United States v. Shelton ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4922
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RANDY WAYNE SHELTON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge.
    (CR-04-110)
    Submitted:   August 21, 2006                 Decided:   August 30, 2006
    Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Paul G. Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke,
    Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney,
    R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    In this appeal, Randy Wayne Shelton challenges his drug and
    firearm convictions as well as his sentence.             For the following
    reasons, we affirm.
    On February 10, 2004, Officer F. Monroe Blevins applied to a
    county magistrate for a search warrant of Shelton’s apartment.              JA
    16.     The   affidavit    accompanying     the   warrant   stated   that    a
    “confidential, reliable informant” had recently observed cocaine
    transactions in the apartment.          JA 18A.      The affidavit further
    stated that an unspecified controlled purchase at some point in the
    past   established   the    informant’s     reliability.    JA   18A.      The
    magistrate found probable cause and issued the warrant.                 Police
    promptly executed a search of the apartment and discovered cocaine,
    firearms, and cash.       JA 52.
    Before trial, Shelton filed a motion to suppress the evidence
    uncovered in the search; he also requested a hearing under Franks
    v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
     (1978).            JA 12.    The district court
    denied the motion and the request.          JA 55.    Shelton then pleaded
    guilty to one count of possessing a firearm as a felon, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2000), and one count of
    possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2000).         JA 61.
    At sentencing, the district court determined that Shelton was
    subject to the 15-year mandatory minimum imposed by the Armed
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    Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for felons-in-possession with “three
    previous convictions . . . for a violent felony.”                         
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1) (2000).         Accordingly, the court sentenced Shelton to 15
    years imprisonment.         JA 102.     Shelton noted a timely appeal.
    Shelton argues first that the district court improperly denied
    his request for a Franks hearing and his motion to suppress.                     We do
    not believe that Shelton has at any point made the “‘substantial
    preliminary showing’” necessary to justify a Franks hearing.                       See
    United States v. Shorter, 
    328 F.3d 167
    , 170 (4th Cir. 2003)
    (quoting Franks, 
    438 U.S. at 155
    ).                   Nor do we believe that the
    affidavit accompanying the warrant failed to establish probable
    cause.       The affidavit relied upon a tip from a confidential
    informant who had reliably cooperated with police in the past.
    Such     a   tip     is   sufficient        to    meet   the    Fourth     Amendment’s
    requirements.        See United States v. Bynum, 
    293 F.3d 192
    , 197 (4th
    Cir. 2002) (“[T]he officer relied not on an unknown informant but
    one whom he knew and who had provided reliable information in the
    past that the law enforcement officers had ‘verified.’”); United
    States v. Wright, 
    145 F.3d 972
    , 975 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
    affidavit     sufficient      when     it    stated      that   “the     [confidential
    informant] has proven his/her reliability in the past by making
    controlled         purchase[s]   of     crack       cocaine     under     the   direct
    supervision of affiant officers”).
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    Shelton next challenges his 15-year sentence.        Constrained as
    we are by Supreme Court and circuit precedent, we reject his
    constitutional challenge to the ACCA.           See Almendarez-Torres v.
    United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
     (1998); United States v. Thompson, 
    421 F.3d 278
    , 286 (4th Cir. 2005).        We also do not find persuasive his
    argument that the district court improperly applied the ACCA.
    Shelton argues that one of his previous convictions should not have
    been classified as a “generic burglary,” as required to invoke the
    statute.       See Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
    , 599 (1990).
    The Supreme Court requires us to adopt a “categorical approach” to
    determine whether a prior conviction is a generic burglary. 
    Id. at 602
    .     Instead of “delving into particular facts disclosed by the
    record    of    conviction,”   our   inquiry   is   generally   “limited   to
    examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea
    agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual
    finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.”
    Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
    , 16, 17 (2005).               In this
    case, we must determine whether these sources show that Shelton’s
    “earlier guilty plea [in state court] necessarily admitted, and
    supported a conviction for, generic burglary.”           
    Id. at 16
    .
    Shelton argues that a 1991 prior state conviction for burglary
    should not have been construed as a predicate offense for purposes
    of the ACCA because the statute under which Shelton was convicted,
    
    Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-91
    , encompasses unlawful entry into areas that
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    are not “building[s] or structure[s].”       Taylor, 
    495 U.S. at 599
    .
    However, the relevant indictment charged Shelton with breaking and
    entering “the business of All American Car Wash.”           JA 154.    We
    believe the reference to “the business” necessarily ensures that
    Shelton sought to enter “a building or structure.”              Thus, we
    believe   that   the   indictment   establishes   that   Shelton’s   prior
    conviction was for a generic burglary.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
    is
    AFFIRMED.
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