755
(4th Cir. 1988)). We therefore find no error in the convictions.
Appellants also challenge their sentences alleging Sixth
Amendment error. They were sentenced on May 6, 2004, prior to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296(2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Instead
of imposing a mandatory life sentence under the original sentencing
guidelines calculation, the district court departed four offense
levels downward bringing the sentencing guidelines range to 360
months to life imprisonment. Pierce and Blount each received a
total sentence of 360 months of imprisonment.
According to their verdict, the jury found an
attributable drug amount of one kilogram of heroin. The district
court determined that at the least the Defendants were responsible
for thirty kilograms of heroin, resulting in a base offense level
of 38. Blount received an enhancement for being a leader or
organizer of the conspiracy. Pierce received an enhancement for
being a manager or supervisor in the organization. Both received
enhancements for the conspiracy involving more than five people,
using minors to assist in the drug trafficking, and possession of
firearms. Pierce had a total offense level of 45, with a criminal
history category of II. Blount had a total offense level of 46,
with a criminal history category of I. Both guideline ranges were
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life imprisonment. Pierce’s unenhanced guideline range would be
135-168 months. Blount’s unenhanced range would be 121-151 months.
At sentencing, the district court recognized that
application of the Sentencing Guidelines produced a term of life
imprisonment. However, the court granted a downward departure
based upon the scale and seriousness of the offense and found that
the offenses were no more serious than that of an offense four
offense levels lower. Therefore, the court found a sentencing
range of 360 months to life imprisonment and imposed 360 month
sentences for each defendant.
After Booker, courts must calculate the appropriate
guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with other
relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a),
and impose a sentence. If a district court imposes a sentence
outside the guideline range, the court must state its reasons for
doing so. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. This remedial scheme applies
to any sentence imposed under the mandatory guidelines, regardless
of whether the sentence violates the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 547
(citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 267 (Breyer, J., opinion of the
Court)).
Here, the district court sentenced Appellants under the
mandatory federal sentencing guidelines in effect at the time and
established a total offense level by determining additional drug
quantity attributable to the Defendants, and enhancements for role
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in the offense, that were not found by a jury or admitted conduct.
The resulting guideline ranges, even after the downward departure,
exceeded those authorized by the admitted conduct. Thus, the
sentences, based on facts found by the district court at
sentencing, violate the Sixth Amendment.
We therefore affirm the Appellants’ convictions, vacate
the sentences, and remand for resentencing. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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