Hill v. Polk , 230 F. App'x 285 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-19
JERRY DALE HILL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
MARVIN L. POLK, Warden, Central Prison,
Raleigh, North Carolina,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior
District Judge. (5:02-hc-00041-H)
Argued: March 14, 2007 Decided: April 20, 2007
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Teresa Lynn Norris, BLUME, WEYBLE & NORRIS, L.L.C.,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Ledford Cheek,
Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cynthia
Katkish, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Roy Cooper, Attorney
General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jerry Dale Hill (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s
denial of his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for relief from
his conviction in North Carolina state court for first-degree
murder and his resulting sentence of death. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
I.
In February 1994, sixteen-year-old Angie Porter Godwin
(“Godwin”) came to Harnett County, North Carolina to visit her
father. Appellant was acquainted with Godwin’s brother, who lived
nearby. On February 18, Appellant approached Godwin in a local
store and asked her for a date. Godwin rejected his advances and,
in Appellant’s view, insulted him in front of several other people.
Early the next morning, Appellant entered Godwin’s father’s
house armed with a gun. As he moved through the house, Appellant
startled Godwin’s dog. After she tried to quiet her dog, Godwin
stepped from her bedroom into the hallway. Appellant then shot her
twice and dragged her into the woods beside her father’s house.
Appellant raped and sexually assaulted Godwin before shooting her
two more times. In an attempt to dispose of evidence of his crime,
Appellant poured gasoline over Godwin’s body and throughout her
father’s house, and set both on fire. He then went home, changed
clothes, and disposed of the gun.
2
On the afternoon of the same day, Godwin’s brother-in-law
drove past Godwin’s father’s house and saw smoke issuing from the
roof. He stopped and, after seeing blood on the front steps,
called the fire department and police. Godwin’s body was found
shortly thereafter in the woods about 200 yards from the house.
She was nude and covered with leaves and pine straw.
When interviewed by police officers later that day, Appellant
denied any involvement in the crime. The following day, however,
he admitted his role in the rape and murder. Subsequent
investigation yielded the gun Appellant used, and semen matching
Appellant’s DNA was discovered in Godwin’s vagina and rectum.
Following a jury trial in state court, Appellant was convicted
of first-degree murder, first-degree rape, second-degree arson,
felonious breaking or entering, and first-degree sexual offense.
The state presented no new evidence during the sentencing phase of
Appellant’s trial. The defense, on the other hand, presented
extensive mitigation evidence focusing on the difficult
circumstances of Appellant’s upbringing. Testimony was presented
highlighting the extent to which Appellant had been neglected and
abused by his parents, raised in extreme poverty, often homeless,
and abandoned for long periods of time. Appellant’s father told
him that his mother was a prostitute to undermine his relationship
with her. Frequently unbathed and “basically unsocialized,” J.A.
35, Appellant was often tormented by his peers.
3
The defense also presented evidence from Claudia Coleman,
Ph.D., an expert in clinical and forensic psychology who has
testified in numerous capital trials. In preparation for trial,
Dr. Coleman reviewed Appellant’s records, interviewed him, and
administered psychological tests. Her testimony at sentencing
focused on Appellant’s troubled educational and psychological
history. Dr. Coleman concluded that Appellant suffered significant
emotional and social alienation, and she testified at length
regarding the origin and implications of these personality traits.
Dr. Coleman, however, was not asked for and did not offer a
specific diagnosis of Appellant’s psychological problems.
At the close of evidence in the sentencing hearing, the trial
court submitted four aggravating and forty-one mitigating
circumstances to the jury. The trial court denied Appellant’s
request to instruct the jury on two additional mitigating
circumstances: (1) whether Appellant was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of his crimes, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(f)(2), and (2) whether his capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his actions was impaired at the time
of his crimes. Id. § 15A-2000(f)(6). The jury recommended a
sentence of death after finding all four aggravating, but only five
of the forty-one mitigating, circumstances. The trial court
4
accepted the recommendation and sentenced Appellant to death for
Godwin’s murder.1
After exhausting his direct appeals, Appellant filed a motion
for appropriate relief (“MAR”) in Superior Court (“state MAR
court”). In his MAR, Appellant raised numerous claims, including
several, which are at issue in this appeal, that his counsel at
trial and sentencing (“trial counsel”) was constitutionally
ineffective. The state MAR court, however, denied relief. In
ruling on the claims at issue here, the state MAR court found that
each failed on the merits and, alternatively, that all but one was
procedurally defaulted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1420(b)(1).2
Appellant petitioned for, but was denied, a writ of certiorari from
the North Carolina Supreme Court for review of the denial of his
MAR. State v. Hill, 354 N.C. 577 (2001). Appellant filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The district court
1
The trial court also sentenced Appellant to two consecutive
life sentences on the rape and sexual offense convictions, and
consecutive sentences totaling fifteen years’ imprisonment on the
arson and breaking or entering convictions. Appellant does not
challenge those convictions and sentences on appeal.
