Sanders v. Mitre Corporation , 198 F. App'x 304 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1954
STEPHEN SANDERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MITRE CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (CA-04-1116-1)
Submitted: July 31, 2006 Decided: August 21, 2006
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen Sanders, Appellant Pro Se. Robert John Smith, Karen Ellen
Gray, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Stephen Sanders appeals from the jury verdict in favor of
Defendant in his suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. He also appeals from the district court’s order granting in
part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We have reviewed the
record and the briefs on appeal, and we find that the district
court’s order on summary judgment was without reversible error.
Thus, we affirm that order for the reasons stated by the district
court. See Sanders v. Mitre Corp., No. CA-04-1116-1 (E.D. Va.
filed July 20, 2005 & entered July 21, 2005).
With regard to the jury verdict, Sanders first challenges
several evidentiary rulings of the district court. We review the
district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
Because the district court has first-hand knowledge of the trial
proceedings, the district court should be afforded wide discretion
in determining whether evidence is unduly prejudicial, and the
district court’s evidentiary determination should not be overturned
except under extraordinary circumstances. United States v.
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1377 (4th Cir. 1996). Sanders raises four
alleged evidentiary errors by the district court.
First, the district court excluded certain copies of
Sanders’ prior performance reviews, because they were not provided
by the deadline for trial exhibits. However, several witnesses
testified about Sanders’ positive reviews prior to his promotion.
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Thus, because the documents did not illuminate a disputed fact, any
error was harmless.
Second, the district court sustained Defendant’s
objection to Sanders’ testimony that he was replaced on one of his
projects by someone substantially younger. However, when Sanders
was taken off this project, he was moved to another project, which
was comparable so far as benefits, compensation, and all other
relevant employment variables. Sanders offered no proof that the
second project was a demotion. Thus, evidence of Sanders’
replacement was minimally probative, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding it.
Third, Sanders contends that he was not permitted to
testify that he could not use his notes to refresh his memory at
his deposition. That fact, Sanders argues, explains why his trial
testimony was different from his deposition testimony. However,
Sanders repeatedly testified in front of the jury that he did not
have his notes at his deposition and that he had reviewed the notes
prior to trial. Because this evidence was not actually excluded,
Sanders’ claim is without merit.
Finally, Sanders asserts that he was not permitted to
testify that his requests for a witness at probationary meetings
were denied. Our review of the record does not show that Sanders
ever attempted to enter this information into evidence, and Sanders
fails to identify where in the trial transcript this alleged error
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occurred. Moreover, even if Defendant refused to have witnesses at
the probationary meetings, this fact is not relevant to Sanders’
claims of discrimination absent an allegation that younger
employees were treated differently, which Sanders does not claim.
Accordingly, any error was harmless.
Sanders also asserts that the district court erred in
denying his motion for a three-month continuance. Sanders sought
the continuance in order to retain an attorney and to permit the
attorney to prepare for trial. However, Sanders had nearly two
months from the date of the final pretrial conference until trial
to find counsel. Moreover, in his motion, Sanders did not provide
any reason for his delay in retaining an attorney. Further,
Sanders does not explain how a better prepared attorney would have
altered the result of his trial. Thus, Sanders has failed to show
that the district court’s denial was an abuse of discretion. See
Kosnoski v. Bruce, 669 F.2d 944, 947 (4th Cir. 1982) (standard of
review).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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