United States v. Singleton , 232 F. App'x 313 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4326
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JONATHON CRAIG SINGLETON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4533
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DEBBIE MARIE SINGLETON, a/k/a Debbie Marie
Wofford,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief District
Judge. (1:05-cr-00030-jpj-pm)
Submitted: June 4, 2007 Decided: July 9, 2007
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Evans D. Prieston, New York, New York; Michael A. Bragg, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellants. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney,
Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Jonathon and Debbie Singleton were convicted by a jury of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 500
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A); 846 (2000). The district
court sentenced Jonathon and Debbie Singleton to 360 months’ and 292
months’ imprisonment, respectively. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Jonathon Singleton contends the district court
abused its discretion in admitting Debbie Singleton’s hearsay
statements into evidence over defense objection. Mr. Singleton
argues that the district court’s ruling runs afoul of Fed. R. Evid.
403, 404(b), and 801(d)(2)(E). Debbie Singleton joins in Mr.
Singleton’s argument as it pertains to Rules 403 and 404(b). She
additionally contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
her conviction and that the district court erred in imposing its
sentence.
The Singletons contend that the district court erred by
admitting statements into evidence over defense objection. We review
a district court’s decision regarding the admission or exclusion of
evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lancaster, 96
F.3d 734, 744 (4th Cir. 1996). Such discretion is abused only when
a district court has acted “arbitrarily or irrationally.” United
States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, evidentiary rulings based on erroneous
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legal conclusions are “by definition an abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 1999).
Jonathon Singleton argues that Debbie Singleton’s
statements made on or about March 6, 2003 were not properly admitted
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because they were made prior to the existence
of the conspiracy.
To admit evidence as a co-conspirator’s
statement [under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)], a court
must conclude (1) that there was a conspiracy
involving the declarant and the party against
whom the admission of the evidence is sought and
(2) that the statements at issue were made
during the course of and in furtherance of that
conspiracy.
United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1992). The
government bears the burden of establishing these elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901,
905 (4th Cir. 1996).
In the instant case, the indictment charged that the
conspiracy began on or about March 6, 2003. Prior to the admission
of the statements at issue, the Government presented the testimony of
Lonnie Crigger. He testified as to the identities of the
co-conspirators, including the Singletons, and their respective roles
in the conspiracy. The Government offered various Western Union wire
transfer documents into evidence, confirming Crigger’s testimony that
he sent money to the Singletons via an intermediary—Roger Oxford.
Though the earliest document was dated April 2, 2003, it is clear
from the testimony that plans between Crigger and Oxford as well as
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Oxford and the Singletons were made prior to this date. It was in
this context that narcotics detective Robert Lincoln testified to Ms.
Singleton’s statements, establishing that the Singletons actively
sought a supplier in furtherance of their plan to distribute
methamphetamine. As the Government established the requisite
elements by a preponderance of the evidence, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Debbie
Singleton’s statements against Jonathon Singleton under Rule
801(d)(2)(E).
Additionally, both Jonathon and Debbie Singleton argue that
Detective Lincoln’s testimony was improper Rule 404(b) evidence and
was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. We have broadly interpreted
Rule 404(b), holding that it “is an inclusive rule that allows
admission of evidence of other acts relevant to an issue at trial
except that which proves only criminal disposition.” United
States v. Watford, 894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir. 1990). “Evidence of
prior bad acts is admissible if it is (1) relevant to an issue other
than character, (2) necessary to show an essential part of the crime
or the context of the crime, and (3) reliable.” United States v.
Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1464 (4th Cir. 1995). Exclusion under Rule 403
is required “only in those instances where the trial judge believes
that there is a genuine risk that the emotions of the jury will be
excited to irrational behavior, and that this risk is
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disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.”
Id. at 1467 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The testimony at issue established the dynamic of the
relationship between the Singletons and illuminated the acts taken in
preparation of their plan to distribute methamphetamine. Such
testimony was therefore relevant to the offense charged. Further,
any danger of unfair prejudice was slight in view of the overwhelming
evidence of guilt. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
Debbie Singleton also contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support her conviction. To determine if there was
sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we consider whether,
taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We review both direct and
circumstantial evidence, and permit the “government the benefit of
all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982).
To prove conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
and to distribute a controlled substance, the government must
establish that: (1) two or more persons agreed to possess with intent
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to distribute and to distribute the substance; (2) the defendant knew
of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
became part of the conspiracy. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). A defendant may be convicted of
conspiracy without knowing all the conspiracy’s details, so long as
she joins the conspiracy understanding its unlawful nature and
willfully joins in the plan on at least one occasion. Id. at 858.
The evidence presented at trial established that Ms.
Singleton was an instrumental part of the conspiracy. She attempted
to secure a supplier, acted as intermediary between Mr. Singleton and
other co-conspirators, received funds, and mailed methamphetamine to
at least one distributor. Therefore, construing the facts in the
light most favorable to the Government, we conclude there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. To the extent Ms.
Singleton argues the Government’s case rested almost entirely on the
“seriously questionable” testimony of Teresa Nicks, it is not the
province of this court to second-guess the credibility determinations
of the factfinder. See United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60
(4th Cir. 1989).
Debbie Singleton finally contends that the district court
erred in imposing its sentence. She initially argues that the
district court’s refusal to grant her a role reduction under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2 (2005) was improper. She
asserts that there were other individuals involved in the criminal
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activity who were more culpable than herself. When reviewing the
district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review
findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo.
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006).
The district court denied Ms. Singleton’s request for a
role reduction. In doing so, the court determined that
[i]t’s clear from the evidence in this case that
[Ms. Singleton] was involved in this drug
conspiracy throughout at a very high degree.
[Ms. Singleton] dealt with those who dealt with
the conspiracy generally, she was involved in
the essential roles in the conspiracy in terms
of sale, packaging, transportation, receipt of
money for drugs, all of which she was involved
in.
Because the materials in the joint appendix support the district
court’s findings, we conclude that it was not clearly erroneous for
the court to refuse Ms. Singleton a role reduction.
Ms. Singleton also argues that the district court failed to
give proper weight to mitigating factors at sentencing. However, the
district court appropriately calculated the advisory guideline range
and considered it in conjunction with other relevant factors under
the Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). See United States v.
Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432-33 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2054 (2006). Ms. Singleton’s 292-month sentence, which is at the
lowest end of the applicable guideline range and below the statutory
maximum, is therefore presumptively reasonable. See Green, 436 F.3d
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at 457. Though the court concededly failed to explicitly discuss
§ 3553(a) factors on the record, we conclude it does not render Ms.
Singleton’s sentence unreasonable. See United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Requiring district courts to address
each factor on the record would . . . be an exercise in unproductive
repetition that would invite flyspecking on appeal.”).
We therefore affirm the judgments of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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