2
Because the state MAR court adjudicated each of Appellant’s
claims at issue in this appeal on the merits, see 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) (setting forth adjudication on the merits as a prerequisite
to post-conviction relief for “person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court”), and we address each substantively
herein, we need not reach the question of whether any was
procedurally defaulted.
5
denied the petition and granted summary judgment to the state on
each of Appellant’s claims. Appellant timely appealed.
II.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief because the
state MAR court both unreasonably applied clearly established
federal law and unreasonably construed the factual record in
rejecting claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective at sentencing. We review Appellant’s habeas claims de
novo. Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2006).
However, because Appellant is “in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court” and the state MAR court adjudicated his claims on
the merits, our review is constrained by § 2254(d). Under §
2254(d), Appellant is entitled to relief only if the state MAR
court’s adjudication of his claims either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
§ 2254(d)(1)-(2).
Under § 2254(d)(1), a decision
is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it
either applies a legal rule that contradicts prior
Supreme Court holdings or reaches a conclusion different
from that of the Supreme Court on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. A decision is an “unreasonable
application” of clearly established federal law if it
6
“unreasonably applies” a Supreme Court precedent to the
facts of the petitioner's claim.
Buckner, 453 F.3d at 198 (internal citations and quotations
omitted). For purposes of § 2254(d)(2), a state MAR court’s
factual findings are to be presumed correct unless rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence. Lenz v. Washington, 444 F.3d 295,
300-01 (4th Cir. 2006); see § 2254(e)(1).
Ultimately, our review must focus, within the constraints of
§ 2254, on whether the state MAR court correctly concluded that
Appellant failed to state valid Sixth Amendment claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. To substantiate these claims,
Appellant must demonstrate that (1) trial counsel’s performance was
deficient in that it fell “below an objective standard of
reasonableness” in light of prevailing professional norms,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); and (2) such
deficiency prejudiced his defense in that there “is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694.
“Unless [Appellant] makes both showings, it cannot be said that
[his] . . . death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. at 687.
In his § 2254 petition, as in his MAR, Appellant contends that
trial counsel was ineffective (A) by failing to investigate and
present mitigation evidence regarding physical and sexual abuse
that he suffered as a child, and (B) by failing adequately to
7
prepare and examine Dr. Coleman on both a diagnosis for Appellant’s
psychological problems and the two mitigating circumstances
rejected by the district court. We consider each claim in turn.
A.
Appellant first requests relief on grounds that trial counsel
failed to investigate and present mitigation evidence that he was
physically and sexually abused as a child. He bases this claim on
affidavits filed with his MAR that allege the occurrence of such
abuse. The state MAR court denied relief after finding no
deficiency in trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of
evidence regarding Appellant’s upbringing, and no prejudice based
on the jury’s assessment of the mitigation evidence presented. We
likewise deny relief.
Even if we assume that there was sufficient evidence of the
alleged abuse to warrant an investigation before sentencing,3 we
3
We note that Appellant has offered evidence of the alleged
abuse that is largely indirect or speculative. For example, a
social worker who worked with Appellant when he was a teenager
stated that she “had heard that [Appellant] was sexually abused”
and “[t]he discipline [Appellant] suffered [at his father’s hands]
was more violent than it needed to be.” J.A. 194 (Affidavit of
Sharon Leigh McDonald Bettini). In Dr. Coleman’s affidavit, she
stated that “Post-conviction counsel has informed me that they have
found evidence that [Appellant] was the victim of physical abuse”
and “likely suffered from sexual abuse during his formative years.”
J.A. 201. Further, Jennifer Miller, an investigator assigned by
the state MAR court to assist in the post-conviction proceedings,
stated that she “learned that [Appellant] suffered severe physical
abuse” and “found evidence of [his] being sexually abused.” J.A.
