United States v. Bonnie , 196 F. App'x 175 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4028
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
GREGORY ALLEN BONNIE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (CR-04-546)
Submitted: August 24, 2006 Decided: August 29, 2006
Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David A. Bornhorst, North Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Carlton R.
Bourne, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Allen Bonnie pled guilty to conspiracy to
manufacture, to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime. On appeal, his attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding
that there are no meritorious issue on appeal but considering
whether Bonnie was properly sentenced as a career offender and
whether his sentence was reasonable. Bonnie has filed a pro se
supplemental brief, further arguing the career offender issue.
After careful consideration of the record, we affirm.
First, Bonnie argues that he should not have been treated
as a career offender because his prior convictions all occurred
within a month and a half period and, therefore, should not have
constituted three separate convictions. However, because Bonnie’s
prior offenses were separated by intervening arrests, the
convictions were required to be counted individually. See United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 126 S.
Ct. 2309 (2006).
Second, the district court properly calculated the
guideline range and appropriately treated the Sentencing Guidelines
as advisory. The district court explicitly considered Bonnie’s
background, the circumstances of his career offender status, and
his assistance to the Government in granting the Government’s
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motion for a substantial assistance departure and imposing a
sentence well below the guideline range. Thus, we find that the
sentence was reasonable. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d
540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing sentencing procedure and
standard of review).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Bonnie’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Bonnie, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Bonnie requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Bonnie.
We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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