United States v. Andaya-Penalosa , 198 F. App'x 314 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4704
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BAUTISTA ANDAYA-PENALOSA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District
Judge. (CR-04-253-WLO)
Submitted: July 31, 2006 Decided: September 6, 2006
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. C. Castillo, Houston, Texas, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner,
United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Bautista Andaya-Penalosa was convicted after a jury trial
of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2000), and conspiracy to
knowingly conduct financial transactions involving proceeds of
unlawful activities, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h) (West
Supp. 2006) (money laundering). He was acquitted of possession of
a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000). We affirm his convictions and
sentence.
Andaya-Penalosa first contends that the district court
erred by allowing the government an additional peremptory strike
during jury selection, which the government used to strike a
prospective juror that was deemed favorable to the Defendant.
Andaya-Penalosa contends that the dismissal of the not-yet-
empaneled jury and starting jury selection anew did not cure the
error. A “defendant in a criminal case cannot complain of error
which he himself has invited.” See Shields v. United States, 273
U.S. 583, 586 (1927). Andaya-Penalosa had objected to the granting
of the additional strike. The district court agreed that it was
error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 24, declared a mistrial, and dismissed
the jury. Because Andaya-Penalosa invited the error, he cannot
object because the court sustained his objection. United States v.
Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (“invited error doctrine
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recognizes that a court cannot be asked by counsel to take a step
in a case and later be convicted of error, because it has complied
with such request”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, Andaya-Penalosa participated in the selection
of a new jury and was ultimately satisfied with the impartiality of
that jury. Because he was tried before a properly-selected,
impartial jury, Andaya-Penalosa cannot show that he was prejudiced
by the granting of an additional strike to the Government, which
was used to select a jury that was dismissed and not impaneled.
See United States v. Potts, 420 F.2d 964, 965 (4th Cir. 1970)
(noting that trial court erred in granting two additional
peremptory strikes to each party based on their agreement, but
finding no harm to defendant because the result was an impartial
jury).
Next, Andaya-Penalosa contends that the district court
erred in allowing evidence of his guilty plea to a charge of
possession of cocaine in California. He contends that this was not
a prior felony conviction, and therefore the evidence was
inadmissible. We find that the evidence was properly admitted to
prove an element of the charged offense of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon. United States v. Rhodes, 32 F.3d 867, 871
(4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, we find that the evidence was
sufficient to prove that element. See California v. Carr, 204 Cal.
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App. 3d 774, 778 (Cal. App. 1988); California v. Banks, 348 P.2d
102 (Cal. 1959).
Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion by the
district court in admitting the immigration documents on which
Andaya-Penalosa admitted his prior conviction. United States v.
Rivera, 412 F.3d 562, 571 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Simpson, 910 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1990). Moreover, because he was
acquitted on the § 922(g)(1) charge, Andaya-Penalosa cannot show
that he was prejudiced by the admission of this evidence.
Next, Andaya-Penalosa contends that the district court
should have instructed the jury that, in determining the drug
quantity attributable to Andaya-Penalosa, they must determine the
quantity that was in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably
foreseeable to Andaya-Penalosa. Instead, the jury was instructed
to answer a special inquiry as to whether the conspiracy was
involved with five kilograms or more of cocaine. Andaya-Penalosa
contends that the failure to instruct the jury to find his personal
involvement was in violation of Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946), and United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d
304, 314 (4th Cir. 2005). Because he failed to raise this issue in
the district court, our review is for plain error. United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
Assuming, without deciding, that this was error and that
Andaya-Penalosa’s substantial rights were affected, in light of the
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overwhelming evidence of the drug quantities with which Andaya-
Penalosa was involved and his admission at sentencing that he was
responsible for at least five kilograms of cocaine, we decline to
exercise our discretion to notice the error. See United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633 (2002) (holding that sentence exceeding
maximum authorized by facts alleged in the indictment would not be
vacated on plain error review because evidence supporting judge-
found facts on which sentence was based was “overwhelming” and
“essentially uncontroverted”). As in Cotton, much of the evidence
implicating Andaya-Penalosa in the drug conspiracy revealed his
involvement with far more than five kilograms of cocaine;
additionally, he admitted to that amount. Thus, we decline to
recognize any error. See id. at 633.
The final issue Andaya-Penalosa raises is whether his
sentence was invalid in light of the failure to properly instruct
the jury. As stated above, we decline to recognize any error in
the determination of the sentencing parameters. Concerning the
imposition of a sentence within the statutory limits determined by
the jury, we find no error. Even without consideration of the
jury’s answer to the special inquiry, Andaya-Penalosa admitted that
he was accountable for five kilograms of cocaine. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (allowing sentencing range to
be increased based on admissions by defendant). This admission
placed Andaya-Penalosa in the statutory sentencing range of twenty
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years to life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). As permitted by Booker,
the district court then made the relevant factual findings within
this statutory range by a preponderance of the evidence. See
United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 71-72 (4th Cir. 2005),
petition for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. Apr. 10, 2006)
(No. 05-11378). The court ultimately sentenced Andaya-Penalosa
within the advisory guideline range of life imprisonment. This
sentence is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Green, 436
F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309(2006).
In conclusion, we affirm Andaya-Penalosa’s convictions
and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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