United States v. Johnson , 196 F. App'x 211 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4728
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ROZELL ALONZA JOHNSON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. W. Craig Broadwater,
    District Judge. (CR-04-40)
    Submitted:   June 9, 2006                 Decided:   August 30, 2006
    Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    L. Richard Walker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wheeling,
    West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas E. Johnston, United States
    Attorney, Thomas O. Mucklow, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Rozell Alonza Johnson appeals the 292-month sentence
    imposed    by    the    district   court   after   Johnson   pled    guilty    to
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
    fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2000); possession with intent to distribute 108 grams of
    crack, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2000), and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (2000); and possession with intent to distribute 129 grams of
    cocaine, in violation of § 841(a)(1) and § 2.            On appeal, Johnson
    asserts that the district court erred by applying a two-level
    upward adjustment under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.2
    (2004), for reckless endangerment during flight, and that the court
    erred by refusing to award a downward adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1
    for acceptance of responsibility.           We affirm.
    In a post-Booker* sentencing like Johnson’s, a district
    court must calculate the applicable guideline range after making
    the appropriate findings of fact, consider the range in conjunction
    with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and impose a sentence.               United
    States v. Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 432 (4th Cir.) (citing United
    States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546 (4th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied,
    
    126 S. Ct. 2054
        (2006).     The   sentence   must   be   “within     the
    statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.”                 Hughes, 401
    *
    United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005).
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    F.3d at 546-47 (citations omitted).              In reviewing the calculation
    of the advisory sentencing guideline range, this court “review[s]
    the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
    findings for clear error.” United States v. Hampton, 
    441 F.3d 284
    ,
    287 (4th Cir. 2006).
    Johnson asserts on appeal that the district court erred
    in failing to apply a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance
    of responsibility.     We review a district court’s decision to grant
    or deny an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility for clear
    error.   United States v. May, 
    359 F.3d 683
    , 688 (4th Cir. 2004)
    (citing United States v. Ruhe, 
    191 F.3d 376
    , 388 (4th Cir. 1999)).
    Our review of the record convinces us that the district court did
    not   clearly    err    in     refusing     to     apply   an   acceptance    of
    responsibility downward adjustment.
    Johnson also challenges the district court’s application
    of the upward adjustment for reckless endangerment during flight.
    He contends that his flight from police was not reckless because he
    was merely a passenger in the car that hit an officer’s unmarked
    vehicle and there was no evidence that he knew his co-defendant
    would hit the officer’s car.               Because Johnson challenges the
    application     of   the     reckless    endangerment      adjustment   to   the
    undisputed facts of his case, our review is de novo.              See Hampton,
    
    441 F.3d at 287
    ; United States v. Butner, 
    277 F.3d 481
    , 487-88 (4th
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    Cir. 2002) (reviewing de novo legal ruling based upon undisputed
    facts).
    An adjustment under § 3C1.2 is warranted “[i]f the
    defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious
    bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law
    enforcement officer. . . .”          USSG § 3C1.2.        In making this
    determination, the normal scope of relevant conduct described in
    USSG § 1B1.3 is narrowed by USSG § 3C1.2 cmt. n.5.         A defendant “is
    accountable only for his own conduct and for conduct that he aided
    or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
    caused.”   USSG § 3C1.2 cmt. n.5.         Because Application Note 5 to
    § 3C1.2 “limits the defendant’s responsibility for the actions of
    another,” this court has held that “some form of direct or active
    participation” on the part of the defendant is necessary for
    § 3C1.2 to apply when the reckless flight is the result of another
    person’s action.   United States v. Chong, 
    285 F.3d 343
    , 346 (4th
    Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Assuming, without deciding, that the district court may
    have erred in applying the two-level upward adjustment under USSG
    § 3C1.2, we find that any error is harmless.           Without the § 3C1.2
    adjustment,   Johnson’s   total    offense     level    would     have    been
    thirty-six.    With   a   criminal   history    category     of    III,    the
    applicable advisory guideline range would have been 235 to 293
    months of imprisonment.   Johnson’s 292-month sentence falls within
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    that range.    See United States v. Mashek, 
    406 F.3d 1012
    , 1017 (8th
    Cir.   2005)   (“[T]here   may     be   situations     where   an    error    in
    calculating the appropriate guidelines range is harmless and,
    therefore, does not require immediate remand[,] [such as] where the
    resulting sentence lies in the overlap between the correct and
    incorrect guidelines ranges.”) (citations omitted).
    Accordingly, we affirm Johnson’s sentence.          We deny the
    motion to relieve counsel and dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before   the   court    and     argument   would   not    aid    the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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