190. However, Appellant did offer an affidavit from his brother,
David Hill, that contained some direct evidence that Appellant was
physically abused by his step-father.
8
cannot conclude that trial counsel violated the Sixth Amendment by
failing to do so. With respect to the deficiency prong of
Strickland, trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of
Appellant’s mitigation case was objectively reasonable. In capital
cases, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to
make a reasonable decision” not to investigate. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 691. We “apply[] a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s
judgments,” id., and begin with a presumption that “conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.
at 689; see also Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203, 209 (4th Cir.
2003).
Here, trial counsel conducted a thorough and detailed
investigation that involved the production of numerous witnesses
and amassed significant evidence regarding Appellant’s upbringing.
At sentencing, trial counsel presented the results of this
investigation through extensive testimony recounting the horrific
circumstances of Appellant’s youth. Indeed, after examining Dr.
Coleman at length about the psychological problems caused by
Appellant’s experiences, trial counsel elicited testimony that his
was one of the worst cases of abuse and neglect that she had seen
in her professional career. Trial counsel was under no duty to
“uncover every scrap of evidence” from Appellant’s past. Tucker v.
Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 442 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
omitted). So long as their actions and decisions were reasonable,
9
trial counsel complied with the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
effective counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Given the
overall breadth and detail of trial counsel’s investigation and
presentation of Appellant’s background, we cannot say that their
actions fell “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 466
U.S. at 688, and, thus, were deficient for purposes of Strickland.
Nor do we find that Appellant has satisfied the prejudice
prong of Strickland. The jury’s assessment of Appellant’s
mitigation case militates against the notion that evidence of the
alleged abuse would have produced a different outcome. To
recommend a sentence of death in North Carolina, a jury “must
unanimously find that mitigating factors do not outweigh
aggravating factors.” Buckner, 453 F.3d at 203. Therefore, to
establish prejudice under Strickland, Appellant would have to
“demonstrate a reasonable probability that at least one juror would
have found that his new mitigating evidence, combined with the
existing mitigating evidence, outweighed the aggravating
circumstances surrounding [Godwin’s] death.” Id. The state MAR
court found that Appellant could not meet this burden based on the
jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstances of his crime
outweighed the little value the jury discerned in his mitigation
evidence. In other words, the state MAR court found no probability
that evidence of additional abuse would have swayed the jury’s
recommendation. We agree.
10
After hearing extensive testimony about Appellant’s upbringing
from his former stepmother, his brother, a social worker, and Dr.
Coleman, the jury found no value in thirty-six of the forty-one
mitigating circumstances it considered. On the other hand, the
jury found value in each of the four aggravating circumstances
presented. Appellant has offered no argument, case law, or facts
to suggest that evidence of the alleged abuse would have carried
weight sufficient to alter the jury’s balance of these factors.
Therefore, we cannot say that there is any meaningful probability,
much less a reasonable one, that an investigation into and
presentation of evidence of such abuse would have had any impact on
the proceedings below. Because Appellant can establish no such
probability, the state MAR court properly concluded that no
prejudice was present for purposes of Strickland.
Ultimately, Appellant has not demonstrated that trial counsel
was ineffective in investigating or presenting his mitigation case.
Therefore, we find no basis to conclude that the state MAR court’s
rejection of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law and deny relief.4
4
We have reviewed and likewise find without merit Appellant’s
claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate
and present evidence that he used drugs as an adolescent. Trial
counsel presented such evidence during Dr. Coleman’s testimony, and
the jury rejected its mitigating value. Appellant has failed to
offer any argument or case law to demonstrate that the state MAR
court’s finding of no Sixth Amendment violation in this regard was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law.
11
B.
Appellant next requests relief on grounds that trial counsel
failed to elicit from Dr. Coleman either a diagnosis of his
psychological condition or corresponding testimony supporting the
two mitigating circumstances rejected by the district court.
Appellant bases this claim on Dr. Coleman’s post-conviction
affidavit wherein she states that, if she had been asked at
sentencing, she would have testified that Appellant suffered from
a severe personality disorder that supported both of the rejected
mitigating circumstances.
The state MAR court denied relief on two grounds relevant
here. First, it found that Dr. Coleman’s affidavit lacked
credibility because she had ample opportunity at sentencing to
offer the testimony contained therein, but failed to do so.
