United States v. Anderson , 234 F. App'x 61 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5171
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DEWAYNE ANDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00120-MJP)
Submitted: July 24, 2007 Decided: July 26, 2007
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Langdon D. Long, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Claude Jendron, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dewayne Anderson entered a guilty plea to possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) (2000). He received a mandatory minimum
sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. Anderson’s counsel has filed
a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), concluding there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11 and whether Anderson’s sentence was reasonable. Anderson
filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing his prior state offense
for failure to stop for a blue light does not qualify as a
predicate offense in classifying him as an armed career criminal.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Counsel first questions whether the district court fully
complied with Rule 11, but identifies no error in the Rule 11
proceeding. Anderson did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea; therefore, his challenge to the adequacy
of the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. See United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). This
analysis requires the court to determine whether there was error,
whether the error was plain, and whether it affected the
defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 524. If a defendant
establishes these requirements, the court’s “discretion is
appropriately exercised only when failure to do so would result in
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a miscarriage of justice, such as when the defendant is actually
innocent or the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 555 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Our review of the record reveals that the district court
substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11. Though
the court did not advise Anderson that the answers he gave at the
hearing could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or
false statement as required by Rule 11(b)(1)(A), we conclude such
omission did not affect his substantial rights.
We also conclude the district court properly classified
Anderson as an armed career criminal and its imposition of the
mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000) was
reasonable. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). Anderson’s assertion
that his prior conviction for failure to stop for a blue light
cannot serve as a predicate offense for his armed career criminal
classification is meritless. See United States v. James, 337 F.3d
387, 391 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that failure to stop for a blue
light is a “violent felony” under armed career criminal statute
because it “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another”). We therefore find Anderson’s
sentence was reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Anderson’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Anderson, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If he requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Anderson. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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