Second, the state MAR court found that Appellant demonstrated no
deficiency in trial counsel’s examination of Dr. Coleman and could
not show that the testimony in her post-conviction affidavit would
have altered the jury’s recommendation. Appellant contends that
these findings constitute an unreasonable determination of fact and
are contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law. We consider each argument in turn.
i.
Appellant first contends that the state MAR court unreasonably
determined that the assertions in Dr. Coleman’s post-conviction
12
affidavit lacked credibility. This finding, however, is entirely
consistent with the record and Appellant has not offered clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of its
correctness, see § 2254(e)(1).
Dr. Coleman is an experienced professional psychologist who
has appeared as an expert witness in numerous criminal matters.
She was retained in this matter specifically to evaluate
Appellant’s psychological health, assess his current mental status,
and identify any psychological problems he might have. To fulfill
these duties, she conducted an extensive investigation into
Appellant’s background, administered numerous diagnostic tests, and
interviewed Appellant on four occasions.
At trial, Dr. Coleman provided extensive testimony about
Appellant’s background, the psychological tests she performed, her
interviews with Appellant, and his psychological problems. Her
testimony unfolded largely through open-ended questions that
elicited narrative responses and provided few constraints on her
ability to offer conclusions formed during her investigation.
Trial counsel’s examination provided Dr. Coleman broad
opportunity to offer the opinions contained in her post-conviction
affidavit. The fact that she failed to offer such testimony is
inconsistent with her post-conviction assertion that she would have
done so if only asked by trial counsel. Appellant, on the other
hand, has failed to offer evidence that clearly and convincingly
13
demonstrates that a witness as experienced as Dr. Coleman would
withhold such critical testimony unless specifically and directly
asked by trial counsel. Therefore, we find nothing unreasonable in
the state MAR court’s adverse credibility determination regarding
Dr. Coleman’s post-conviction affidavit.
ii.
Appellant next contends that the state MAR court’s finding
that trial counsel’s examination of Dr. Coleman did not violate the
Sixth Amendment was contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Strickland.
With respect to the deficiency prong of Strickland, Appellant
argues that the state MAR court erred by focusing on Dr. Coleman’s
failure to offer testimony, rather than trial counsel’s failure to
elicit it. We disagree. Although the state MAR court focused on
Dr. Coleman when assessing the credibility of her post-conviction
affidavit, it analyzed the effectiveness of her examination by
focusing on trial counsel. Indeed, the state MAR court
specifically held that Appellant had “failed to show that the
manner by which his trial counsel elicited evidence from [Dr.
Coleman] . . . was deficient or constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel.” J.A. 283. This analysis properly focused on trial
counsel, rather than Dr. Coleman.
Further, the record supports the state MAR court’s conclusion
that trial counsel was not deficient. Trial counsel conducted a
14
lengthy and searching examination of Dr. Coleman that thoroughly
conveyed to the jury the existence, origins, and effects of
Appellant’s psychological problems. Although her testimony stopped
short of offering a discrete diagnosis, Dr. Coleman evinced
sufficient preparation to, and, in fact, did convey the substantive
import and relevance of Appellant’s mental health issues. We,
therefore, find no basis to conclude that the trial court’s
determination as to the deficiency prong was an unreasonable
application of Strickland.
With respect to the prejudice prong, Appellant asserts that
the state MAR court assigned unreasonable value to the jury’s
acceptance of the aggravating circumstances. Again, we disagree.
In its order, the state MAR court merely found that, given that the
jury balanced the sentencing factors in significant favor of the
aggravating circumstances, there was no reasonable probability that
additional testimony from Dr. Coleman would have produced a
different outcome. This conclusion did not, as Appellant suggests,
assign undue weight to the jury’s acceptance of the aggravating
circumstances. Indeed, the conclusion is well-supported by the
record given the jury’s near-absolute rejection of Appellant’s
mitigation evidence. Because Appellant cannot demonstrate that the
additional testimony from Dr. Coleman would have altered the jury’s
balance of the sentencing factors, the state MAR court correctly
15
concluded that he could not establish prejudice for purposes of
Strickland.
Ultimately, Appellant has not demonstrated that the state MAR
court’s rejection of his claim either resulted from an unreasonable
determination of facts or was contrary to or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s claims
are without merit and we affirm the opinion of the district court.
AFFIRMED
16